SECURITY AND SOCIETY IN NIGERIA

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Foreword

Nigeria has been plagued by the worsening multidimensional and intractable security problem over the past three decades. Although the manifestations of crime and disorder in the country varied over the period, they consistently caused significant concern to the government and her citizens. Since the return to Civil Rule two decades ago in 1999, incidence of violent conflicts among and between ethnic, religious and other groups significantly increased, resulting in the killing of thousands of people. Insurgency by ethnic, religious and regional militias emerged in different parts of the country. The militias and criminal gangs killed, maimed and kidnapped thousands of citizens. They were involved in the destruction of properties, including critical national assets. The emergence of *Boko Haram* terrorists in the North-East region of the country in 2009 and their activities in several states within and outside the region, especially Abuja, Jos, Kano and Bauchi have claimed tens of thousands lives and displacement of more than two million citizens.

In addition to the insecurity arising from violent conflicts, insurgency and terrorism, there was increasing incidence of several serious crimes. Some of the crimes include kidnapping, armed robbery, sexual exploitation and violence, murder and assault. There was also growing incidence of several transnational organized crimes like human, drug and arms trafficking; corruption and money-laundering, illicit financial transactions, cybercrimes and smuggling. Across the country, there is widespread fear of insecurity with adverse impact on economic activities and political stability. Insecurity eroded trust and cooperation between individuals and groups.

The country's security problems are compounded by serious inadequacies within the security and criminal justice agencies. They are ineffective due to toxic political, socio-economic and working environment. Absence of clearly-articulated national security philosophy, policies and strategies meant that the security and criminal justice organizations lack goals and direction. Further, the agencies are poorly resourced. Their personnel are poorly trained and remunerated. Leadership is weak and often lack required knowledge for effective security management. Absence of

effective coordination of the agencies often results to inter-agency antagonism and mutual subversion. The poor relationship between the citizens and security agencies further compound the ineffectiveness of law enforcement and intelligence organizations in the country.

These adverse conditions associated with insecurity underscores the strong relationship between security and development. The two conditions are mutually reinforcing. It is not a coincidence that insecurity in the country is most intense when there is economic crisis and mismanagement resulting in widespread deprivation, despair and inequalities. Without security, there can be no development and conversely, without development, there can be no sustainable security. From a governance perspective, the primary responsibility of a government is to guarantee security and development. Citizens have primary responsibility for ensuring that their actions do not undermine conditions for safety, trust and productivity in the country.

Corruption is a critical source of the multidimensional manifestations of insecurity in the country. The struggle to control the apparatuses of the state and use them to loot the public asset and suppress opposition to bad governance foster antagonistic competition among classes, politicians, ethnic and religious groups. Widespread corruption undermines credible election and erodes the legitimacy and capacity of the government to deliver services to the citizens. Deprivations resulting from bad governance, poor service delivery and gross inequality precipitated by corruption predisposes a significant proportion of the population to violence and crime.

Successive governments introduced different mechanisms, laws and agencies to tackle worsening state of insecurity without significant results. The growing problem of insecurity in the country is an effect of crisis of governance that manifests as lack of capacity, weak institutions, and impunity. Because of these inadequacies, economic well-being and social security of citizens are compromised resulting in predisposition to criminal activities. A major problem with efforts of government toward solving the problem of insecurity is the adoption of repressive mechanisms which are generally expensive and ineffective compared to proactive measures aimed at preventing crimes and disorder that

are mainstreamed into national and sub-national socioeconomic and political development planning and strategies.

The complex factors responsible for insecurity in the country have not been rigorously theorized and researched by scholars. Politicians deploy 'political conspiracy theories' to explain the country's insecurity challenges and constraints to address them. Paradoxically, academics often employ the same explanations because requisite conditions for innovative and rigorous scholarship have been progressively eroded since the 1980s. There is a general lack of rigorous research on different crimes and manifestations of insecurity within Nigeria. There is a dearth of publications on the subject and many of those available are highly opinionated without theoretical and empirical grounding. There is an urgent need for knowledge production and dissemination relevant to understanding and solving the country's crime and insecurity challenges.

The articles in this book discussed the sources, patterns and effects of crime and insecurity in the country. Different types of crime and insecurity were analysed by the authors. Crimes and disorder discussed in the book include youth deviance, smuggling, maritime insecurity and terrorism. Some of the contributors offered prescriptions for improving the criminal justice system and other measures to enhance security in the country.

Contributions in this book provide insight into the social, political and economic sources of the country's security problems and the constraints in solving them. Rational socio-economic policies that enhance human development and security provide sustainable solutions to problems of crimes and insecurity. The book contributes to the understanding of the problems of crimes in Nigeria and how they can be tackled with discernible effectiveness. Therefore, the book is recommended to students, policy makers and general readers.

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Introduction

The issue of security is clearly stated in the Nigerian constitution as a basic responsibility of the government. Section 14(2b) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, provides that the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government. It is instructive that security is tied to the issue of welfare – broadly defined in this work as embracing physical, social, economic and mental wellbeing.

Since independence, Nigeria has witnessed various levels of insecurity. Efforts made in fighting crime using brute force during the era of military rule did not significantly change the scenario, suggesting that socio-economic and related factors are crucial to providing answer to the insecurity question in Nigeria. In spite of current liberal democratic governance that commenced in 1999, insecurity has remained a huge challenge to the society. Governance institutions remain weak. A cursory observation indicates that insecurity seems to be worsening over the years with the increasing sophistication of criminality. The mutation of crime tends to keep security agents on their toes in a bid to catch up with the erudition and increasing sophistication of criminality.

The above can be illustrated with the case of Jamā'at ahl al-sunna li'l-da'wa wa'l-jihad popularly known as "*Boko Haram*" which emerged in 2002 as ethno-religious militant group torching and bombing important public facilities including the United Nations House in Abuja. It supported Al Qaida in 2010 and in 2015 took a recourse to insurgency when it pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The belief of the group that Westernisation is responsible for corruption, poverty, social injustice and other ills of society, made its members to consider Islamic jihad as the best way to remedy the situation. With the abduction of 276 school-girls from Chibok in April 2014, the group became notorious for various acts of insecurity such as bank robbery, cattle rustling, drug trafficking, extortion and kidnapping for ransom. Hence, *Boko Haram* was rated third on global terrorism index in 2018 and from a record low of 3.86 in 2002, Nigeria was rated 9.31 in 2015 in the terrorism index. The weak institutional capacity of the Nigerian state in providing for the

wellbeing of its citizens and controlling crime provided an atmosphere for crimes that generate insecurity in society.

Following from the above, most of the contributions to this book adopted a holistic perspective in their discussions which is traditional to sociological investigation. As the title of the book implies, society is conceptualized from the social systems perspective as consisting of community life woven around social institutions that ensure the wellbeing of the social actors. From this viewpoint, security is compromised when the institutions malfunction. Hence, discussions on security associate it with such undercurrents as poverty, institutional weakness, corruption, labour market underpinnings such as unemployment and related socio-economic deprivations.

This book comprises twelve chapters contributed by experts in the field. The contributions were made from various universities and institutions across the country. Chapter one focuses on the issue of restiveness of the Nigerian youth and its linkages with insecurity in the Nigerian society. Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa with one of the largest populations of youth in the world. While youth 16-24 years constitute about one third of the population, there is no impactful policy implemented by the Nigerian state with the view to meeting their aspirations. The author examines the trajectories of youth restiveness in Nigeria and traced it to labour market issues such as unemployment and poverty. The chapter also engages the development outcomes and policy pathways out of the quagmire.

Chapter two is concerned with the activities and consequences of *Boko Haram* insurgency on Nigeria. The authors argue that the dominantly military strategy adopted by the Nigerian Government has recorded limited success because crucial elements such as adequate provisioning of social goods has not been equally pursued. It recommends a quadruple action package involving military response, improved social services, conflict resolution initiatives and pacifism.

Chapter three of the book concentrates on community policing – viewed as an inevitable approach to insecurity in Nigeria. It opined that the economic, social and psychological costs of insecurity in the country has made the Nigerian society

distraught with low rating in the Global Terrorism Index. From the viewpoint of internal security, the paper discusses the Nigeria Police and its structure with a view to operationalizing its functions and effectiveness in the context of community policing. The operational challenges and prospects were pointedly discussed.

The fourth Chapter deals with the issue of kidnapping and the administration of justice in selected states in Nigeria. Tracing the occurrence of kidnapping historically the authors observe that the phenomenon has graduated from hostage taking of oil workers in the Niger Delta to becoming a threat that endangers the average Nigerian irrespective of position or status. The chapter discusses the different forms of kidnapping, their prevalence, the underlying causes, such as unemployment, greed, corruption, poor equipment of the police, decline in social values and the poverty of governance. It also discusses the legal loopholes associated with kidnapping and the challenges they pose for the administration of justice in Nigeria.

Chapter five interrogates the security question from the viewpoint of the maritime domain – which includes defence, commerce, fishing, seabed mineral resources, laws governing navigation and sea based transportation. These, among other factors, make the preservation of maritime security a critical issue to all the stakeholders in the maritime domain. The author undertakes a detailed discussion of the insecurity threats associated with the Nigerian maritime domain. They include sea robbery and piracy, human trafficking, kidnapping, illegal oil bunkering, drug trafficking, armed smuggling, dumping of toxic waste, environmental degradation and poaching. The impact of these on logistics – the demand and supply chain flows of the Nigerian economy were contextually and critically interrogated.

Chapter six is concerned with destructive entrepreneurship - economic endeavour that promote insecurity and endanger society. The author outlines the causes of insecurity in Nigeria but concentrates on the issue of unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship basically aimed at rent seeking without recourse to public interest. Using the case of arms dealing to drive the point, the author demonstrates how such endeavour hurt society and economy. Meanwhile, the conflict entrepreneurs become socially

famous and further use their position to manipulate conflicts in their own interest. The author utilizes data to provide evidence of the occurrences across Nigeria and made recommendations on how to deal with the challenges.

Chapter seven examines the role of mass media in conflict and security reporting. The author engages the Agenda Setting Theory to discuss the role of the "fourth estate of the realm" as watchdogs in a terror-afflicted society. It identifies the basic functions of the mass media and explains how they can be utilised in setting agenda for civil society engagement, swaying opinions and contributing to good governance in Nigeria. It highlights the need for the press to exercise discretion in communicating information that may have security implications - in order to moderate the negative effects on society. It also recommends a strategic collaboration of the mass media with security agencies for better synergy.

Chapter eight examines the activities of the police and the military in internal security *vis a vis* their expected roles. The author identifies gaps in police-military relations and discusses the effects on the performance of the security agencies within the prism of world best practices in internal security. Issues bothering on the conception of internal security by the Nigerian state, bounded roles for the police and the military and undue overlaps in the processing of security were discussed. This was done with a focus on the North East of Nigeria, where security of lives and property has been threatened by *Boko Haram* insurgency. The author also examined constitutional provisions for internal security on the basis of which he provided a road map for effective security operation by the agencies.

The author in chapter nine engages with the issue of gender-based violence as an aspect of human security. It utilises the Gender Policy in Nigeria as a framework to interrogate the problem and the progress made in alleviating the problem. Aspects of gender-based violence discussed include female genital mutilation, domestic violence, girls/women trafficking, widowhood rites, and sexual violence. It also identifies some gender discriminatory provisions in the Nigerian Constitution considered inimical to the human development of the females and stressed the need for the amendments.

Discussions in chapter ten are focused on the implications of high population growth for security in Nigeria. The chapter highlights the factors associated with the rapid population trend in the country and linked it with rapid urbanization that lowers socio-economic opportunities for well-being. The author stressed the view that scarcity of resources arising from the above scenario leads to conflicts and exacerbates insecurity in the society. The paper alluded to official regulation of population growth and population education of young adults in school as a means of population control.

The eleventh chapter of the book discusses the issue of education as an important aspect of security. The chapter is an exploration of the concept of the security-insecurity continuum anchored on education and going beyond surface manifestations to root-cause propellers of insecurity. It explored an analytical model that demonstrates how best the nation can meaningfully invest in a genuine education enterprise, the very striking return of which would be an enhanced national capacity for creating an enabling environment in which security would thrive. The author outlines political, social, economic and technical bubbles underlying security challenges - as applicable in Nigeria. He emphasised that a neglect of all or any combination of the stated factors would lead to a condition of bubble burst, as a result of which the society experiences an atmosphere of insecurity.

In chapter twelve, the author established an unusual link between security and spirituality. He emphasises that security should embrace the trio of physical, mental and spiritual realms. He provided examples from various African countries such as Zambia, Burundi, Tanzania, Liberia and Cameroon and Nigeria to illustrate the power of rituals and charms in promoting criminal acts. These include the remote control processes employed by "Yahoo boys" in the execution of advanced fee fraud. He emphasises the need to upgrade the extant laws and crime investigation system to embrace the perspective.

1

Youth Restiveness, National Security and Development in Nigeria

Olayinka Akanle

Introduction

Development is the most critical need of all human societies. When issues occur and people react negatively, it is because of the negative implications such issues may have on development. When people commend and support a government and regime, it is because such government is perceived as pro-development to the extent that the government guarantees peace and security of lives and properties, provides an environment that guarantees decent life; and provides stable systems that protect sustainable human capacity and empowerment. These are systems that protect national security and ensure societal survival. For development to be possible, there must be a significant measure of practical peace and national security realization (Orji 2011). Once conflict becomes endemic and national security is threatened, the possibility of development becomes endangered and unlikely. This is why it has become realized that extensive minimization of conflict and restiveness is imperative for development (World Youth Report 2003).

Nigeria is commonly described as underdeveloped, conflict ridden and fragile due to the ascendancy of restiveness and near conflict institutionalization. There is no region of the country that has not experienced full blown conflict in the recent times. In fact, in all regions of the country, it is either there is a violent conflict going on or one has just subsided or one is about to erupt. Consequences of conflict, destruction of lives and property, have become so much of a common place that Nigerians are nearly no longer shocked when reports of hundreds of human deaths are reported in the media. In the country today, one is only waiting for the next report of deaths and kidnapping in any part. Restiveness has become so normal that absence of it is abnormal in Nigeria.

From the Niger Delta conflict to the Oodua in the West to the Movement for the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) in the East, Arewa in the North and now *Boko Haram* in the North (see Abolurin 2012a and Amaraegbu 2011), restiveness and its consequences are endemic in the country (see also, Ojua, Etuk and Asu 2012 and Akpan 2010).

Nigeria only enjoys relative peace, and youths are central to the current high spate of restiveness and conflict in Nigeria (Akanle and Oladosu 2010). The youths form the basic and major *armies* perpetrating and driving conflict across the country (see also Abolurin 2011). These, mostly, are people aged 18-35 (National Youth Policy 2009). Youths are targeted on two fronts during conflict in Nigeria; for recruitment and to be attacked. The youths in Nigeria today confront many challenges that are not their making (see Akanle and Oladosu 2010). According to Chukuemeka and Agbara (2010), human society is nothing but a complex entity. This is truer relative to the youths in Nigeria. Nigerian youths find themselves in a very complex nation of Nigeria and most times find it very difficult to navigate these complexities and often become trapped in the complex systems. Nigeria is complex and layered relative to ethnicity, resource distribution, wealth flow, class dynamics and general socio-economic structure that predates the existence of the youths. The complex national structures are dangerous recipes for conflict and when they erupt like socio-cultural and political volcanoes manifested in conflict, the youths are caught in the middle. They experience conflict, fight within conflict for survival and bear the consequences conflict.

According to Ogbonnaya (2011), individuals and groups have their own complexities, needs, aspirations, hopes, goals, views, opinions and values which could be social, economic, religious, psychological and political. Against this background, youths operate within the characteristics elucidated above by Ogbonnaya (2011) and this is why they are easily used and attacked during conflicts. Nigerian youths today are beclouded. Their hopes and aspirations are endangered just as their values are affected and adulterated and constantly in a state of flux due to globalization, westernization, modernization, complicated history and internal

national dynamics, culture and political high-handedness often displayed in corruption and governance irresponsibility (see also Abolurin 2012a; Abolurin 2012b; Muhammad 2011; Oyedolapo 2010; Omobowale and Olutayo 2005; Abudah 2004; Ifidon 1999 and Coleman 1996). The youths are thus trapped in restiveness and conflicts that are motivated by issues that predate their existence. They are thus the drivers and victims of a social reality that is so layered, diverse and dynamic. They themselves can hardly comprehend yet they are involved. It is against this backdrop that this chapter succinctly pragmatically engages the contours of Nigerian restiveness and conflict domains and the national security and development implications.

Youth Unemployment, Poverty and Restiveness in Nigeria
The youths form a major proportion of the Nigerian population with about 20 percent of the population (National Youth Policy 2009). Thus, the number of youths in Nigeria can never be ignored. They are many and very energetic. They are the force that drives the country and the barometer with which the dimension of development and occurrences in the country can be gauged. The youths are full of ideas, dreams and aspirations and once these are endangered their innovativeness must certainly come into play. This is more so in the age of globalization and Information Communication Technologies (ICTs). They are exposed to ideas across the world and can circulate these ideas with the greatest ease and at cheapest cost. Social media platforms like the *twitter, instagram, wattsap, facebook, yahoo group* and so on with *blackberry,* commonly called *BB* among Nigerian youths, come handy for ambitious knowledge gathering and information dissemination among the youths (see also Akanle 2011 and Owasanoye and Akanle 2010).

Ambitions, dreams, ideas, goals and energy can either be assets or agents of destruction among the youths when they correlate with ICTs. They are easily exposed to desired lifestyles across the world and can share information about threats to and enablers of their dreams. Once their dreams and aspirations are threatened, they will certainly retire to the innovative selves to salvage their dreams and these include participation in restiveness once it meets their needs.

This scenario is well captured in the *Merton's Paradigm of Deviant Behaviour* as demonstrated in the Matrix below.

Table 1.1: The Merton's Paradigm of Deviant Behaviour

Attitude to Goals	Attitude to Means	Modes of adaptation
Accept	Accept	Conformity
Accept	Reject	Innovation
Reject	Accept	Ritualism
Reject	Reject	Retreatism
Reject/accept	Reject/accept	Rebellion

Source: Robert K. Merton, Social Structure and Anomie. *American Sociological Review*, 3 (October 1938): Pp. 672–82.

According to the Matrix, in the Mertonian Order of Anomie Explanation, the youths have goals they want to achieve as ambitious people and there are both legitimate and illegitimate means toward achieving the goals. Depending on the degree of congruity and incongruity of the goals and means however, the youths will adapt through certain modes. For instance, when the youths accept their goals and the means set by the society, they adapt by conforming. When they accept their goals and reject the means set by the society, if they perceive the means as dangerous to the achievement of their goals, they *innovate suitable means* even if the innovations conflict with the societal dictates. This could be through restiveness and conflict. When they reject goals and accept means, they fall into ritualism and just follow rules as a routine/ritual. When they reject goals and means, they retreat and when the last is the case as shown in Row 6 of the Matrix, they fall into rebellion. Of all the categories, the most expected in the society is the conformity for peace and stability to reign but other situations are also common and they can lead to restiveness and conflict as well as social change just as they can lead to revolution.

This is why it has been documented that at least 90-95 percent of active actors in Conflict in Nigeria are Youth (Idoko 2007). Nobody or groups perceive his/her/their life chances threatened or compromised and remain inactive. Thus, in a nation with *youth bulge,* massive youth unemployment and poverty, youth restiveness ascendancy is thus predictable and nearly normal and

self fulfilling prophesy. Youth restiveness is thus usually inflicted on the Nigerian people by the Nigerian political class.

The political system in Nigeria can be best described as dysfunctional and anti-youth. There is huge cynicism and scepticism relative to youths and adults (especially political class) relations. The social relations that exist between the political class and the youths is that of mistrust and distrust as the political class see the youths as anti-social just as the youths see the political class and adults as non-chalant to the plights of the youth. It is thus possible for many youths to even see promotion of restiveness and conflict as survival strategy and economic opportunity in an irresponsible state. Youth unemployment is very high in Nigeria. The unemployment rate in Nigeria as at the latest figure in 2011 is 21 percent and the nation is 166 by global comparison[1] meaning Nigeria is among the nations with highest level of unemployment. More importantly, most of the unemployed people in Nigeria are the youths. The national unemployment average by age group in Nigeria is in the region of 90.4 percent for Nigerians 15-44 years of age (National Population Commission 2013). This has made the youths to experience high level of poverty since the immediate and the most practical outcome of unemployment is poverty and systematic disempowerment. Poverty has increased consistently in Nigeria and the youths have not been spared.

Table 1.2: Relative Poverty Headcount in Nigeria from 1980-2011

Year	Poverty Incidence (%)	Estimated Population (Million)	Population in Poverty (Million)
1980	27.2	65	17.1
1985	46.3	75	34.7
1992	42.7	91.5	39.2
1996	65.6	102.3	67.1
2004	54.4	126.3	68.7
2010	69.0	163	112.47

Source: Nigeria Poverty Profile, 2010.

According to the table 1.2 above, Nigeria's poverty rate was 69 percent as at 2010, a higher percentage against the 54 percent for 2004. Based on other data released in the profile[2], the North-West

and North-East geo-political zones had the highest incidence of poverty rates in the country with 77.7 percent and 76.3 percent respectively. The South-West geo-political zone had the lowest poverty incidence rate with 59.1 percent. Among the states from the North-West and North-East geo-political zones, Sokoto had the highest poverty rate with 86.4 percent in 2010 against 95 percent recorded by Jigawa in 2004. Niger had the lowest with 43.6 percent in 2010 against 22 percent recorded by Anambra in 2004. Nigerians, who had minimal standards of foods, clothing, healthcare and shelter stood at 60.9 percent in 2010 as against 54.7 percent recorded in 2004.

Of all geo-political zones, the North-West and North-East recorded the highest incidence of poverty with 70 percent and 69 percent respectively, while the South-West had the least at 49.8 percent. Sokoto had the poverty rate at 81.2 percent, while Niger had the least at 33.8 percent during the review period. Generally however, 93.9 percent of Nigerians considered themselves to be poor in 2010 against 75.5 percent recorded in 2004. This shows the social reality and social psychology of poverty as the thing of the mind with huge practical capacity to influence actions. Relative to restiveness, it will certainly influence actions negatively in manners that could be termed socio-behavioural consequences of poverty as manifested in restive actions. The Federal Capital Territory (FCT) with 97.9 percent had the highest number of people with self confession of poverty, while Kaduna with 90.50 percent, had the least number of people who considered themselves poor. Also, the income inequality in the country as measured by the Gini-Coefficient increased from 0.429 in 2004 to 0.447 in 2010. In the contemporary terms, it is possible to observe a strong link between poverty and perpetration and involvement in restiveness and conflict. Northern Nigeria, according to the poverty distribution data above, has the most predominance of poverty incidence. When one then considers the fact that the northern Nigeria is the epicentre of *the Boko Haram* insurgency in Nigeria, the unemployment and poverty implications and explanations for restiveness and conflict may then be understandable and sustainable after all.

The Youth and National Security in Nigeria

If Nigeria will ever be secured, the place of the youths can never be trivialized against the background of the youth parameters and characteristics already demonstrated above. Moreover, the youths are the sustainable vanguard of the nation and tomorrow's leaders. They are thus the conscience of the nation and sight of the country. Any nation that underestimates the capacity of its youths in quest for national security will soon become history. There is thus the need for sustainable understanding and appropriation of the youth's capacity if Nigeria is to ever be secured and develop. National security provides the enabling environment for development (Orji 2011). For people and resources to be sustainably mobilized and deployed for national development, there must be a strong sense of security within the nation.

Local and external aggressions must be seen to have been checkmated. No investor will invest in a nation seen to be insecure and constantly under threat, this is why nations, especially developed ones, spend huge amount of money to secure their nations and deploy ideological apparatuses especially the media to create both real, imagine and managed impressionistic sense of security in their nations and any appearance of insecurity is dealt with decisively. A case in point is that of September 11, 2001 attack of America. 10 years after the attack, the United States was still able to track down and destroyed the mastermind. For an average American, even if Obama has not done much, he has restored the sense of American invincibility and superiority in terms of national security capabilities and protection of the America people. It is nearly a security axiom today that America will destroy a whole nation to safe an American.

National security covers both the protection and vulnerability of the territorial integrity of nations. It is however more encompassing to include international perceptions and national socio-structural arrangement of the nation that could affect peace and stability of the people and the nation. This is why national security can be best described as the capacity of a nation to safeguard its internal and external physical environments, and at the same time protect its internal social structure for peace

assurance and for sustainable development galvanization. This description thus interconnects with the importance of the external environment and internal systems. It also demonstrates the fact that national security is not only about boundaries but also none tangible and none geographical entities that make up the nation. It also demonstrates the fact that national security maintenance is not only about military actions but all other socio-cultural, economic and political activities that can enable the achievement of peace and security for growth and development through stability.

National security achievement thus must be systematic and not unnecessarily violent as has been the case in Nigeria. To achieve national security also, preventive actions must be attended to rather than curative, combative and reactive actions which, most of the time, are destructive and aggravate occurrences of conflicts and institutionalize them. National security is thus very critical for development and all machineries must be put in place to guarantee it for without it development can never be achieved and the real sense and real worth of the nation will ultimately be traded off. This is not however to assume a simplistic and teleological as well as lineal explanation of the nexus of national security and development. In other words, this is not to suggest that peace and national security will always equal development but the fact is that the trajectories and dynamics of the nexus of national security and development must be constantly interrogated and understood, prevented from threat and appreciated and youth are very important in this regard.

For the youths to function effectively for national security, they must be effectively empowered and re-orientated. Negative outcomes of involvement in conflict must be made known to them and the need to embrace peace and have positive view of life must be well inculcated into them. This must start from the homefront as charity begins at home. The education sector must be made more functional to enable a well-trained youth that could compete internationally. Since they are well exposed through ICTs, if they are sure of having competitive capacity that can compete globally, their propensity for restiveness and conflict may reduce as they are more likely to support the system that has empowered them. As at

now however, it is impossible to maintain that the education system in Nigeria is very functional. Graduates from the Nigerian higher institutions are constantly described as either *half baked* or *outrightly unbaked.* This is largely because the outputs from graduates of Nigerian higher institutions have been found to be below international peers. Common explanations for this are that the schools are frequently on strike and when they are on for business facilities are poorly available.

Hence, many Nigerian youths are not sure of employment after graduation. This is because there has been a huge disconnect between the education sector and the economy. While the education sector has expanded considerably[3], the same has not been the case at the economic system which has actually contracted. The Nigerian education system is mostly seen as more dysfunctional than functional. It is also usually considered, internationally, as sub-standard in terms of quantity and quality (see also Igbanibo 2011). Moreover, existing companies are relocating in droves to neighbouring West African countries due to high level of insecurity and paucity of infrastructures, especially electricity, in the country[4] while new ones do not even bother to come into the country to invest as they see the country as unsafe for businesses, lives and properties and the government has not demonstrated sufficient will power and capacities to provide the material and security infrastructures. Many developed nations have actually warned their nationals against visiting Nigeria let alone investing in the country and they have labelled the country as *high risk* and *unsafe* only waiting for appropriate time to label it *terrorist nation* which many are in the process of doing finally. Also, for the little available jobs in the country, many multinationals and even indigenous companies prefer to employ expatriates and Nigerians with foreign certificates instead of graduates of Nigerian universities for fear they were not properly trained and that they are *half baked.*

Once the youths and their life chances are portrayed in negative light and endangered, the tendency for them is to be reactive and become indifferent to activities that could secure the nation as they become detached and struggle for survival since they will see ends

as justifying the means. This is also why many youths engage in cybercrimes popularly known as *yahoo yahoo* in the country regardless of the backlash on the nation even when they know the negative socio-economic and diplomatic implications on the country. As far as they are concerned, this is how they can survive in a nation that does not care about their existence as they suffer in the midst of plenty and witness opulence and corruption in the face of their own poverty.

Concluding Remarks

Youth restiveness is no doubt a major challenge to development in Nigeria today. If Nigeria will experience development, there is a need for peace and stability. No development can exist and thrive in the midst of conflict. From the foregoing analysis, it could be inferred that injustice and negative governance parameters are strongly implicated in the restive situations of the country. This is also why peace and settlement of the conflicts in Nigeria have been in futility. Even huge investment in security apparatuses in the country has not yielded much positive results.

For sustainable peace, stability and development within the context of a secured nation to be achievable in Nigeria, participatory governance must be instituted. Equity must be institutionalized and responsible governance is necessary. A situation where the few enjoy the wealth of the nation and the majority suffer will not bring peace and stability in the long run. The youths are more in poverty and this must be reversed otherwise Nigeria will continue to witness restiveness, sit on time bomb and toy with nuclear weapon of mass destruction.

The northerners are also experiencing poverty more than other regions and this must be attended to urgently if there is to be peace in that region and the nation at large as *the Boko Haram* insurgents are now beginning to move down South. The investment profile of Nigeria is beginning to shrink as youths' perpetration of kidnapping increases in the South East and Niger Delta and *Boko Haram* insurgency accentuates. The time for all inclusive development policy formulation and implementation is now! The youths are Nigerians. Let them be brought on board and given

leadership roles. Let them see their generation in leadership roles perhaps they could have renewed hopes and be mentored by their peers. The period of *monkey dey work baboon dey chop should be over.* The youths today are more innovative, more daring and could be more destructive than ever imagined. Thus, it is only positive moves devoid of politics that could guarantee national security and stem the tide of conflict and restiveness been driven by the poor youths of Nigeria. And this is only when meaningful development can be seen in the country. A stitch in time saves nine and a word is sufficient for the wise. So the agelong wise sayings go before it is too late.

Notes

[1] *https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni-.html.* Accessed 22nd Aug., 2012.

[2] Please see also *http://www.nigeriadailynews.com/general/29401-nigeria-poverty-profile-report-indicates-93-9-nigerians-are-poor.html.* Accessed 22 August, 2012.

[3] This is partly due to the deregulation of the education sector up to university level in Nigeria.

[4] Cases abound but a few are Shell, Dunlop, Michelin, and Unilever.

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2

Towards Mitigating *Boko Haram* Terrorist Insurgence in Nigeria: The Need for Quadruple Action Strategy

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Introduction

Today's world is characterized by rising cases of violent crimes affecting many countries. The situation constitutes a very worrisome development to the global community. Regrettably, terrorism has taken the centre-stage in the global upsurge of violent crimes. Over the past decade, different forms of domestic and international terrorism have been witnessed around the world (Bergeseen and Lizzardo 2004; Lutz and Lutz 2008).

Nigeria on its part has been attacked severally by the dreaded *Boko Haram* terrorist group with tremendous casualties. The upsurge of terrorist activities in Nigeria has not only caught international attention, but has also exposed inherent conflict tradition which Nnoli (1978, 2012) had lamented to characterize intergroup social relationships in the country over the years. Obiajulu (2011) observes that such conflict situations in Nigeria manifests as struggle over values, claims to status, power and scarce resources, in which the aims of the opposing parties are not only to gain the desired values, but also to neutralize, injure or eliminate rivals.

In addition, Nigeria has also had a chequered history of conflict situations such as civil war, inter and intra ethnic conflicts, religious conflicts among others (Nnoli 1978; Olawale 1998). On his part, Elaigwu (2005) reported that between 1980 and 2004, there were 145 cases of violent conflicts in Nigeria. Unfortunately, at the end of these calamities, Nigerians and particularly the government do not commit adequate efforts to understand the causes of those conflict situations, douse all tensions, reconcile all

parties and proffer lasting solutions. This is in order to avoid its recurrence. This failure, keeps fermenting and brewing grievances until it culminates to another violent scale.

The tendency of not getting to the root of conflict situations and fully resolving it is a major reason for emergence of social tensions which often degenerate to horrendous heights such as terrorism/insurgency (Premium Times 2014). For instance, inter-religious conflicts in Nigeria that started in the North-Eastern region, dating back to about 1953 has dragged till date only changing in scope and intensity. Unfortunately, not much was done by the government in each case to end it effectively. Consequently, the Northeast geo-political zone of Nigeria has continued to experience rampant cases of ethno-religious conflict resulting in blood-letting and death of Nigerians. This situation has ultimately contributed in the springing up of the *Boko Haram* terrorist sect, worst felt and still devastating the Northeast region of Nigeria.

The concept of terrorism has been approached or defined by scholars from diverse perspectives. However, irrespective of mode of conceptualization of terrorism, groups and individuals who carry out acts of terrorism often fall into either traditional state-sponsored or non-state armed actors.

Given enormous consequences arising from terrorism, its prevention and elimination requires a host of traditional means (policing, military, economic sanctions, intelligence) and non-traditional means (cultural, social and development initiatives including peace and conflict resolution options). Nigeria is currently applying some of the above-mentioned strategies, but peace and conflict resolution option is yet to be adequately explored.

To this end, two major objectives are central to this paper. First is to examine activities and consequences of *Boko Haram* insurgency on Nigeria over the past five years. The second objective is to recommend effective strategies anchored on peace and conflict resolution initiatives inclusive of pacifism to complement other measures towards ending *Boko Haram* insurgency in Nigeria.

Conceptualizing Terrorism, Terrorist Orientations and Insurgency

The phenomenon of terrorism has lacked widely-accepted definition. Over the years, it has been conceptualized differently by scholars like Tilly (2004), Victoroff (2005), Bergeseen and Lizzardo (2004) among others. In particular, Tilly (2004) had argued that the terms terror, terrorism, and terrorists do not identify casually coherent and distinct social phenomena but strategies that recur across a wide variety of actors and political situations. He further argued that social scientists who reify the terms confuse themselves and render disservice to public discussion. This is more so when United States Government's own catalogs of terrorist events, according to Tilly (2004), are actually in support of the claims or views he had expressed.

In view of the above, Angus Martin (2003) maintained that the international community has never succeeded in developing an accepted comprehensive definition of terrorism. Jeffrey Record (2003) opined that for the US Army, about 109 definitions of terrorism that covered a total of 22 different definitional elements have been used. Laquer (2001) also recounted over 100 definitions and concluded that attempts to define terrorism by the United Nations encountered difficulties due to differences in opinion between various member states. The controversy is usually about the relevance of use of violence in the context of conflicts over national liberation. This deadlock has delayed or made it impossible to conclude a comprehensive convention on international terrorism that incorporates a single, all-encompassing, legally-binding, criminal law definition of terrorism.

In his own reaction, Ruby (2002) argues that state actors in different climes use the concept of terrorism to refer to a wide variety of events, ranging from state oppression and killing of civilians, to shootings in public places by lone gunmen. Similarly, Victoroff (2005) concludes that terrorism is aggression against innocents, aimed largely at influencing a target audience to achieve essentially political goals.

On their part, Bergeseen and Lizarrdo (2004) stressed the need to ignore mere abstract explanations to terrorism without focusing

on the goals of such violent activities. To him, to do otherwise may obscure important variables that influence the development of terrorist groups and terrorist actions. In a similar disposition, Tilly (2004) added that a good definition of terrorism should be adapted from their goals which are to inflict, or spread a sense of terror or general psychological distress in their victims for politico-ideological purposes. He however cautions that focusing on the terror component alone as an essential feature of what actually defines terrorism may be theoretically misleading.

The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has condemned terrorist acts since 1994. The UNGA adopted a political description that has come to be finally accepted by some UN member countries to define terrorism. For the UN, terrorism refers to criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes that are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations; political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them (UN 1994).

On the other hand, Crenshaw (1988) and Hoffman (1998) described the features of terrorist orientations. To them, a terrorist's ideological perspective provides a set of beliefs about the external world that not only foster an identity around commitment to a course, but also shape expectations about the rewards of terrorism and dictate the extent to which the terrorists' goals are dependent on the cooperation of the authorities. Terrorists see their role as one of an extreme martyr figure who, in making an honourable sacrifice, would expect to receive both social recognition and rewards in the afterlife (Silke 2003). Accordingly, most terrorists feel that they are doing nothing wrong when they kill and injure people. They seem to share a feature of the psychological condition known as antisocial personality disorder or psychopathic personality disorder. This is reflected by an absence of empathy for the suffering of others. However, they do not appear unstable or mentally ill for this. A common feature is a type of thinking such as "I am good and right. You are bad and wrong." It is a very polarized thinking which allows them to distance themselves from

opponents and makes it easier for them to kill people. It is not the same kind of simplistic thinking one would expect from someone with low intelligence or moral development. Most terrorists are of above-average intelligence and have sophisticated ethical and moral development. A closed-minded certainty is a common feature of terrorist thinking (Merari 1990).

Irrespective of choice of definition, terrorism has been generally associated with features such as outlaws, insurgency, violent crimes, conflicts, guerrilla warfare, organized crime, militancy, armed rebellion, extremism, deviants from rules and conventions, use of political violence among others.

This study adopts an all embracing and integrated perspective of terrorism. Such approach harnesses crucial elements or manifestations of terrorism contained in various definitions of the concept as reviewed above. The approach is also relevant to fuller understanding and comprehensive articulation of strategies for effective resolution of the phenomenon of terrorism in any social system. An integrated approach to conceptualizing terrorism ensures that no essential terrorist aspect, actions, strategies, or types of non-state organizations that engage in terrorism and terrorist actors themselves is missed out. Notable longstanding local and regional conflicts linked to terror activities and violent crimes in some parts of the world include the Israeli-Palestinian, Iraqi, Afghan, Yemeni, Somali, Indian-Pakistani, Chechen, and most recently Nigeria and the Israeli-Gaza conflicts (Chiduluemije 2014).

It is noteworthy that not all rebellions are insurgencies. Non-violent rebellions are known to use other strategies like civil resistance to achieve their goals. Recent examples are the revolution in Philippines around the 1980's which ousted President Marcos and the Egyptian revolution of 2011. Insurgency is an armed rebellion against a constituted authority recognized as such by other nations mostly United Nations, whereas the other party taking part in such rebellion are not recognized.

The nature of insurgency emphasizes the fact that the rebels' course is illegitimate as is the case of *Boko Haram* in Nigeria. However, there is also the possibility that those insurgents (*Boko*

Haram group) see the authority itself as illegitimate. United Nations contended that an insurgency can be fought via counter-terrorism (counter-insurgency). There should be put in place, measures to protect the population as well as political and economic actions aimed at undermining the insurgents' claims against the incumbent regime.

Overview of the Role of 'Peace' and 'Creation of Peace-Building Platforms' in Nation States as Panacea for Sustainable Development

The term peace refers to occurrence of harmony characterized by lack of violence, conflict behaviours and the freedom from fear of violence. It is commonly understood as the absence of *hostility* and *retribution*, and suggests sincere attempts at *reconciliation*, the existence of healthy or newly healed *interpersonal* or *international relationships*. Peace also underscores prosperity in matters of social or economic welfare, the establishment of equality, and a working political order that serves the true interests of all. Many terms have been associated with the concept of peace such as peacemaking, peace-building, peacekeeping, conflict resolution etc.

Peacemaking involves stopping an ongoing conflict, whereas peace-building happens before a conflict starts or once it ends. *Peacekeeping* prevents the resumption of fighting following a conflict; it does not address the underlying causes of violence or work to create societal change, as peace-building does. It also differs from peace-building in that it only occurs after conflict ends, not before it begins. Furthermore, the perception of peacekeeping versus that of peace-enforcement is very different. Peace-enforcement requires more than just the perception of security, but also that of compassion and understanding. Peacekeeping operates under a simple premise, prevent violence. Peace-enforcement must maneuvre itself and support restorative justice operations, contribute to the reconciliation process, support and protect the truth-commissions, etc

Peace-building is an approach or a set of interrelated efforts that support peace. It addresses the underlying causes of violence

and works to create societal change. Although peace-building includes pre-conflict interventions, in practice most peace-building interventions are usually post-conflict interventions.

The *UN Secretary-General's* Policy Committee (2007), defined peace-building as a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of conflict. It involves strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and lays foundations for sustainable peace and development. It is an intervention that is designed to prevent the start or resumption of violent conflict by creating sustainable peace.

Peace-building includes a wide range of efforts by diverse actors in government and civil society at the community, national and international levels to address the root causes of violence and ensure civilians have freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom from humiliation before, during, and after violent conflict. The process of peace-building stabilizes society politically and socioeconomically.

There are two broad approaches to peace-building. First, peace-building can refer to *direct work* that intentionally focuses on addressing the factors driving or mitigating conflict. Here, there is an explicit attempt to reduce structural or direct conflict. Second, the term peace-building can also refer to efforts to coordinate a multi-level, multi-sectoral strategy, including ensuring that there is funding and proper communication and coordination mechanisms between humanitarian assistance, development, governance, security, justice and other sectors that may not use the term "peace-building" to describe themselves.

Peace-building efforts aim to manage, mitigate, resolve and transform central aspects of the conflict through official diplomacy as well as through civil society peace processes and informal dialogue, negotiation, and mediation. Peace-building addresses economic, social and political root causes of violence and fosters reconciliation to prevent the return of structural and direct violence. Peace-building efforts aim to change beliefs, attitudes and behaviors to transform the short and long term dynamics between individuals and groups toward a more stable, peaceful coexistence.

During the 2005 World Summit, the United Nations began creating peace-building architecture based on Kofi Annan's previous proposals. She created UN Peace-building Commission in 2005; the UN Peace-building Support Office in 2005; and the UN Peace-building Fund in 2006. These three organizations enable the Secretary-General to coordinate the UN's peace-building efforts.

Nigeria as a conflict-ridden state stands to benefit from peace-building models. Its underlying strategies should be effectively utilized in Nigeria's conflict situations and to fully resolve the *Boko Haram* insurgence. Furthermore, to complement the goals of peace-building, Nigeria must adequately address social services, functional structures, emotional conditions, socio-political stability, rule of law etc.

Theoretical Framework
This study adopts Marxian Strand of Conflict Theory with emphasis on Class Conflict as a theoretical platform. The major concepts of the theory include class divisions, power, exploitation, struggle, inequality, alienation. The key assumption of the theory is that society is made up of groups that have opposing interests. Coercion and attempts to gain power are ever-present aspects of human relations. According to Marx, societies are divided into classes with unequal resources. Since such marked inequalities exist, there are divisions of interest which are 'built into' the social system. Divisions also arise between ethnic groups or political factions. Thus, conflict or tension becomes a regular feature of society groups because of presence of antagonistic groups. Against the above background, this study applies conflict theoretical framework to argue that:

(1)   Gross economic exploitation of the masses by the privileged political class (whether in or out of government) and marked inequality in access to resources of the Nigerian state constitute a major factor that stimulates forms of agitations against the privileged upper class and or the Nigerian state that they manage.

(2)   *Boko Haram* insurgency in Nigeria is offshoot of conflict within the political class (in and out of government)

generated by emerging divisions or political factions and conflicting interests.

(3) The political class manipulates other social divisions like ethno-religious cleavages to pursue their economic and political interest.

(4) The political class also takes advantage of inherent deprivation and poverty among peasant class to advance their interests. For instance, they use religious indoctrination and material inducements to mobilize members of the peasant class as foot soldiers of insurgency, in their struggle for political power. According to Ogunrotifa (2013), Mohammed Yusuf and his *Boko Haram* ideology found an echo and appeal within the rank of frustrated members of the peasant class in Northern Nigeria. He capitalized on their dwindling economic situation and the *Almajeri* system to attract large followership especially amongst the commoners (peasant class).

In view of above submissions, this study argues that attempts to fully understand and proffer solutions to *Boko Haram* insurgency in Nigeria, must not relegate class conflict, particularly among the political elites and issues of widespread poverty especially in northern Nigeria to the background.

Historical Perspectives on Insurgency in Nigeria
Insurgency is not new in Nigeria. According to Okumagba (2012), the first known insurgency or terrorism attempt in Nigeria could be credited to the movement to liberate the Niger Delta people led by Major Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro. On February 23, 1966, he declared the Niger Delta Republic and rebelled against the Federal Government. Their anger was on perceived exploitation and total disregard of the Niger/Delta region which is the major source of the nation's revenue.

Another case of insurgency in Nigeria was the attempt by the defunct Republic of Biafra to secede from Nigeria because of perceived marginalization (Nnoli 2012). The group led by late

Colonel Odimegwu Chukwuemeka Ojukwu declared the Republic of Biafra on 27th May, 1967. This action led to the Nigeria/Biafran war which Muzan (2014) described as the most brutal War witnessed in Africa.

More than thirty (30) years after the demise of Major Isaac Adaka Boro, there was a resurgence of the armed protest against both the federal government and the multinational companies engaged in oil exploration in the Niger Delta in the early 1990s. In the view of Osini (2013), the insurgency led by Ken Saro-Wiwa seem to decidedly unfocused as it targeted oil companies, the government and even the chieftains and their middle men.

After Ken Saro-Wiwa was killed, it resulted into a full-fledged insurgency that led to the death of many people and loss of properties. The leaders of the resulting two groups—Ateke Tom and Alhaji Mujaheed Asari Dokubo declared war on the federal government. The insurgency lasted for months before the then president, Olusegun Obasanjo used military force to silence majority of them. Finally, President Umaru Musa Yaradua employed dialogue and granted amnesty to the militants to arrest the situation (Okumagba 2012).

The latest insurgency in Nigeria is the *Jama'atu Ahlil Sunna Lidawati Wal Jihad* popularly known as *Boko Haram*. It is without doubt, the most sophisticated and complex insurgency Nigeria has ever experienced. *Boko Haram* has brought about heightened tension, anxiety and a sense of insecurity in Nigeria.

Boko Haram Terrorist Insurgence in Nigeria: Background Issues, Violent Attacks and their Effects on Nigerians

When Nigeria was amalgamated in 1914, the North and the newly created country then had been largely Muslim (with a pagan minority) for centuries whereas the South was mostly animist. However most of these ancestral beliefs were supplanted by the Christian faith in the south in the decades to come. This difference came to be associated with resultant religious conflicts in Nigeria which was first recorded in 1953 (Sahara Report 2014) during a religious riot in the Northern city of Kano followed by the 1980s upsurge in violence due to the death of Mohammed Marwa

"Maitatsine". Before the decade, Nigeria joined the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) during the regime of General Gowon although her membership only became known to many Nigerians when the country's delegate participated at OIC conference during the military ruler of General Ibrahim Babangida. This very much aggravated religious tensions in the country mostly among the Christian community.

However, following the return of democracy in Nigeria in 1999, 'Sharia' (an Islamic legal framework) was instituted as a main body of civil and criminal law in predominantly Muslim-state of Zamfara. Other Muslim states followed the Zamfara example in a push for the institution of Sharia legal principles at the state level of government. The Sharia system brought about controversy as to the would-be legal status of the non-Muslims in the Sharia system. This culminated in a spate of Muslim-Christian riots that emerged and continued till date but merely changing in rate and scope.

According to Eme and Ibietan (2012), the *Boko Haram* was founded by Mohammed Yusuf in 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital of the north-eastern state of Borno as a Sunni Islamic fundamentalist group advocating strict Sharia law and opposing the westernizing of Nigerian society. This accounts for the name '*Boko Haram*' meaning 'Western Education is forbidden'. Yusuf used existing infrastructure in Borno of the Izala society, a popular conservative Islamic sect originally welcomed into government to recruit members before breaking away to form his own faction. However, the sect initially operated in a quietist nature, conducting its operations more or less peacefully during the first seven years of its existence. They then withdrew from society into remote north-eastern areas but were soon to change into a Salafist-Jihadi group known for terrorist attacks since 2009 with political goal of creating an Islamic state.

Also in 2009, due to *Boko Haram* extremist motives and increasingly militant character of the sect, government directed the police and military to begin investigation into the sects' affairs in an assignment code-named 'Operation Flush' (Ogunrotifa 2013; Chidulumije 2014). Sahara Reporters (2014) noted that on 26th July 2009, security forces arrested nine *Boko Haram* members,

confiscated their weapons and bomb making devices. This culminated in revenge attacks on police during a funeral procession and widespread riot which lasted till 30th July 2009 with more than 700 people, mostly *Boko Haram* members losing their lives. Also police stations, prisons, government offices, schools and churches were destroyed. Yusuf was arrested and later died in custody while trying to escape. He was succeeded by his second-in-command Abubakar Shekau.

The activities of *Boko Haram* sect took a new dimension after the death of Mohammed Yusuf, their founder and leader. His death marked the beginning of the worst era of terrorism ever to be recorded in Nigerian history (The Cable, US Embassy Abuja 1999). According to Alhaji Dibal, the Al Qaida, Islamic Sect in the Egyptian Maghreb has ties with *Boko Haram*. They have in the last half decade or so; become the most dangerous insurgent group that Nigerians have witnessed. They are known to destructively attack churches, mosques, schools, police stations and government, international agencies, motor parks, market squares and other highly-populated places, private and public-owned facilities with a kind of guerrilla warfare tactics (Sahara Reporter, April 21, 2014).

The group's weaponry includes bombs, arms and ammunitions of various degree of lethal capacity. The activities of *Boko Haram* in Nigeria have brought about insecurity, state of emergency, loss of lives and properties among others. An outline of *Boko Haram* attacks in Nigeria and their casualties from 2009 to 2014 is attached at the end of this paper.

Quadruple Action Package for Curbing *Boko Haram* Insurgence in Nigeria
(a) Application of Relevant Conflict Resolution Strategies
Conflict Resolution is conceptualized as the methods and processes involved in facilitating the peaceful ending of conflict situations and retribution. It does not include some components of peace-building, such as state building and socio-economic development. Best (2007) emphasized that scholars on conflict studies should appreciate that; every conflict has a specific context,

history and background which deserves to be appreciated in resolving the conflict situation.

Oftentimes, conflict resolution aim at finding the *win-win* solution, or mutually satisfying standpoint for everyone involved (Fisher and Ury 1981). Nonetheless, achieving such compromise can be very difficult. Furthermore direct communication between disputants that explicitly addresses issues at stake in the conflict can be perceived as very rude, making the conflict worse and delaying resolution. Involving religious, tribal or community leaders: communicating indirectly through a third party and making suggestions through stories are some useful options in conflict resolution. Other strategies of conflict resolution are arbitration, adjudication, mediation, negotiation, conflict suppression, conflict management, traditional approach, realism. These strategies are fully discussed below as we examine their relevance to proffering lasting solution to *Boko Haram* terrorist insurgence in Nigeria.

The role of conflict resolution initiatives in resolving terrorist challenges cannot be over emphasized. This is why, Hayes, Kaminski and Beres (2003), contended that those who oppose terrorism should endeavour to engage in a broader set of dispute resolution strategies to ascertain the one workable and thus use it. Furthermore, Harik (2004) observed that there have been many occasions in which governments and others engaged in conflict resolution strategies with terrorists including amnesties, treatment of arrested terrorists, and negotiations during terrorist events and campaigns etc. All these justify that conflict resolution can be an important tool in fighting terrorism even in Nigeria.

In contemplating solutions to terrorist activities, Hayes et al. (2003) divided terrorists into absolute and traditional forms. The absolute types are not willing to enter into political discourse. Their demands are immediate, unconditional, and universal, often using suicide attacks to draw attention to their issues. In contrast are traditional terrorists who focus on more specific ethnic and ideological courses, such as changing a specific political structure in a particular location.

This distinction suggests that there are two general approaches to the issue of dispute resolution with terrorists. For absolute terrorists, the leaders are generally hidden and unknown, while tangible goals are unclear. The situation makes direct negotiations infeasible. This is truly the case of *Boko Haram* in Nigeria.

Notwithstanding that *Boko Haram* terrorist insurgence in Nigeria is a typical example of absolute terrorism with hidden leaders and unclear objectives, it must be emphasized that majority of appropriate strategies for responding to terrorism is non-violent. Over bearing application of force is a less useful element in the approach. Force is only relevant in two instances and is intended to provide peaceful atmosphere needed for talks or conflict resolution to proceed and achieve result (Ruby et al. 2002). The first situation that may require application force is during initial stages of peacekeeping where force helps to achieve or allows for a cooling off period to occur to start the rest of the strategic conflict resolution processes. The second is during the implementation of peace-enforcement processes. Outside the two scenarios, force is mostly counter-productive as an instrument against terrorist groups.

It is in light of the foregoing, and the fact that prospects of resolving *Boko Haram* terrorist insurgence in Nigeria are bright if appropriate, effective, and broader set of conflict resolution strategies as recommended below are applied. Such conflict resolution options will stimulate much desired peace and put Nigeria back on the path of socio-economic development.

Role of Negotiation and Mediation: Best (2007: 105) defined negotiation as a direct process of dialogue and discussion taking place at least between two parties who are faced with a conflict situation or dispute. The aim is for the two parties to reach an agreement on the sources of conflict between them. According to Best (2007), Roger Fisher is associated with this mode of conflict resolution and also introduced the term *principled negotiation* which advocated for interest-based negotiation that should result in showing empathy to each other.

Best (2007) defined mediation as informal and non-binding process undertaken by an external party that fosters the settlement of demands of different parties to a dispute. Mediation is usually associated with the emergence of a third party. It is supposed to be a voluntary process. Mediation usually involves dialogue aimed at helping parties to dispute reach a solution to their problems. The mediator is expected to help the parties by creating the enabling environment for dialogue between them to prevail.

Despite its advantages, Joshua Weiss (2003) notes that the negotiation option for dealing with terrorists is often viewed as a weak option or a compromise. He further expressed doubts that negotiation with terrorist groups could be done properly since absolute terrorists refuse to be known but rather remain faceless. On his part, Best (2007) warns that there is a risk that negotiation with terrorists or mediation by a third party might inadvertently justify their actions and/or provide false legitimacy. Negotiation and mediation with terrorist groups are also considered ineffective because terrorist organizations exist and operate both domestically and internationally. It is too narrow to view resolution with just allied group members in a locality as the best solution. Often too, there are technical/practical problems related to negotiation with terrorists because their organizations can be structured in a manner that can make it hard to physically locate them, identify the leadership, and then transmit messages to them.

The position of this paper is that it is wrong to view negotiation, mediation, and dialogue with terrorist groups like *Boko Haram* as a sign of weakness or compromise. Refusing to talk with them (terrorists) and over reliance on military force are defective responses which has often escalated conflicts. It is important to emphasize that all terrorist activities are founded on real or imagined grievances, demands, or deprivations. Dialogue not only provides opportunity to fully understand the basis of the terrorism but also conveys a sense of achievement on the part of the terrorist group that they have successfully drawn attention of the state to their plight. The speculations in some quarters that *Boko Haram* group in Nigeria asked government to exchange her members in detention with the Chibok girls they abducted is an

indication that they are ready to negotiate. Thus, negotiation should not be completely ignored as an approach to resolving contending issues.

Arbitration Option: It involves the use of a (supposedly neutral) third person to resolve a conflict situation. The parties to a dispute can be involved in deciding the arbitrator. The third party usually listens to the parties position statements, weighs the evidences presented, before handing down their decision. Such decisions are expected to be binding on the parties to the dispute. The fact that *Boko Haram* terrorist group are faceless does not make this strategy inapplicable as some people erroneously contend. Effort should be sustained toward identifying leaders of the group. Such leaders shall be presented the olive branch of peace and encouraged to choose an arbitrator they can trust who will preside over the resolution of the matter.

Adjudication Option: According to Obiajulu (2011), adjudication involves the use of courts and other litigation processes. He added that courts vary according to their levels of jurisdiction. Parties to a dispute are usually represented by their counsels. The court is usually briefed by the counsel to the parties in dispute. Evidences are usually taken which are important in determining the facts of the matter. Court ruling on the issue(s) in dispute is binding on parties. Appeals can be made to a higher court. Judicial decisions are usually enforced

Although the fact that *Boko Haram* leaders and membership have remained faceless and unknown makes it difficult for the group to be summoned, arbitration is still a relevant tool. In this regard, members of *Boko Haram* arrested for involvement in their nefarious activities should be charged to court of appropriate jurisdiction and allowed access to counsel of their choice. That way, some of their grievances, demands and possible pacifiers may be uncovered. Furthermore, public enlightenment on need to take matters against the government to law courts for adjudication should be stepped up while costs of litigation are minimized. All

these will make adjudication an attractive and feasible option both to government and aggrieved groups.

Shift of Emphasis from Conflict Suppression and Realism to Conflict Management: Conflict suppression is using instruments of suppression (police, army, local vigilante, taskforce, thugs etc.) to quell or push issues precipitating conflict under the carpet. Oftentimes, solutions that are not sustainable and shared by other parties are imposed. It is indeed a conflict resolution method that is both wrong and strong. It is suggestive of unequal social relationship between parties in conflict. It usually leads to protracted conflict because of its spillover effects and reprisal attacks. Similarly, realism is based on coercion or use of force to resolve conflict. It includes both violent and non-violent methods of coercion like war and diplomacy. It is usually a win-lose situation (Obiajulu 2011).

On the other hand, conflict management represents measures applicable to on-going conflicts especially with de-escalation efforts. It is about ensuring that the society, using available cultural mechanisms, does not allow conflict to escalate to the point of consuming people (Obiajulu 2011). Conflict management strategies include conflict limitation, containment and litigation among others. Also, pacifism which is one of the measures advocated in this paper for addressing *Boko Haram* in Nigeria constitutes a viable conflict management tools.

Conflict management as an interventionist effort towards preventing the escalation and negative effects, especially violent ones is very relevant in the current *Boko Haram* terrorist insurgence in Nigeria. This is particularly important because conflict suppression measures (rather than conflict management options) being applied by the Nigerian Government through military Joint Task Force (JTF), has been minimally effective and yet to fully enthrone peaceful coexistence in the areas affected. Killing *Boko Haram* terrorists through JTF attacks have been used as major counter-terrorism strategy with obvious side effects. Such side effects include counter attacks by the group upon unsuspecting villages. More worrisome is the fact that recruitment

or membership of *Boko Haram* group appears to be on the rise despite the attacks. Thus conflict management initiatives will be very useful in ending the flow of new recruits and resolving various local and regional issues linked to *Boko Haram* terrorist group. Furthermore, the US Embassy Records (2001) noted that a measure of conflict suppression has been recorded to work in Western Countries with formidable Intelligence and Military Apparatus, but often failed in pluralist ethnic, religious or cultural orientations such as Nigeria.

(b) Use of Military Force
Over bearing application of force is a less useful element in fighting terrorism. Force is only relevant in two instances and is intended to provide peaceful atmosphere needed for talks or conflict resolution to proceed and achieve result (Ruby et al. 2002). The first situation that may require application of force is during initial stages of peacekeeping where force helps to achieve or allows for a cooling off period to occur before the start of the rest of strategic conflict resolution processes. The second is during the implementation of peace-enforcement processes. Outside the two scenarios, force is mostly counter-productive as an instrument against terrorist groups. Above all, there must be strict adherence to applicable rules of engagement in situations where military force is used. The timeframe for military action against *Boko Haram* insurgents in Nigeria must not be unduly protracted to reduce casualties (even on the part of the terrorist group). The protracted use of military force might negatively affect the appetite of the sect for peace talks. It could also make them go underground and incline more to sporadic guerrilla warfare approach often channelled towards soft targets and civilians. This is already happening in Nigeria hence an urgent need to explore complimentary strategies discussed in this paper.

(c) Government Attendance to Social Issues
Nigeria needs to adequately address social services, functional structures, socio-political stability, and rule of law, good governance, poverty, corruption, and all forms of religious

intolerance among others. Alemika (2004) frowned at the disconnection between the governed and the government in Nigeria, He lamented that some manifestations of the crisis of the state and governance in the country are inability to guarantee a basic minimum standard of living that accord with human dignity for the majority of the citizens. Such unfavourable living conditions and non adherence to good governance could account for some grievances, opposition and terror attacks because terror exists to create opposition. To this end, strict adherence to the ten pillars of good governance advocated by World Bank should be the rule rather than the exception in the Nigerian state. Such pillars of good governance like rule of law, citizenship participation, and accountability among others must be respected. Furthermore, appropriate power should be exercised in the management of the country's economic and social resources for development. Also the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies and to respect citizens should not be in doubt. Government must address root causes of insurgency rather than being mere relational in approach. Attention must shift beyond temporal solutions because none of them has capacity to end insurgency in Nigeria. Okogu (2007) maintains that good economic policy, including diversification of the economy from oil will create prosperity, retard the propensity for conflict, and enhance national security in Nigeria.

(d) The Unique and Crucial Role of Pacifism

Against the background of conflict resolution strategies advocated, vis-à-vis their weaknesses as identified, the strategy of *Pacifism*, an ideology which opposes the use of violence or war to settle disputes is strongly canvassed. The option pacifism will complement recommended conflict resolution initiatives and limited military actions that are conducted in extreme obedience to applicable rules of engagement, while government addresses social services. This quadruple approach constitutes most feasible means to end the conflict situation in Nigeria.

Pacifism in its purest form categorically opposes application of any forms of *war* or *violence* as means of settling disputes. It is

essentially about talking differences over rather than use of war and violence to resolve them. This strategy is not popular globally, as a means of conflict or dispute resolution due to erroneous belief that it is a sign of weakness on the part of the recognized individual or sovereign state that applies it. Yet it is adjudged as a very effective strategy given impressive results that Ghandi achieved with it in India It is worthy of note that Ghandi's vision of a free India based on religious pluralism was challenged in the early 1940s by a new Muslim nationalism which was demanded a separate Muslim homeland carved out of India. The demand gave rise to religious violence in the Punjab and Bengal areas of India, similar to the current *Boko Haram* insurgence Nigeria. However, the tactics of conflict resolution (pacifism) applied by Ghandi conquered the violence because she befriended even those who ordinarily should be seen as enemies in the other camp which gave rise to favourable platforms to talk over the issues until acceptable resolutions to both parties were reached.

Pacifism covers a spectrum of views ranging from the belief that international disputes can and should be peacefully resolved; to calls for the abolition of institutions of the military and war; to opposition to any organization of society through governmental force (anarchist or libertarian pacifism); to rejection of the use of violence to obtain political, economic or social goals; to opposition to violence under any circumstance, including defense of self and others. The philosophy or strategy of pacifism sees means and ends as inseparable. By implication, it is contradictory to try to use violence to obtain peace. Principled pacifism also holds that violence of any form is an inappropriate response to conflict, and is morally wrong. Pragmatic pacifism holds that the costs of war and inter-personal violence are so substantial that better ways of resolving disputes must be found.

Since pure forms of pacifism abhors violence, the modified pacifist approach canvassed in this paper differ because it permits limited or initial use of force by government to gain control and restore some degree of order and functionality of institutions prior to her peace talks with the terrorist group. Thus, modified pacifism involves complete reliance or dependence on peace-building

initiatives (set of interrelated efforts that support peace) in post military operation situations which should go hand in hand with other conflict resolution strategies earlier enumerated.

However, before the government lays down arms to fully shun violence and embrace only peace moves in the spirit of modified pacifism, Barnett et al. advocated that efforts should be made to ensure that all the guiding principles are in place viz; stabilizing the post-conflict zones (in this case, the North-east geopolitical zone), restoring state institutions and dealing with social, economic and religious issues that triggered the conflict. Pacifism entails the need to gather all elder statesmen, elites, religious and traditional rulers in the zone and ensure their full participation in the settlement process. The role of such people is important not only in calling youths who are fraternizing with *Boko Haram* to order but also in the implementation of peace building strategies generated via pacifism like cease-fire agreements. Pacifism is deemed as having the greatest possibility of succeeding given its success in India and elsewhere.

Nigerian government should also seek intelligence support of the United Nations (UN) and in the area of brokering peace. Approaching the UN for assistance is in recognition of her aims to facilitate cooperation in international law, international security, economic development, social progress, human rights, and achieving world peace. Interestingly, Agenda 6 of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, General Assembly Resolution**,** pledges to take concerted action against international terrorism which *Boko Haram* is an example.

Conclusions

This paper examined the challenges posed by *Boko Haram* terrorist insurgents in Nigeria and efforts to contain them. The authors were worried that Nigeria cannot make meaningful progress in her socio-economic and political life while consistently fighting terrorism in her area. No developmental project or investment can thrive in such atmosphere of conflict. The *Boko Haram* terrorist insurgency in Nigerian has done too much harm in the past eight years of violent activities in the country. The loss of lives, loss of

government-owned and private property, failure of sustainable development initiatives, loss of prospective foreign investments are major fallouts of *Boko Haram* insurgency in Nigeria.

The authors however deeply appreciated efforts, especially on the part of government through the military Joint Task Force but noted that such measures are yet to fully and permanently entrench peace in the affected areas. It was thus advocated that a strategy which is comprehensive in nature, attacking the premise of terrorism itself, addressing the root causes, the enablers, and the operations be put in place. In this regard, conflict resolution initiatives, government attendance to social services, and limited use of force and modified pacifism defined as 'quadruple action package' were recommended. This is because it is within these processes that the war on terrorism could be won.

Nigerians irrespective of diverse social, political, ethnic, religious or cultural inclination of Nigerian must cooperate to achieve optimum results from the processes. This is because when all government institutions, non-governmental organizations, community-based and cultural organizations, political and religious leaders, stakeholders and individuals jointly work in liaison, the scourge of *Boko Haram* insurgence will be effectively resolved.

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APPENDICES

Outline of *Boko Haram* Attacks in Nigeria from 2009 to 2014

Date (Timeline of Attack Incidents)	Place, Nature and Casualties
7 September, 2010	Bauchi prison break where Boko Haram freed 700 prisoners.
31 December, 2010	Abuja Attack.
12 March, 2011	Muslim Cleric Imam Ibrahim Ahmed Abdullahi assassinated for criticizing the violent groups in Northeast Nigeria.
22 April, 2011	Boko Haram freed 14 prisoners during a jailbreak in Yola, Adamawa State.
29 May, 2011	Northern Nigeria bombings.
16 June, 2011	Boko Haram claims responsibility for the Abjua Police Headquarters Bombing.
26 June, 2011	Bombing attack on a beer garden in Maidujuri leaving 25 dead and 12 injured.
10 July, 2011	Bombing at the All Christian Fellowship Church in Suleja, Niger State.
11 July, 2011	The University of Maidujuri temporarily closes down its campus citing security conerns.
12 August, 2011	Prominent Muslim Cleric Liman Bama was shot dead by Boko Haram.
26 August, 2011	2011 Abuja Bombing.
4 November, 2011	2011 Dematuru attacks.
25 December, 2011	December 2011 Nigeria Bombings.
5-6 January, 2012	January 2012 Nigeria attacks.
20 January, 2012	January 2012 Kano Bombings.
28 January, 2012	Nigerian Army says it killed 11 Boko Haram insurgents.
8 February, 2012	Boko Haram claims responsibility for a suicide bombing at the Army Headquarter in Kaduna.
16 February, 2012	Another prison break staged in central Nigeria; 119 prisoners are released, one warden killed.
8 March, 2012	During a Bristish Hostage Rescue attempt to free Italian Engineer Franco Lamolinera and Britain Christopher Mcmcances, abducted in 2011 by a splinter Boko Haram group, both hostages were killed.
31 May, 2012	During a Joint Task Force (JTF) raid on a Boko Haram dens. It was reported that 5 sect members and a German hostage were killed.
3 June, 2012	15 church members were killed and several others injured in church bombing in Bauchi. Boko Haram claimed responsibility through spokesperson Abu Qaqa.
17 June, 2012	Suicide Bombers stroke three churches in Kaduna. At least 50 people were killed.
17 June, 2012	130 bodies were found in Plateau state. It was presumed they were killed by Boko Haram Terrorists.
18 September, 2012	Family of four murdered.

18 September, 2012	Murder of six at an outdoor party.
19 September, 2012	Nigerian Military arrests Boko Haram militants, reported death of Abu Qaqa.
3 October, 2012	Around 25-46 people were massacred in the town of Mubi in Adamawa, Nigeria during a night time raid.
18 March, 2013	Kano Bus bombing; at least 22 killed and 65 injured, when a suicide car bomb exploded in Kano bus station.
19 April, 2013	Deadliest attack since 2009: gun battle with security, forces leaving 260 dead and nearly 1000 injured.
7 May, 2013	At least 55 killed and 105 immates freed in coordinated attacks in army barracks, prison and police post in Bama town.
6 July, 2013	Yobe State school shooting: 42 people mostly students were killed in a school attack in North East Nigeria.
29 September, 2013	College of Agriculture in Gujba: 40 male students killed.
14 January, 2014	At least 31 people killed, over 50 people injured by suicide bombing in Maiduguri, Borno State.
16 February, 2014	Izghe massacre: 106 killed.
25 February, 2014	Federal Government College attack: Fury at military over Yobe death at least 29 teenage boys dead at Federal Government Collage Buru Yadi.
14 April, 2014	Chibok kidnapping: Government properties including the only girls' secondary school attacked. At least 16 killed or missing and 234 female students kidnapped. The Boko Haram militants said it would treat the assaults.
14 April, 2014	Abuja bombing: two bombs exploded at a crowded bus station in Abuja, Nigeria, killing at least 90 people and injuring more than 200.
1 May, 2014	A car bomb exploded killing at least 19 people and injured at least 60 in the same area of Abuja as the April bomb.
5 May, 2014	Gamburu attack: Boko Haram attacked the towns of Gamboru and Ngala in Borno State, Nigeria. They started shooting in a busy market place, set houses on fire and gunned down anyone who tried to flee. The death toll of the massacre has been set as high as 336.
13 May, 2014	Menari, Tsangayari and Garawa: Boko Haram attacked the three villages, killing around 60 people in Manane; Vigilantes fought back, killing over 200 Boko Haram militants.
17 May, 2014	Paris Summit: The summit in Paris has declared Boko Haram is pas of alqued as leaders from West African nations resolved to mount a region-wide offensive against the group that is hiding more than 200 school girls hostage in a dense jungle. Western nations have pledged to provide technical expertise and training to the new regional African effort against the Islamic extremists.
18 May, 2014	Kano: Suicide car bomb kills five people.
20 May, 2014	Jos: Twin bomb explosions kill 118 people.

30 May, 2014	Assassination of Muslim leader Alhaji Idrissa Timta the Emir of Gwoza in Borno.
1 June, 2014	Mubi bombing: An attack at a football field in Mubi, Adamawa killing at least 40 people.
2 June, 2014	Men dressed as soldiers slaughtered at least 200 civilians in three communities in Gwoza. A community leader who witnessed the killings said that local residents had pleaded for help from the military, but it did not arrive in time. It took a few days for word from survivors to reach the provincial capital of Maiduguri, because the roads are extremely dangerous and phone connections are poor or non existent.
29 May-June 5 2014	6 attacks, killing 506 civilians, 5 military; 20 women and 3 men abducted 60 Boko Haram killed by military.
6 June-12 June, 2014	4 attacks, killing 5 civilians, 6 military; military kill 50 Boko Haram.
13 June-19 June, 2014	2 attacks, 93 civilian killed, 8 Boko Haram killed by Borno Vigilante government.
20 June-26 June, 2014	4 attacks, 93 civilian killed, 60 abducted. A military fighter jet bombed unknown number of Boko Haram in counter attack; 25 Boko Haram and 16 soldiers killed in attack on military base. Cameroon military killed 10 Boko Haram near border.
27-26 June, 2014	2 attacks, 112 killed.
4 July-10 July, 2014	4 Boko Haram attacks, 11 civilians, 1 vigilante, 33 soldiers, 4 police killed. 53 Boko Haram were killed while capturing a military base and police station in Borno on the 4th of July. On the 6th, soldiers killed a Boko Haram kingpin and has brother at their home in Kaduna; also on the 6th, 44 Boko Haram were killed in 2 military operations in Borno.
11 June-17 July, 2014	4 attacks, 81 civilians killed many of these slot by fighter jet in a failed counter-attact. German teacher kidnapped and 2 vigilantes killed on July 16 in Adamawa, presumably by Boko Haram.
25 July-27 July, 2014	2 attacks in Kolofata, Cameroon, including the kidnapping of the wife of the Vice-Prime Minister, Amadau Ali, as well as local religious leader and mayor, Seini Boukar-Lamine.
11 August, 2014	28 civilians killed, 97 kidnapped, all men and boys, in attacks on villages in Borno State in rural Northeast Nigeria. Many homes torched in the raid.

Source: Culled from Classified Cable Source, US Embassy Abuja, August 2014

**Some *Boko Haram* Attacks/Activities and Number of
Casualties in 2015 and 2016**

S/N	Date	Attack/Activity
1	February 1, 2015	Twin explosions in Gombe, 5 persons killed.
2	February 1, 2015	Suicide bomber in Potiskum killed 10 persons.
3	February 1, 2015	Boko Haram insurgents attack northeast Nigeria's capital city, killed 512 persons.
4	February 2, 2015	Car bomb explodes in Nigeria's Gombe after Jonathan's rally, killed 18 persons.
5	February 11, 2015	Boko Haram tackle Chadian troops in Gamburu, killed 13 persons.
6	February 12, 2015	Suspected suicide bombers kill at least 11 in Nigeria's Borno State 11 persons killed.
7	February 13, 2015	Boko Haram separate attacks kill 21 in northeast Nigeria.
8	February 15, 2015	Female suicide bomber kill 13 in Nigerian bus station.
9	February 17, 2015	Multiple explosions in Biu, 37 killed, 23 injured.
10	February 17, 2015	Suicide bomber kills three in Yobe restaurant, persons 3 killed.
11	February 19, 2015	Boko Haram kills 30 near Chibok killed 30 persons.
12	February 19, 2015	Boko Haram kills 30 in Adamawa village Killed 30 persons.
13	February 20, 2015	Boko Haram attacks Adamawa villages, killed 10 persons.
14	February 20, 2015	Boko Haram kill 21 in Nigeria near missing girls' village.
15	February 22, 2015	Female Suicide Bomber, killed 8, injures 42.
16	February 24, 2015	Nigeria bus station blast, 16 killed.
17	February 24, 2015	Suicide bombers killed 20 in Kano.
19	February 26, 2015	Bombs explode at bus station near university in central Nigeria's Jos killed 18 persons.
20	February 26, 2015	Another suicide bombing kills many in Biu killed 21 persons.
21	February 27, 2015	Boko Haram kills 15 many in Borno's Mainok village market.
22	February 28, 2015	Female Bomber kills 4 accomplice, two others in Borno.
23	March 2, 2015	Boko Haram beheads two in new video killed 2 persons.
24	March 3, 2015	Boko Haram kills 20 children, 74 others.
25	March 4, 2015	Boko Haram attacks Borno town, kills 9 persons.
26	March 7, 2015	Bomber dies in Borno killed 1 person.
27	March 7, 2015	Four die as soldiers discover bomb factory in Yobe killed 4 persons.
28	March 7, 2015	58 killed, 139 injured in Borno multiple blasts.
29	March 8, 2015	Fresh explosion rocks Borno market, kills 5.

30	March 9, 2015	Boko Haram attacks Adamawa community killed 10 persons.
31	March 10, 2015	Borno village under fresh Boko Haram attack killed 8 persons.
32	March 10, 2015	Borno village under fresh Boko Haram attack killed 8 persons.
33	March 10, 2015	Suspected suicide bomber kills 34 in Nigeria's Maiduguri.
34	March 15, 2015	Boko Haram kidnaps hundreds in northern Nigeria town killed 50 persons.
35	March 19, 2015	Boko Haram recaptures Gamboru, kills 20 in raid 20.
36	March 22, 2015	2 female bombers killed selves.
37	April 2, 2015	Suicide bomber in Gombe motor park killed 20 persons.
38	April 3, 2015	Boko Haram beheads four fishermen killed 4 persons.
39	April 4, 2015	Boko Haram attacks Kayamla, Borno killed 5 persons.
40	April 15, 2015	Boko Haram slit throats of 12 as army tries to save civilians.
41	April 23, 2015	Troops flee as Boko Haram retakes Borno town killed 40 persons.
42	April 25, 2015	Suspected Boko Haram attacks Plateau village, as securityflee duty post killed 4 persons.
43	April 28, 2015	14 injured in Yobe school suicide bomber attack killed 2 persons.
44	May 8, 2015	14 injured in Yobe school suicide bomber attack killed 2 persons.
45	May 13, 2015	At least 13 dead after attack on Nigeria's Maiduguri city.
46	May 16, 2015	Fresh Boko Haram attack in Adamawa village 11 killed, 6 women abducted.
47	May 19, 2015	Suicide bomber attacks Garkida killed 9, injured 8.
48	May 21, 2015	Boko Haram kills many in fresh Borno attack killed 40 persons.
49	May 23, 2015	Boko Haram attack in Borno kills 43.
51	May 29, 2015	Twin bombs in Nigeria's Borno state kill 7 and injure 12.
52	June 2, 2015	Bomb blast hits market in Nigeria's Maiduguri city, 50 killed.
53	June 6, 2015	Bomb blast hits market in Nigeria's Borno State, 16 dead.
54	June 8, 2015	Boko Haram attacks village in Borno 19 dead.
55	June 10, 2015	Boko Haram attack in Borno killed 43 persons.
56	June 16, 2015	Explosives abandoned by Boko Haram killed 63 in Borno town.
57	June 22, 2015	Boko Haram attack in Borno killed 20 persons.
58	June 27, 2015	Borno suicide bomb attack killed 5 persons.
59	June 30, 2015	Suicide bombers attack hospital as Osinbajo visits Borno killed 2 persons.
60	July 1, 2015	Twin blasts killed 12 persons.

61	July 3, 2015	Kill 29 villagers.
62	July 5, 2015	Suicide bomber kills 6.
63	July 6, 2015	Suicide bomber strikes near Kano mosque killed 1.
64	July 10, 2015	Boko Haram killed 45 persons.
65	July 13, 2015	Bus bomb hits checkpoint in Nigeria's Maiduguri killed 1 person.
66	July 14, 2015	Boko Haram raids Borno border town in night attack, killed 15 persons.
67	July 22, 2015	Blasts in Nigerian city of Gombe killed 37 persons.
68	July 24, 2015	Boko Haram burns houses in Borno killed 18 persons.
69	August 2, 2015	Boko Haram attack in Madagali killed 8 persons.
70	August 11, 2015	Terrorists kill eight, abduct four women in Maiduguri community killed 8 persons.
71	August 15, 2015	Suicide bomber 6 killed.
72	August 25, 2015	Boko Haram members ambush convoy of Nigeria's chief of army staff 11 killed.
74	August 28, 2015	Boko Haram Attacks Borno Village on Horseback killed 68 persons.
75	August 31, 2015	Suicide bomber attacks mosque in Maiduguri killed 26 persons.
76	September 3, 2015	Again, Boko Haram attack in Borno killed 53 persons.
77	September 11, 2015	Yola IDP camp bomb blast killed 10 persons.
78	September 24, 2015	Many feared killed as Boko Haram attacks Monguno, Baga again killed 20 persons.
79	September 27, 2015	Boko Haram killed 20 persons.
80	October 1, 2015	Boko Haram suspected attack killed 11 persons.
81	October 1, 2015	Boko Haram suicide bombers Maiduguri 15 killed.
82	January 27, 2016	Destroyed five communities in Jere Local Government Area of Bornu State 13 killed.
83	April, 19 2016	Boko Haram attacks soldiers in Borno 30 terrorist killed, 24 soldiers wounded.
84	May 25, 2016	Attacks on Villages in Dalori and outskirts of Maiduguri injured 65.

Source: The Cable (2015), *www.thecable.ng*

3

Community Policing and Challenges of Policing a Distraught Society: Rethinking the Nigeria Police for Effectiveness

Oyesoji Aremu

Introduction

Other than the economic challenge confronting Nigeria as a sovereign country, the challenge of insecurity has undoubtedly impacted negatively on the entire fabric of the country. This has brought untold hardships on the country. The insecurity which initially aggravated in 2009 and later blossomed into a full blown terrorism motivated by *Boko Haram*, a Jihadist fundamental group in the North East, Nigeria has practically affected the entire North East and by extension, the entire country (Aremu 2015). The *Boko Haram*-motivated terrorism more than any insecurity prior to 2009 in Nigeria was the most serious security challenge that almost brought the entire security apparatus into an operational and logistic halt. The worst hit of the security agencies given the ferocious *Boko Haram*'s terrorism is the Nigeria Police which was mainly the target of the *Boko Haram* fighters. The Nigeria Police not only lost its personnel, the agency also suffered losses in terms of arms, ammunition and stations. While it is difficult to estimate losses suffer by the Nigeria Police due to lack of records, it is an open statistical documentation that between 2009 and 2015 when *Boko Haram* is said to have been 'technically incapacitated' by the Federal Government of Nigeria, the Nigeria Police has lost about 525 personnel excluding civilians who were estimated to be 30,000. This also excluded the economic loss estimated to be millions of dollars. The casualty figure also put about 2.1 million people in internally-displaced camps as at December, 2015 from 207 local government areas covering 13 states in Northern Nigeria including Abuja Adamawa, Bauchi, Benue, Borno, Gombe, Kaduna, Kano, Nasarawa, Plateau, Taraba, Yobe and Zamfara (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2016). Although the

Database of Terrorism in Nigeria from 2009 till date appears empirically available, the Global Terrorism Index (2015) ranks Nigeria with a score of 9. 213 as the third most terrorized country after Iraq and Afghanistan out of 125 cases of terrorism globally. The record by GPI underscores the seriousness of terrorism in Nigeria.

In spite of the Federal Government of Nigeria's position that *Boko Haram'*s sect has been 'technically' defeated, concerns from security stakeholders on the seeming rejuvenated of *Boko Haram* indicates the contrary. Although, the sect given the intelligence report is said to be split into two with the emergence of Sheikh Abu Musab Al-Barnawi, competing leadership with Sheikh Abubakar Shekau, the sect is still deadly going by the fact that it still operates albeit minimally (Aremu 2015). Till date, the sect is still holding in hostage, most of the Chibok girls who were captured more than three years ago. This renewed 'strength' of the sect is still a major concern in the security circle in Nigeria.

Another security concern in Nigeria is the *Fulani* cattle-motivated mayhem that sprang up in Benue and Nasarawa states between *Agatu* Nasarawa and Benue and nomadic *fulanis* over land resource control. These two insecurity challenges (*Boko Haram*-motivated terrorism and *Fulani*/farmers mayhem) not only brought Nigeria to the spotlight of insecurity globally, kidnapping and hostage-taking are equally going on simultaneously across the country especially in states like in North Central (especially Kogi State), South West and chiefly in South South. The latter's philosophy is quite different as it is motivated by pecuniary gains mainly as a result of unemployment and poverty in the land.

The fourth in the scheme of insecurity challenge confronting Nigeria is the militancy in the South East and Niger Delta. While the philosophy of the two-pronged insecurity is towards self-determination, the colossal loss of life and especially of oil installations in the South-South has made it to assume a more fearsome dimension because of its link to poor economy now confronting the country. Conservatively, the militancy orchestrated by the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) from January, 2016 till date has cost the country a gargantuan barrel of oil. This challenge of insecurity especially by the NDA is infiltrating to the coastal areas

of the South West states like Lagos and Ogun and thereby making life and properties no longer safe in the region as well.

The totality of economic, social and psychological costs of insecurity in Nigeria as experienced during the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan and currently in the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari has not only overstretched the security agencies (especially the police), it has also made the Nigerian society distraught. Nigeria is therefore, security-wearied and her people psychologically unsaved majorly in the North Eastern parts of the country; and by extension, other parts of the country. The increasing insecurity of life and properties has made Nigeria to be rated by Global Terrorism Index (2016) as the third most unsecured country in the world after Iran and Iraq. While it is difficult to align to this global rating of the country on Security Watch given almost-daily occurrences of insecurity in America, Europe and Asia, at best, Nigeria could be said to be the most unsecured country South of Sahara. The import of this as it affects the Nigerian nation would be discussed in the latter part of this paper. However, it is instructive to note early in this paper that insecurity being discussed so far is internal security which is the operational responsibility and constitutional security jurisdiction of the Nigeria Police. For a deeper understanding of this security template, this paper would discuss the Nigeria Police and its structure with a view to operationalizing its functions and effectiveness in the context of community policing which is one of the celebrated policing strategies of the 21st century.

The Nigeria Police and Security of a Distraught Society
Police and policing are two intertwined concepts in criminal justice that scholars have extensively and continuously discussed not only because of the place of importance that the concepts enjoy in literature, but also because of the attention that they draw in contemporary discussion in security globally. Right from the Peelan's years till now, policing as a concept and as a subset of criminal justice system has remained very significant part of discourse in literature and contemporary discourse. Although much if not all the literature in this respect is from Europe and America and perhaps from Asia in recent times, African perspectives of

criminal justice and security with emphasis on police and policing are limited. Earlier scholars on police literature have focused on historical documentation of police and policing activities. While these cannot be said to address criminal justice and insecurity in true sense, the works of the likes of Tekena Tamuno have given the next generation of police scholars like Alemika further exposition of the subject of criminal justice. It was not until early 2000s that serious empirical investigations started emerging on the Nigeria Police and policing structure in Nigeria. The works of Aremu (2000, 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011) Aremu, Pakes, Johnston (2009), Aremu and Tejumola (2008), Aremu and Jones (2011) were quite instructive here. From thence, serious scientific analysis of the Nigeria Police, the structure of the organization and performance of the rank and file takes the centre stage in literature.

Writing on the Nigeria Police, Aremu (2014) catalogues the emergence of agency as from 1930 with the submission that till date, the personnel of the force still carry syndromes of the dictates of the colonial masters. Aremu (2014) then lists the constitutional responsibilities of the Nigeria Police as contained in Part Two and Section 4 of the Police Act and Regulations as follows:

- The prevention and detection of crime,
- Apprehension of offenders,
- Preservation of law and order,
- Protection of life and property,
- The due enforcement of all laws and regulations with which they are directly charged, and
- Performance of military duties within or without Nigeria as may be required by law.

These provisions as clearly as they are, bestow huge security responsibilities on the personnel of the Nigeria Police. This also comes with greater responsibilities on the internal governance of the Nigeria Police authorities. Doing so, would improve policing effectiveness and could engender public trust which is lacking in Nigeria. Aremu (2014) enthuses that this public trust is not earned flippantly given the history of police ineffectiveness in Nigeria. However, in what appears like a way out, Purdy (2013)

admonishes that public trust could be earned if the police would embrace what he refers to as the "three spirits". These are: the police personnel, the government and the public. Essentially, policing effectiveness of the society should rest on the tripod.

From 2009 till date, Nigeria has witnessed a geometric decline in peace. According to Global Peace Index (GPI 2016), of the nine countries (excluding Syria) with the most internal conflict deaths in the world, Nigeria is ranked number four after Mexico, Iraq and Afghanistan. This suffices the level of criminality in Nigeria. As observed above, Nigeria has become an unsafe country in the last couple of years. The degree of insecurity has reached an all-time high and has caused some economic, social and psychological distraught in the country.

Globally, the economic impact of violence in 2015 was estimated to be $13.6 trillion in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms (GPI 2016). A fraction of these expenditures was only for peacekeeping and peacebuilding. This perhaps account for the rise of insecurity profile in 2016 in countries like Turkey, Germany, France, Sudan, Iraq, Libya, United States of America, Pakistan, and Nigeria. Specifically, Nigeria is getting more attention with the increasing profile of insecurity in some parts of the country. Recently, the Government of the United States of America declared twenty states in Nigeria unsafe and warned its citizens against visiting the states. These and other related factors could distraught the wellness of a society. The distraught is both physical and psychological and has also impacted negatively on the image of the country globally given the rating of the country on both Global Terrorism and Peace Indexes.

The insecurity facing the country is classified as internal and therefore under the security watch of the Nigeria Police. Arguably, Nigeria has a weak police both in terms of number and intelligence. Alluding to this, the former Chief of Army Staff in Nigeria and the current Interior Minister, Gen. Bello Dambazau in a convocation lecture delivered on November 28, 2013 described the intervention of the military in counterinsurgency in Nigeria as an aberration. This is because it is primarily police duty in Police Act of 1990. The Nigeria Police are however, incapacitated in terms of personnel, logistic operation and motivation to deliver on their security mandate. In one of his seminal works on the Nigeria

Police, Aremu (2013) notes that police not only 'suffer' from systemic crises, he notes again that oversight functions of the police transcend ensuring peace and order. This assertion presupposes that the police should not only ensure peace and order, they are expected to guide against internal insurrection which can be guaranteed provided the government and the public do their bits. This explains the need for community policing.

Community Policing and Security Strategies
According to Aremu (2013), the Nigeria Police embraced the philosophy of community policing at the intervention of President Olusegun Obasanjo who responded to the challenge following his state visit to Houston in America. This led to the beginning of community-oriented police in Enugu State in February 2004 (Aremu 2009). From thenceforward, the Nigeria Police has accepted the reality of community policing in its operations. The Nigeria Police has a Community Policing Unit at its headquarters in Abuja. While the unit has been working hard at encouraging community policing principles at the Police State Commands through the Commissioners of Police, much in terms of its operational reality has not been felt given the increase in the upsurge of crimes. It should also be stressed that in the Nigeria Police, there are no functional logistics that could make community policing work. The take here is that community policing should be made to be peculiar to each society's fundamentals, culture and psychology.

Writing on the concept, Purdy (2013), describes community policing as a natural extension of the process of reform and modernization of police agency. The contention of Purdy is premised on the notion that the idea of community policing itself is not entirely novel in the police; it was only a reaction to the increasing challenges of insecurity. The principle of community policing is therefore, to make it specific to the need of a particular society or neighbourhood. It is not straight-jacketed given the fact that policing challenges vary according to the culture, psychology and needs of each society. Purdy (2013) then defines it as a partnership between the citizens and the police working towards safety and an enhanced quality of life for all. Cox and Wade (1998) describe it as a cooperative approach between the police

and members of the public, focusing on solving community problems and improving the quality of life in the community. Such a policing relationship between the public and the police is to make both the public and the police to be both responsive to the security needs of the society. Greene and Decker (1989) also contribute that citizens who are less satisfied with police are less likely to be cooperative with police officers and less willing to share information critical to making police work more efficient. In other words, the philosophy of community policing places responsibility on the police and the public albeit greater efforts with the police personnel. Robert Peel (1829) averred the police are the public and the public are the police; the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence. This relationship synergy is the all mark of policing philosophy. This has however, being eroded over the years given the fact in some societies; the police agency has been made to be 'alienated' from the public by being made to be responsive only to the government. In Yorubaland in Nigeria, the police are referred to as '*agbefoba*' (those who do the bidding of only the authorities). In effect, as long as policing work is made enforceable (police legitimacy) and not participatory with the willing intervention of members of the public, the philosophy of community policing is defeated. In some climes (including Nigeria), policing work still thrives on legitimacy under the constitutional roles of police in the Police Act of 1990. As long as policing work thrives on legitimacy, expected police effectiveness might be a mirage given the fact that criminals are harboured in the society.

Generally in literature, community policing has been variously described as neighbourhood policing or police and the public working together. Beyond this, the most important principle of the philosophy of community policing is bringing the police and the public together with the sole aim of partnership in crime reduction or at best, crime stoppage.

What drives community policing is the need to proactively reduce crime in the society. Effective crime reduction is therefore, a function of effective community policing. While effective community policing is a function of the willing public and police officers who understand their beats very well. Aremu (2013)

submits that the Nigeria Police are in dire need of a reform. While he proposes the intervention of Emotional Intelligence as one of the drivers of the reform, it is again incumbent as part of the continued search of police effectiveness in Nigeria that the proposition of the 'Trinity Model' would serve also serves in the quest for police reform in Nigeria.

The 'Trinity' Policing Model: A Model for the Future
All over the world, scholars and stakeholders have always theorizing on the best policing approaches. It was an answer to this that led to the conceptualization of Community Policing in the United States of America. This chapter has discussed extensively community policing and its relevance to policing effectiveness. Arguably and given its wide acceptance in America and Europe and in some parts of Asia (especially in India), it has been found to be very effective. The Nigeria Police has equally accepted it as an effective policing principle. Fundamentally, policing basics in Nigeria was associated with community approaches given the fact that it was people that well known in the community that were recruited into the native police. This was later adopted by the regional governments in the first republic. Eventually, the Nigeria Police was again unified (the first reunification was in April 1, 1930 when the Northern Nigeria Police Force was unified with the Lagos Police Force and the Niger Coast Constabulary) with the absorption of the regional police under one body (Tamuno 1970). The major criticism against the regional police in the first republic was that the regional administration used the police to oppress the opposition.

Upon my continuous search for effective policing in Nigeria, the 'Trinity' policing model was evolved with a view to capturing basic fundamentals that studies have found to have impeded policing effectiveness. There are three fundamental mutually-related conceptual strands in police literature globally: the police personnel, the governance of policing activities and the consumers of policing product. Purdy (2013) refers to this as the "three spirits" (the government, the police and the public). This I also consider as a tripod of policing effectiveness. Categorically, Aremu (2014) notes that it is instructive to conclude that effective and result-oriented policing rest squarely on the 'Trinity' (the

government, the police and the public). Aremu (2014) again emphatically submits that the fulcrum of policing rests squarely on the tripod and this is to ensure people-oriented policing (which is community policing). In his attempt to give credence to this submission, Aremu (2013) submits that the need for an effective, lawful and people-oriented police organization cannot be overemphasized.

It is in a response to those submissions, that the idea of the 'Trinity' Model of policing was developed by me. It is therefore needful to explain the model using each effect that forms the 'Trinity'.

The first leg of the model is driven by police governance. Police effectiveness is determined by the quality of both its internal and external governance. This explains why governance constitutes the first intervention of the 'Trinity' model of policing. More often than not, the quality of the police personnel and their productivity are dictated by the government in terms of the quality of funding the agency receives. Purdy (2013) attests to this by stressing that without resources, the police cannot be productive. Aremu (2014) also corroborates this by submitting that the actual cost of policing a state (country) is enormous and requires adequate funding. Aremu (2014) notes further that "Effective policing depends on adequate budgetary allocation to security of which the police are the primary agents" (p. 12). For emphasis, the first intervention in the model is government interference in the police internal governance which could determine effectiveness in the police if compromised. All over the world, police governance is tied to the dictates of the ruling class which in many cases are abused. In Nigeria, the police agency is on the exclusive list of the constitution. The police agency until the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari had its own ministry, Ministry of Police Affairs. The force is now under the supervision of Interior Ministry although with a supervisory commission, the Police Service Commission. One of the confronting challenges in this respect is the incessant changes of the leadership of the police which make internal governance in the force unstable. Between 1966 and date (a period of fifty years), the Nigeria Police has been headed by eighteen Inspectors General of Police (IGPs). This is an average of 2.7 years for each of the police IG. Aremu (2014) then

contends that the danger in this is that instability in security policies could threaten internal security.

In effect, the first intervention of the model could hamper police effectiveness given the associated challenges. Aremu (2014) concludes that too much political interference may disorganize police commitment and organizational behaviour.

The second leg of the intervention of the 'Trinity' model of policing is the workforce (police personnel). The quality of the personnel that constitute a police agency is a direct reflection of the operational working of the agency and its system. The personnel therefore would determine the totality of what operates in the police agency: its vision, philosophy, operations, and the direction. These however, depends on how the personnel is constituted in terms of its enlistment drive and recruitment policy, how the personnel go through the training in police colleges and academy, how they are trained; and what constitutes the training they receive. Writing on this, Purdy (2013) admonishes that the hiring process should support the recruitment efforts and focus on only those who meet the established criteria of ethics, intelligence, interpersonal skills, logical thinking, decision-making, psychological suitability and maturity. Writing in the same vein, Aremu (2014) submits that 21st Century policing requires thinking outside the conventional box. He notes further that the police and its personnel, more than ever before, should be more proactive, intelligent-driven, solution-focused and develop problem-solving abilities. Studies of Aremu (2006, 2009, 2010, 2013) and Aremu, Pakes and Johnston (2009) have addressed this by concluding that it is the expected paradigm shift required in the Nigeria Police. Good as this would seem to ensure the right personnel in the police, the interference of some factors like padded recruitment policy (Aremu 2014), corruption (Aremu et al. 2009), and lack of organizational citizenship behaviour (Reichers 1985; Beck and Wilson 1998; Aremu and Tejumola 2008). Relatedly, the police culture in terms of what they go through in training (which in most cases is antithetical to police values) could be a dispositional factor affecting police effectiveness in the society.

Police effectiveness would also be determined by the quality of both its internal and external governance. This explains why governance constitutes the second effect of the 'Trinity' model of

policing. More often than not, the quality of the police personnel and their productivity are dictated by the government in terms of the quality of funding the agency receives. Purdy (2013) attests to this by stressing that without resources the police cannot be productive. Aremu (2014) also corroborates this by submitting that the actual cost of policing a state (country) is enormous and requires adequate funding. Aremu (2014: 12) notes further that "Effective policing depends on adequate budgetary allocation to security of which the police are the primary agents". Related to the second tripod in the model is the too much government interference in the police internal governance. All over the world, police governance is tied to the dictates of the ruling class which in many cases are abused. In Nigeria, the police agency is on the exclusive list of the constitution. The police agency until the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari had its own ministry, Ministry of Police Affairs.

The last leg of the model is the public which Aremu (2014) refers to as the consumers of policing products. Police work is a function of the support base of members of the public. Unarguably, the public is the determinant of the quality of policing work in the society. Police job is all about contact with the public either directly or through electronic policing. Robert Peel (1829) avers that policing fulfillment are functions and duties that are dependent on public approval. Where the public approves of the police job, security becomes more acceptable and also a function of police effectiveness in the society.

These interventions are mutually inclusive to produce overall security outcome, police effectiveness; and could be driven from all ends and not straight-jacketed. Enhanced police productivity (effectiveness) would be best achieved by a police mechanism (governance) that provides appropriate support to its officers and front-line personnel; and commitment to the police task is also expected by members of the public for police effectiveness (Aremu and Jones 2011).

With these three interventions—the police personnel, police governance and the public, 'Trinity' policing model could engender effective policing in the society if the interventions work optimally. The model that was self-developed, is diagrammatically sketched below in figure 3.1:

POLICING

POLICE
GOVERNANCE
- Policies
- Funding & Cost of
  Policing
- Leadership &
  Framework

Feedback

ENCLAVE

INTERNAL SECURITY ENCLAVE

THE POLICE
- Enlistment &
  Quality of
  Personnel
- Police Culture &
  Ethics
- Intelligence
- Physical &
  Psychological
  Composures of
  Personnel
- Paradigm shift

COMMUNICATING
SECURITY AND
FEEDBACK
MECHANISM

COMMUNICATING
SECURITY AND
FEEDBACK
MECHANISM

Police/Public
Synergy

THE PUBLIC
- Attitude
- Perception

POLICING

Fig. 3.1: The 'Trinity' policing model.

In the model above, the three interventions are mutually inclusive and could through the intervening variables in the boxes (policies, funding and cost of policing, leadership and framework, enlistment and quality of personnel, police culture and ethics, intelligence, physical and psychological composures of personnel, paradigm shift, attitude; and perception) determine policing effectiveness. The feedback systems as shown in the model are also crucial to the outcome measure (police effectiveness) in the model.

Rethinking Policing Work for Effectiveness in Nigeria
Nigeria as a country is going through a colossal security challenges which have impacted negatively on many strata of her national life. Given these challenges and evident ineffectiveness of the Nigeria Police, there is a need to rethink policing work as operationalize by the Nigeria Police. The clarity is expedient in that other security agencies like the Army, Navy, Air Force, Civil Defense, Department of State Security Service, and others also engage in policing work. The Nigeria Police is arguably the only constitutionally empowered security agency in charge primarily of internal security. In spite of this constitutional role of the police, all is not well with the agency. Aremu (2014) submits that policing work in Nigeria is daunting and burdensome as a result of challenges confronting the agency. According to him, with about 365,000 police personnel and a population of more than 175 million people, the population of police to civilians is 1: 480. This indicates that the country is less policed and a far cry from the United Nations' recommended standard. With the population projected to be 186.9 million people in 2016 (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2016) and no corresponding increase in the number of police personnel in Nigeria, it is worrisome to aver that police effectiveness could be very difficult to achieve. Alluding to this, Aremu (2015) in his work on policing and insurgency in Nigeria bluntly asserts that the Nigeria Police is ineffective and public trust in the agency has waned. Nothing can be farther from the true given the rising profile of crime in Nigeria and uncooperative disposition of the public.

The Nigeria Police as a security agency is not known to have evolved a scientific model for its operations. While personnel of the Nigeria Police excel in peacekeeping operations in foreign countries, the same cannot be said of the personnel internally. This might be due to some factors like scientific logistics provided in foreign peacekeeping, the right motivation, proactive model of policing. Often, members of the Nigeria Police still thrive in legitimacy model of policing which is coercive in nature. Policing in the 21st Century though have legitimacy, it is also balanced with Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP). ILP according to Aremu (2014) as a policing concept is solution-driven and geared towards public safety using information and dissemination of same. Aremu further reiterates that ILP is all about prioritising policing duties. ILP is also explained as police and community collaboration for effective security interventions; and the needed paradigm shift in public safety is for the police to make good use of the community for intelligence gathering and exchange (Aremu 2015). Collaborating this, Aremu (2014) avers that the police need intelligence that is community-driven.

With ILP, the Nigeria Police would be repositioned to engage in policing by brain and not policing by force. The Nigeria Police realize this by removing the word, 'Force' from its name some years ago but this is not effectively operationalize by its personnel. Policing in other climes especially in Europe, America and India is by brain, third-eye (Close Circuit Television) and more of public contact. Emphasis on ILP can again be inferred from Ratcliffe's (2008) definition as a conceptual model that uses crime analysis and criminal intelligence in a strategic manner to determine offenders for targeting. This is in effect what community policing philosophy is all about. The Nigeria Police should not ease out only the sobriquet of the force in its name; the police should add value to its operations. This requires paradigm shift from the age-long policing model to value-added policing.

Value-added policing is in tandem with the 'Trinity' policing model discussed above. To add value to policing work in Nigeria, the three core elements of the personnel, police governance and the public would have to be re-engineered for results (police effectiveness). This model stands to impact on policing effective-ness especially in Nigeria where the three elements are at variance

with one another – the police are suspicious of the public, while the public detests the police; and the state's interference and underfunding of the police agency. That expressed, a fundamental inference from the philosophy of the model is to harness the three interventions to promote police effectiveness. The model is therefore, a seamless and strategic determinant of police effectiveness.

Conclusion
This paper encapsulates criminal justice with emphasis on the Nigeria Police approach to internal security. The paper is motivated to address this with a view to addressing insecurity and Nigeria Police effectiveness. In doing so, the paper gleans from a policing philosophy, community policing and inaugurate a model, the 'Trinity' Policing Model.

Obviously the security challenges in Nigeria should be reappraised with a view to addressing operational laxities. These are best addressed by the police who are constitutionally empowered for the role. There is no doubt that Nigeria needs to address the challenges confronting the police for the agency to be repositioned for paradigm shift which is crime reduction. To address the problem of police ineffectiveness given the rising profile of insecurity in Nigeria, the second intervention in the 'Trinity' Policing Model, police governance would have to be well addressed. This is not exclusive of the other two interventions (the police and the public). The challenges here are police culture, governance and public attitude as addressed in the chapter.

With the above still in the burner, security stakeholders would continue to address the problem of police effectiveness. And for emphasis, this would continue to agitate the minds of both police practitioners and researchers beyond the political will to drive the needed policies for the expected paradigm shift most especially in the Nigeria Police. Ordinarily, police are expected to provide safety to citizens by proactively fighting crime and maintaining public order. This cardinal security responsibility of the police can only be achieved when the personnel are well-motivated. Police effectiveness would continue to be a mirage in Nigeria given the poor funding of the agency and intra corruption in the agency.

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4

Kidnapping and the Administration of Criminal Justice in Nigeria

Emmanuel Imuetinyan Obarisiagbon and Adeyinka A. Aderinto

Introduction

Prior to the 1990s, kidnapping for ransom was not a major issue in Nigeria (Okengwu 2011). Kidnapping is not new or peculiar to Nigeria, as people had been kidnapped and sold into slavery during the 18th and 19th centuries (Ikime 2006). Others were kidnapped from their homes as a result of quarrels over farmlands, child-napping was also not uncommon, as children were abducted and used for money-making rituals (Sanyaolu 2009). In Nigeria, before the 1990s, cases of kidnapping were so few that there was no mention of kidnapping in the Eighth United Nations Survey on Crime Trend and Operation of Criminal Justice System conducted in 2002 by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (Graham 2005).

Early statistics on kidnapping in Nigeria are those given by the Hiscox Group (2009) that placed Nigeria as the 6th highest in kidnapping cases in the world. The current dimension of kidnapping became alarming in the Niger Delta region when militants in February, 2006, abducted some oil workers ostensibly to draw global attention to the deplorable situation in the oil-rich Niger Delta region of the country. Since then, kidnapping has spread to most parts of the country, especially the south-eastern and south-southern regions of Nigeria. The targets are no longer oil workers or foreigners alone; every Nigerian is now a target. In fact, the safety of persons in Nigeria and their property cannot be guaranteed owing to the near daily incidents of kidnapping.

Kidnapping is an offence punishable under the Nigerian law. Anybody caught involved in the act is expected to face a penalty of ten years' imprisonment. Apart from this, some states like Abia, Akwa Ibom, Anambra, Enugu, Imo, Ebonyi, Rivers and Edo have

passed into law a bill termed "Prohibition of Hostage Taking and Related Offences Law" with death penalty as punishment for offenders (Inyang 2009). In further response to the rising waves of kidnapping, some states have improved their methods and strategies of stemming the menace. They have increased their funding on security matters and provided more equipment, communication gadgets, vehicles and other tools of policing to their various State Police Commands.

Only scanty cases of kidnapping have been successfully prosecuted in Nigeria but these cases are unreported. A question is: Why this unwholesome state of affairs? Ukiwo (2002) has argued that the problem lies squarely at the foot of the corrupt and corrupting role of the police and the courts which makes up the criminal justice system. The unprecedented upsurge in kidnapping currently being experienced across the country has drawn attention to the imperative of reviewing the current strategy of dealing with the crime. In particular, there is the need to explore the extant laws and the extent to which they are being enforced with a view to establishing their efficacy as a punitive measure and as a deterrent. Therefore, this chapter examined the interplay between kidnapping and the administration of the criminal justice in selected states of Nigeria.

Meaning, Nature and Forms of Kidnapping
Kidnapping is a very serious crime but it is relatively unheard of in contemporary scholarship compared to robbery, burglary and other forms of crime. Yang and Huang (2007) attributes such relative obscurity to three reasons: rarity of the event itself, access to known kidnappers and data problem. As a rare event, scholars tend to see kidnapping as an insignificant criminal act which accounts for low research interest directed to it. Getting access to known kidnappers is difficult in most instances. There is also the problem of reliability and validity of data.

Turner (1998) has attempted documentation of how kidnapping originated. According to him, the term "kidnapping" originated in the 17th century England where children were "kidnapped" and often sold as slaves or agricultural workers to colonial farmers. Centuries before, in ancient Rome, the Emperor Constantine (AD

315) became so alarmed by the incidence of kidnapping that he ordered the death penalty as punishment for the crime. Robber-barons were kidnapping merchants and holding them for ransom in the Middle Ages in Europe. King Richard I of England was held hostage for years by the Archduke of Austria in the 12th century (Turner 1998). In 1800, in the Sulu Archipelago, now part of the Philippines, there was already a standard scale of ransom fees ranging from 2000 pesos for a European friar to 30-50 pesos for a male Filipino (Turner 1998). An upsurge in kidnapping in the United States of America by organized criminal gangs led, in 1931, to the introduction of federal legislation on kidnapping in both the Senate and House of Representatives (Theoharis 1998).

The law of kidnapping is not defined with precision because it varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Kidnapping generally occurs when a person without lawful authority physically asports (that is moves) another person without that person's consent, with intent to use the abduction in connection with some other nefarious objective. Kidnapping laws in Nigeria derives from the common law of kidnapping that was developed by courts in England. The crime of kidnapping is defined as the unlawful and non-consensual transportation of a person from one country to another. In Nigeria, Section 364 of the Criminal Code, Chapter 77 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 provides for kidnapping. The Act most notably eliminated the requirement of interstate transport.

Two key elements must be sustained in a charge of kidnapping. Firstly, the asportation or detention must be unlawful. Not all seizures and asportation constitute kidnapping: police officers may arrest and detain a person they suspect of committing a crime, and parents are generally allowed to reasonably restrict and control the movement of their children. Secondly, some aggravating circumstances must accompany the restraint or asportation. This can be a demand for money; a demand for anything of value, an attempt to affect a function of government, an attempt to inflict injury on the abductee, or an attempt to commit a felony.

Kidnapping has also been defined as "carrying a person away, without his consent, by means of force, threats, or fraud" (Martin 2003). Similarly, it has been defined as "to unlawfully and forcibly take and carry away a person" (Blackwell 2008). According to

Section 364 of the Criminal Code, that is applicable in the southern part of Nigeria only,

Any person who:

(1)   Unlawfully imprisons any person, and takes him out of Nigeria, without his consent; or

(2)   Unlawfully imprisons any person within Nigeria in such a manner as to prevent him from applying to a court for his release or from discovering to any other person the place where he is imprisoned, or in such a manner as to prevent any person entitled to have access to him from discovering the place where he is imprisoned; is guilty of a felony, and is liable to imprisonment for ten years.

Furthermore, Section 365 thereof provides that:

Any person who unlawfully confines or detains another in any place against his will, or otherwise unlawfully deprives another of his personal liberty, is guilty of a misdemeanour, and is liable to imprisonment for two years.

Also, there are provisions on kidnapping in the Penal Code, which is applicable in the northern part of Nigeria. For example, the Penal Code applicable in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, provides a definition for the offence of kidnapping in Section 271 as follows:

Whoever takes or entices a person, under fourteen years of age if a male or under sixteen years of age if a female, or any person of unsound mind out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such person without the consent of such guardian or conveys that person beyond the limit of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, without the consent of someone legally authorized to consent to such removal is said to kidnap such person.

From the above provisions of both the Criminal Code and the Penal Code, it is clear that for the offence of kidnapping to be complete some elements must be established. In the first place, there must be the enticement or taking away of the victim. Secondly, the taking away of the victim must be without the consent of the victim, his parents or lawful guardian. Thirdly, the victim must be confined and be denied access to his parents or lawful guardian. In other words, the place of confinement must be a secret place in relation to the victim's relatives. The demand for the payment of ransom is not necessary for the offence of kidnapping. Where a ransom is demanded, it amounts to further proof of the fact of unlawful confinement. The absence of a demand for ransom does not detract from the commission of the offence of kidnapping. An important question in relation to kidnapping is whether it is synonymous with abduction. Abduction has been defined by Martin (2003) as:

> The offence of taking an unmarried girl under the age of 16 from the possession of her parents or guardians against their will. It is no defence that the girl looked and acted as if she was over 16 or that she was a willing party. No sexual motive has to be proved. It is also an offence to abduct an unmarried girl under the age of 18 or a mentally defective woman (married or unmarried) for the purpose of unlawful sexual intercourse. In this case a defendant can plead that he had reasonable grounds for believing that the girl was over 18, or that he did not know the woman was mentally defective, respectively. It is also an offence to abduct any woman with the intention that she should marry or have unlawful sexual intercourse with someone, if it is done by force or for the sake of her property.

Abduction has been defined as the taking away or detaining unlawfully a female, intending to force her into marriage, concubinage, or prostitution (Blackwell 2008). The Criminal Code and Penal Code are not without provisions relating to abduction.

Section 361 of the Criminal Code says:

> Any person who, with intent to marry or carnally know a female of any age, or to cause her to be married, or carnally known by any other person, takes her away, or detains her, against her will, is guilty of a felony, and is liable to imprisonment for seven years'.

Also, Section 362 provides that:

> Any person who unlawfully takes an unmarried girl under the age of sixteen years out of the custody or protection of her father or mother or other person having the lawful care or charge of her, and against the will of such father or mother or other person, is guilty of a misdemeanor, and is liable to imprisonment for two years. Ignorance of age of girl, or consent, is not a defence.

Furthermore, Section 363 states that:

In the case of proceedings in respect of an offence under the preceding section –
   (a) it is immaterial that the offender believed the girl to be of or above the age of sixteen years;
   (b) it is immaterial that the girl was taken with her own consent or at her own suggestion.

According to Section 272 of the Penal Code

> whoever by force compels or by a deceitful means induces a person to go from a place, is said to abduct that person.

A clear difference between the provisions of the Criminal Code and Penal Code in respect of the definition of abduction is that the Criminal Code defines it in relation to sexual intercourse, which is absent in the definition given in the Penal Code.

The definition in the Criminal Code is consistent with the practice in the United Kingdom as can be gleaned from the definition of the term in *Oxford Dictionary of Law* (Martin 2003). It can, therefore, be concluded that, in spite of the fact that the offences of kidnapping and abduction are usually mentioned side by side in most statutes, they are not synonymous. They may have similar elements, but they do not have the same elements in totality.

Other Statutory Provisions on Kidnapping
A casual observer of the events in the Houses of Assembly in most states of the Federation in Nigeria would be inclined to think that there are no laws dealing with the offence of kidnapping. This is so because the legislative arms of the government of most states are either debating or have recently enacted new laws in respect of kidnapping. The statute books are replete with provisions dealing with the offence. Both the Criminal Code and the Penal Code have provisions prohibiting and penalizing the offence. Other statutes also have provisions relating to kidnapping. These statutes include the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act 2003 which provides that:

> That a person who kidnaps, abducts or by deceitful means lures any person in order that such person maybe killed for any purpose, commits an offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for life.

Also, Section 29 of the Act provides that:

> Any commercial carrier who knowingly carries any person in contravention of the Act, in addition to any other penalty provided in any other Act or enactment, commits an offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for two years or a fine of ₦2 million instead thereof.

Another statute worthy of mention in discussing the offence of kidnapping and the administration of criminal justice is the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (Amendment) Act (No. 6) 2007, which amends the Nigerian Security and Civil

Defence Corps Act 2003. Section 4 thereof inserts a definition for the phrase "act of terrorism" into the original Act. It defines the term to mean an act which involves the kidnapping of a person.

Garner (1999) identifies five kinds of kidnapping. The first is the aggravated kidnapping, which is accompanied by some aggravating factors (such as demand for ransom or injury of the victim).

Child-kidnapping is the second form of kidnapping. This is the kidnapping of a minor, often without the element of force or fraud (as when someone walks off with another's baby). This is also referred to as child-stealing, baby-snatching, and child-napping. No matter the term or name by which it goes, it remains an offence and it is specifically provided for in Section 371 of the Criminal Code.

The third form of kidnapping is kidnapping for ransom. This is the offence of unlawfully seizing a person and then confining the person, usually in a secret place, while attempting to extort ransom. This grave crime is sometimes made a capital offence in some jurisdictions, while it carries life imprisonment in others. A person who acts as a go-between to collect the ransom is generally considered guilty of the crime too. This third form of kidnapping is the focus of this chapter.

The fourth variant of kidnapping is parental kidnapping. This is the kidnapping of a child by one parent in valuation of the other parent's custody or visitation rights. The last type of kidnapping is simple kidnapping. This refers to the kidnapping not accompanied by an aggravating factor.

Incidence and Prevalence of Kidnapping in Nigeria

Prior to the Niger Delta crises (1999-2009), kidnapping as an organized crime was seldom prominent in Nigeria (Okoli and Agada 2014). The sudden surge in the crime over the years has been attributed to the Niger Delta crises. In recent times, kidnapping has become a recurrent event in Nigeria, especially in the south-south and south-east geo-political zones of the country (Illechukwu, Uchem and Asogwa 2015). This has been attributed to the de-escalation of the Niger Delta crisis by the dawn of the 2000's (Okoli 2013).

Available statistics reveal that kidnapping has been on the rise in Nigeria over the recent years. Whereas in 2006, for instance, a total of 189 cases of kidnapping were officially recorded in the country (Alemika 2012). This figure rose to 358 cases in 2008 as noted by Illechukwu, Uchem and Asogwa (2015). However, since the year 2009, the figures have significantly multiplied as table 4.1 indicates below.

Table 4.1: Incidence of Kidnapping in Nigeria (2009-2012)

Year	No. of cases	Remark (s)
2009	690	Annual record
2010	579	Annual record
2011	441	Annual record
2012	285	January 01 – June 30
	Total	2,184

Source: Police Reports as cited in Alemika (2012:48)

More recent indicators point to the fact that Nigeria is still very notorious for kidnapping as there appears to be a recrudescence of criminal kidnapping in the southern part of the country, notably Edo, Delta, Lagos, Anambra, Imo, Abia, Rivers and Enugu States; with Edo appearing to be taking the lead in terms of high profile kidnapping. In these states, there seem to be a dwindling trend in armed robbery apparently because the bulk of the perpetrators have taken to kidnapping in view of its comprehensive payoff advantage (Okoli and Agada 2014).

It is to be pointed out that most kidnap cases in Nigeria have not been reported and documented. As such, there exist no comprehensive records to track the incidence of kidnapping in absolute numbers. On the whole, the number of Nigerians and even non-Nigerians who have been kidnapped over the years remains a matter of conjecture (Raheed 2008).

However, table 4.2 below indicates that Edo, Delta and Anambra States are still the hotbeds of kidnapping. The table also reveals that not all cases reported at the police stations are charged to court. A possible reason for this could be the inability of the law enforcement agents to apprehend the perpetrators of the crime.

Table 4.2: Cases of Kidnapping in Edo, Delta and Anambra States between January, 2014 – September, 2015

	Edo	Delta	Anambra
No. of cases reported	90	70	82
No. of cases charged to courts	36	24	30
No. of convictions obtained	10	6	8
No. of acquittal	3	2	4
No. of pending cases	23	16	18

Source: Obarisiagbon (2016)

Underlying Causes of Kidnapping in Nigeria
Unemployment

Many reasons have been given as probable causes of kidnapping in Nigeria. Inyang (2009) identifies unemployment as a reason why kidnapping in Nigeria is on the increase. He uses the widely-acknowledged adage, which says that "an idle mind is the devil's workshop" to present the situation of unemployment and kidnapping in Nigeria. He notes that there are uncountable able-bodied men and women in Nigeria roaming the streets in search of non-existing jobs. Out of frustration together with mounting responsibilities to tackle, many idle young persons have ventured into criminal activities, kidnapping inclusive. A graduate who is unable to secure a job is psychologically bereft of other means of survival. Faced with such a situation, the young person could develop not only a negative attitude towards society but attribute his failure to the same society. In addition, he has little or no regard for the law nor the law enforcement agents, believing that he can always circumvent the law and gratify the law officers

Ugwuoke (2011) observes that many unemployed youths in Nigeria are poverty-stricken and usually find solace in criminal activities. Diara (2010) asserts that kidnapping in Nigeria is a kind of social revolution by the youths, especially the unemployed ones who are not satisfied with their socio-economic lots.

Kidnapping is as a result of the rising incidence of unemployment in Nigeria. Thousands of Nigerian youths are roaming the streets in search of jobs. Some of these unemployed

youths do engage in criminal acts, like kidnapping, as a means of livelihood (Adibe 2009; Inyang 2009).

More worrisome is the fact that various higher institutions of learning across the country turn out graduates in large numbers but this is not marched with job vacancies. Few or no plans, projections or policies are made to absorb these graduates. If the youth who are the more vulnerable are empowered, if they are given jobs to do, if the government provides two to three million jobs in this country, most of these crimes will be reduced. Even at times when the youths want to be creative, there is no government incentive to empower them.

Okoro (2010) states that the unemployment factor in Nigeria, with its alarmingly increasing rate, is among the country's top five headaches. This evil monster, "unemployment", has succeeded massively in pouring into the minds of its victims, bright but negative thoughts and ideas on how to make fast money, by ignoring all cautions. Today, the newest idea seems strongly to be kidnapping.

It was not until the late 1990s that the kidnapping business became popular as a route to consider, especially amongst the militant unemployed groups in the oil-rich Niger Delta. It was all along considered a veritable tool in fighting the refusal of oil operators to install in host communities some developmental project, for constantly sucking their resource—oil. Victims were usually foreigners, who were either staff or expatriates of an oil operator. They would be captured, kept safely away until some huge amount of money is paid for their release. This trend continued successfully for a long time. It must have slipped at some point into the minds of some group of unemployed youths to want to experiment with kidnapping their own black brothers and sisters, who are either oil workers, public figures or just wealthy. The experiment obviously turned out to be a huge job offer, for as many unemployed graduates who saw it as such.

If the activities of kidnappers are not checked, everybody will become a potential target, even the so-called common man. If the government, in their usual check-back approach, fails to address the unemployment situation in the country, soon the entire country

may have to go for a ransom. The kidnappers believe they should take their destinies in their own hands and grab whatever they can. The startling revelations coming out from the now infamous Dasuki gate obviously could trigger off more kidnapping.

Greed and Inordinate Ambition to Amass Wealth
Diara (2010) in a study identified greed and inordinate ambition to amass wealth as one of the causes of kidnapping. Owing to the quest for materialism, people engage in criminal activities to amass more wealth. In Nigeria, money is held higher than virtues. Kidnappers are in the business to extort money and the money is given under duress; often times the choice is either to give them money or lose the victims (Ugwulebo 2011). Greed has caused many persons to take part in heinous criminal acts. It is greed that pushes kidnappers to brutalize and torture a stranger and put his family through a cruel ordeal for weeks, months sometimes years, so as to ensure that ransom is paid to them.

In Nigeria, many youth are in a hurry to get to the top of the economic ladder. They have jettisoned the adage or axiom that 'slow and steady wins the race'. Without questioning the source of another's income, many youths make up their minds to be like those who appear to have arrived economically. This has led them into various social vices of which kidnapping is the most prominent today.

Corruption among the Nigeria Police and Politicians
Ugwuoke (2011) observes that, the corrupt influence of Nigerian leaders must have played a significant role in the escalation of vices such as kidnapping. Adibe (2009) asserts that corruption among the Nigeria Police Force and politicians contributes immensely to kidnapping in Nigeria. He gives the example of a case of kidnapping which was said to have been masterminded by a high-ranked police officer who thought that he was above the law (Ugwulebo 2011). Politicians arm the youths to help them secure electoral victory and when they no longer have access to these politicians or measure up to the life they were living at the time they were getting money from the politicians, they start threatening

and kidnapping innocent people (Onyeishi and Eme 2011). In this vein, the corrupt politicians and police may not be physically involved in the act but may be aiding it.

Many people today who are desperately in economic and social needs are often the ones who are likely to commit kidnapping. Where the gap between the rich and the poor is constantly widening and where the possibility to earn money in honest way is often difficult to attain, kidnapping turns out be a lucrative means to fall back on. Nwaorah (2009) notes that a situation where government officials, especially top-ranking persons in the civil service who are custodians of government resources, spend recklessly or loot the government coffers could automatically encourage few of the economically and socially dissatisfied persons to vent their anger on these looters and their relatives. Ogabido (2009) claims that "the issue of poverty and unemployment of youths as well as social injustice and unfair distribution of the nation's resources are potent causes of kidnapping in Nigeria. These factors have caused the youths to engage in kidnapping and criminal activities as a way of getting their share of nation wealth". He blames the Federal Government for lack of equity and fairness in the business of governance as well as lack of responsible leadership, one that is complacent or that does not attend to the people's yearnings and aspirations.

Low Morale and Lack of Training and Equipment from the Police

Meanwhile, one of the major problems of security agents is training in order to match the well armed criminals. Osaghae (2011) asserts that police training must include infantry, weapon handling, and anti-terrorist training in order to match the well-armed criminals. Dambazau (1994), Shittu and Olufemi (2008) opine that there is need to increase the salaries and allowances of officers and men of the Nigeria Police Force as a way of boosting the low morale and efficiency of the force. To Dambazau (1994), crimes, including kidnapping, based on the statistics he examined, are rampant in Nigeria owing to the inability of the Nigeria Police Force to carry out its statutory functions. This could be attributed, among other reasons, to the fact that the salary of the average

policeman is well below the poverty line. He also notes that prison warders must be co-opted in the fight against kidnapping because criminals that act outside are known by inmates. But, Nigerian prisons are faced with many problems and so have been less helpful in the quest to curb the incessant spate kidnapping.

While there is need to condemn these acts of criminality, there is also the need to condemn the security agencies for incompetence and complicity. The Federal Government which has the exclusive power over security matters has to put in place a mechanism for ending kidnapping, particularly in the southern part of the country. The negative impact of this worrisome trend on the economic well-being of the country is grievous. Wogu (2010) describes the ugly development as a violent assault on the dignity and right of Nigeria workers.

Osaghae (2011) opines that the relatives of the kidnapped persons should cooperate with security agents because they can be of great help. The Nigeria Police has been accused of aiding and abetting kidnappers, as a result people detest using the police against kidnappers (Ugwulebo 2011). The police will not have information to act on if cases of kidnapping are not reported to them. Despite the shoddy performance and corrupt tendencies of the police, the populace still needs to report and assist the police with information on kidnapping.

Leadership Failure
The current state of anomie in the political history of Nigeria could be blamed on poor leadership among the elite who are unresponsive to this state of insecurity, as they overconcentrate on how to acquire political power. They give little or no value to matters of national aspiration and the dignity of the lives of the people. The political leaders are too engrossed with the issue of power acquisition because of what they personally get out of it and neglect the responsibilities expected of them. The character of the political leadership at all levels contradicts the logic and philosophy of governance, which essentially is the promotion of human dignity and the protection of core values of society. This in a subtle way, encouraged and sustained kidnapping.

Political Economy of the Niger Delta

The political economy of the Niger Delta crisis continues to dominate the discussion on the current Nigerian political economy. Lack of true federalism has contributed to the injustice in Nigeria, which has denied the people of Niger Delta the fair share of the national resources to finance community development projects. The inequity in resource allocation and systemic injustice that have subjected the people to economic hardship and misery prompted the agitation for resource control and youth militancy in the region. This has degenerated into a greater political and national security problem and could cripple the economy if the root causes of the agitation are not amicably addressed. As the crisis deepens and as the key economic indicators look southwards, foreign and local investors would relocate their resources elsewhere.

Dode (2007) observes that this harsh reality has placed the Nigerian youth against the Federal Government and the oil-producing companies, hence the incessant rate of kidnapping. Dode (2007) notes that the level of political imbalance in the country leads to marginalization and unfair federalism. The conventional wisdom and official position in Nigeria is that kidnapping arises out of local dissatisfaction over the material compensation paid by oil companies and government for exploitation right and ecological damage. This was the initial intention of the Niger Delta militants who engaged in abducting expatriate workers of the oil-exploring multinational cooperation in Port-Harcourt who were operating from a number of rig sites (Inyang 2006).

Loss of Societal Value

In Nigeria today, the cherished culture of respect, love for human lives, hardwork, friendliness and receptiveness to strangers have been mortgaged for the Western culture and ostentatious orientation. These have given birth to modern crimes and social evils, destroying the core value of our society. Onovo (2009) attributes the rising crime rate in the different regions to the celebration of fraudsters by leaders. He frowns at the appointment of individuals indicted of corruption as head of parastatals and

various ministries of government. This explains the absence of clear direction on those in the corridors of power, who are preoccupied with self-aggrandizement rather than pursuing policies that will benefit society. He also condemns the practice in which people who embezzled or misappropriated public funds are celebrated by religious and traditional rulers. Celebrating people of questionable character is an indictment on the societal and moral value which such rulers should represent. It also encourages them to do more.

Onovo (2009) opines that the high wave of crime in the country, especially in the South-East and South-South, is fundamentally due to materialism and loss of societal values. People are ready to do anything to get rich and be celebrated in society. While also blaming the wave of kidnapping and armed robbery in these areas on unemployment, he argues out that most of the graduates of Nigerian universities are half-baked and cannot defend their certificates. He suggests the need to resuscitate many industries, like the Nkalagu Cement Company, that has been moribund which could employ 50,000 people; and the Nigerian Railway Corporation, which could employ 78,000 people if fully operational. The religious leaders should join in fighting this war by stopping the celebration of people who embezzle public funds and are of questionable character.

The Criminal Justice System
The criminal justice system is the collective institutions through which an accused person passes until the accusations have been disposed of or the assessed punishment concluded. The system typically has three components: law enforcement which include police, sheriffs and marshals; the judicial process. Judges, prosecutors, defence lawyers; and corrections—prison officials, probation officers, parole officers. Iwarenue-Jaja (2003) defines the criminal justice system as a process when the different components co-ordinate their independent functions by processing the criminal suspect from one stage to the other. The criminal justice process basically involves arrest, booking, trial and confinement. Once a crime is reported to the police, information

obtained leads to the arrest of a suspect who may be detained or placed in police custody, or even released on bail, where there seems to be no threat. Police discretion could be exercised at this stage, either to charge or discharge the suspect. In other words, criminal justice is of different stages which commences when the police has a reasonable suspicion that a person has either committed a crime or is committing a crime. The other stages are arrest, filling of criminal charges, bail hearing, trial; in the case of conviction, sentencing; imprisonment; and release upon completion of sentence (Ayorinde 2014).

Criminal justice can be defined either as a legal process or as an academic discipline. As a legal process, it involves the procedure of processing the person accused of committing crime from arrest to the final disposal of the case. According to Clare and Kramer (1977):

> It is possible to view criminal justice as a consequence of decision making stages. Through this system, offenders are either passed on to the next stage or diverted out of the system, this diversion may be due to a number of reasons such as lack of evidence or a desire to reduce the load on the system. Each subsequent stage of the process is dependent upon the previous stage for its elements. It is the dependence that best explain the system, and nature of criminal justice.

As an academic discipline, criminal justice studies provide a thorough understanding of the criminal justice system in relation to society. Students who are interested can pursue professional careers in the criminal justice system on subjects, with specialization in law enforcement, corrections or legal studies. The subjects covered include criminal law, criminal investigation, police science and management, introduction to criminology, and security management. The criminal justice scholar must be knowledgeable in law and the legal process because the criminal justice system is a legal entity.

Origin of the Nigerian Criminal Justice System
The origin of the Nigerian legal system is traceable to Britain, whose system is based on the common law. Originally, English judges applied norms and rules peculiar to each community whenever they were settling disputes. It was through such that Britain eventually established what came to be known as the Common Law. According to Dambazau (1994), the Common Law is a judge-made law because the rules are determined by judges and not by any legislative body. The law has two principal divisions, Criminal and Civil. Criminal law is a body of rules listing the various criminal offences, identifying the ingredients thereof and specifying the potential punishment. A major goal of the criminal law is the prevention and control of crime. Crime, under criminal law, is considered as an offence against the public to which punishment is prescribed by law in the event of violation. Criminal law is concerned with public wrongs, or wrongs against society, matters deemed by society itself as wrong which must also be so serious that, in the event of a person transgressing a legal rule, it is society itself which must punish the offender (Devaham 1983).

Criminal cases begin with arrest by the police on behalf of the State. By implication then, it is the State that initiates action on behalf of the person wronged. Since criminal cases have the possibility of penal sanctions, the rules of evidence are very strict and the prosecution is required to prove "beyond reasonable doubt" the offence before an accused can be convicted. An essential feature of criminal law in Nigeria is the fact that an accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. There is another feature which rests the burden of proof on the prosecutor. It is the prosecution which must prove what an accused has been charged with.

Nigerian criminal justice is given its legal foundation through the constitution, most especially the portion of the constitution which relates to the powers of the court, or jurisdictional mandate of the courts. Sections of the constitution, such as fundamental human rights, particularly the provisions on right to liberty and right to fair hearing, deals with criminal justice. The State, in using

its power to convict a person who has committed a crime, must respect the constitutional provisions on human rights.

The Nigerian legal system is divided into sub-systems which comprise various laws in force both at the federal and state levels. There is no uniformity of laws governing criminal law and procedure in the country although the criminal justice system in all the states of the Federation is similar, with some differences in the law applicable in the northern and the southern states. In respect to substantive law the Criminal Code Act applies in the southern states and the Penal Code Act applies in the northern states. In procedural matters, the law applicable in the southern states is the Criminal Procedure Act, whilst the Criminal Procedure Code applies in the northern states. Despite these differences, there is almost nothing to distinguish the states in terms of development and challenges. Indeed, it is not out of place to discuss the criminal justice system as a unitary system rather than an aggregate of state systems within a Federation.

Theories of Criminal Justice System
Despite several years of research and development, criminal justice studies and criminology do not have a recognizable body of theoretical scholarship about the criminal justice system and crime control. This notwithstanding, scholars are agreed that the theory of criminal justice is a branch of philosophy of law that deals with criminal justice and particularly, punishment. This section examines the classical theory, neo-classical theory and modern version of classical theory as well as the consensus and conflict model of criminal justice system.

Classical Theory
One of the major proponents of the classical theory of the criminal justice system is Cesare Beccaria. The theory rests on three major assumptions: all individuals possess freewill, rational manner and manipulability. Beccaria (1963) like all classical theorists argues that all individuals have free will and make choices on that free will. Rational manner means that all individuals rationally look out for their own personal satisfaction. This is key to the relationship

between laws and crime. Individuals will rationally look for their best interest, and this might entail deviant acts. The law, whose goal is to preserve the social contract, will try to stop these deviant acts. This ends up with the individuals and society rationally looking for satisfaction. At times these interests may clash. Manipulability, universally shared human motive of rational self-interest, makes human action predictable, generalizable and controllable. The job of the criminal justice system is to control all deviant acts that an individual with free will and rational thought might do in the pursuit of personal pleasure. This is made easier by the fact that human actions are predictable and controllable. With the right punishment or threat, the criminal justice system can control the human being with free will and rational thought. The problem the criminal justice system has is finding the right punishment or threats.

Beccaria (1963) expresses not only the need for the criminal justice system, but also the government's right to have laws and punishments. He notes that in the social contract, or the idea that individuals with free will and rational thought made a choice to live in a society instead of living alone.

When one chooses to live in a society, then one chooses to give up some personal liberties in exchange for the safety and comfort of a society. Laws are designed as the framework of society and the rules for which acts are encouraged or prohibited. Laws are the conditions of a society of individuals who have free will and are rational. There is a need to have a system set up in order to ensure that the individuals in society are protected against any individual or group that wants to take back the personal liberties forfeited in the social contract and those who want to also harm the personal liberties of others in society. Beccaria (1963) states that, "but merely to have established this deposit was not enough; it had to be defended against private usurpation by individuals each of whom always tries not only to withdraw his own share but also to usurp for himself that of others". So, there is a need for and a right to have laws and a criminal justice system to ensure that all individuals in society obey or follow the social contract.

Although, Beccaria (1963) asserts that, while there is need for a government and a criminal justice system if there is to be a civilized society, he does not believe that the government or criminal justice system of that time was appropriate. The government at that time, to him, was just a few remnants of the laws of an ancient predatory people, compiled for a monarch who ruled twelve centuries ago in Constantinople, mixed subsequently with Longobardic tribal customs, and bound together in chaotic volumes of obscure and unauthorized interpreters. The criminal justice system was not anymore enlightened than the government. The criminal laws and especially the "barbarous" punishments of the time were in need of reform. His treatise, "On Crimes and Punishments" is aimed at creating a blueprint for which the new enlightened criminal justice system would be based.

One thing that is essential to any laws regarding criminal justice is that the laws be created by a dispassionate student of human nature. Many of the laws then were just mere tools of the passion of some, or arose from an accidental and temporary need. Instead of laws created out of passions, Beccaria (1963) stresses the importance of creating laws for the greatest happiness shared by the greatest number. To ensure that laws of that nature were formed, an educated and enlightened male should create the laws that would benefit the entire community, and he should do so without looking for only his benefit or passions. Laws should be enlightened, rational, logical and should be the greatest good for the greatest number. He observes that criminal laws should be formed with rational thought and not passions.

With the creation of criminal laws and a criminal justice system, a rational form of punishment must also be created. Beccaria (1963) is very much against the cruel and arbitrary punishments of the day, but he claims that the government had the right and duty to punish those individuals that threatened the society. The government had only the right to inflict punishments that were necessary for the crime. For a punishment to attain its end, the evil which it inflicts has only to exceed the advantage derivable from the crime; in this excess of evil one should include the certainty of punishment and the loss of the good which the

crime might have produced. All beyond this is superfluous and for that reason tyrannical. So while the government could punish, it could not go farther than what was necessary for the security of society.

To determine what amount of punishment is necessary of safety and what is excessive, the legislators, the dispassionate students of human nature, must define the punishments for each crime. Since members of society are rational human beings with free will, they will commit acts if the pleasure of the act outweighs the cost. To stop individuals from committing prohibited acts, punishments must be set to make the punishment just over the amount of pleasure the individuals receive from the deviant acts. Any punishment that grossly or even slightly goes over the amount necessary to stop individuals from committing prohibited acts would be considered unjust.

Beccaria (1963) gives examples of how the system should work. He gives the particular principles that a just government would use to maintain the security of the society, namely: the arrests, court hearings, detention, prison, death penalty, particular crimes and crime prevention. One of the first parts of the criminal justice system that he discusses is the role the courts play in obtaining justice. He discusses some rules, which include: laws must be set by legislators; legislators cannot judge persons; judges in criminal cases cannot interpret the laws; laws must be clear and in need of no interpretation; offenders must be judged by its peers (half of the victim, half of the criminal); right of the criminal to refuse some jurors; no secret accusation by government; judges should be impartial searcher of truths; and judges should not become part of the treasury so that they do not look to criminals to make money. He stresses the importance of laws being clear and known because a rational person cannot make a rational choice not to commit an act if he or she does not know that the act is prohibited. When the number of those who can understand the sacred code of laws and hold it in their hands increases, the frequency of crimes will be found to decrease, for undoubtedly ignorance and uncertainty of punishments add much to the eloquence of the passions.

The Neo-Classical School
A number of criminal justice historians have noticed the pendulum-like nature of criminological theory. Once a particular model becomes dominant, its antithesis is argued by "reformers". The neo-classical approach to criminology is not a true antithesis but a form of revisionism. Neo-classical criminologists argue that the freewill approach has a number of shortcomings. Among them was the English jurist William Blackstone. Neo-classical criminologists consider the types of criminal behaviour best explained by the classical model and what type of criminal behaviour the model is inadequate to explain. Some of the objections pointed out by neo-classical thinkers are exceptions long accepted by criminal justice systems. These include classic criminal defence such as self-defence or mistake of fact. It also recognizes the fact that not all persons are completely responsible for their own actions. For example, should children be expected to behave with the same level of responsibility as adults? When does a child become fully responsible for their own actions?

Neo-classical theorists also note the fact that some people appear to be compelled by forces beyond their rational control. While a supernatural possession model has accounted for some of this behaviour, the decline in belief in supernatural forces is matched by an increasingly positive treatment toward mental illness type explanations. There were some who behaved irrationally. Separating the rational from the irrational has become a continuing problem for modern criminal justice systems. Another area of long legal concern is whether individuals can be influenced by others to do things they would not normally do, and whether they should be exonerated by the courts in such instances.

Modern Versions of the Classical School
Within criminology, the classical school's importance diminished as positivist explanations of criminal behaviour emerged and became dominant. However, most modern criminal justice systems have never rejected free will explanations of criminal behaviour. In the United States and some other constitutional democracies, the classical model has been thwarted more by the system in which it

is implanted (one requiring an adversarial procedure and due process) than by positivism. The classical model has re-emerged in criminology and American jurisprudence as the "justice model" and rational choice explanations. The approach holds thus:

(1) Doing away with indeterminate sentencing and its replacement with various forms of determinate sentencing, including sentencing guidelines, mandatory sentences, habitual offender statutes, and so on.
(2) Truth in sentencing: One should serve one's full sentence and not receive an early release through parole or prison overflow control policies.
(3) The use of the death penalty: Must favour decreasing the amount of time between sentencing and execution by limiting the appeals process.

The Principal Actors in the Administration of Criminal Justice in Nigeria

In this section, efforts are geared towards examining the nature and functions of the principal actors in the administration of criminal justice in Nigeria. It is argued that criminal justice is a process made up of stages and that each stage of the process is dependent upon the previous stage for its elements.

The Police

The police organization is the biggest, most visible and most important sub-system of the criminal justice system. It provides the entry point into the criminal justice either through crime reports from the public or its own discovery. It is unique among the other components of the criminal justice system. The uniqueness borders on the fact that the decision of the policeman on the street is as important as the existence of the criminal justice system. The policeman is the "gatekeeper" of the criminal justice system, as he decides who goes into the system and his decision has wider implications for the other system components. The policeman lubricates the system through the arrest of suspects, who are essentially the inputs into the criminal justice system.

The Functions of the Police
The functions of the Nigeria Police are similar to those of any police force in the world. United States National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (1973) identified eleven functions of the police, and from all indications, these functions have universal application:

(a) Preventing criminal activity,
(b) Detecting criminal activity,
(c) Apprehending criminal offenders,
(d) Participating in court proceedings,
(e) Protecting constitutional guarantees,
(f) Assisting those who cannot care for themselves or who are in danger of physical harm,
(g) Controlling traffic,
(h) Resolving day-to-day conflicts among families, friends and neighbours,
(i) Creating and maintaining a feeling of security in the community,
(j) Investigating crimes, and
(k) Promoting and preserving civil order.

According to the Nigeria Police Act (2004), the police are employed to prevent and detect crime, apprehend offenders, preserve law and order, protect life and property, enforce laws and regulations; and they are directly charged with, and perform such military duties as may be required of them.

The Court
In the triangular relationship of the criminal justice system, the second most prominent component is the court. A court has been defined as "… an agency set up by government to define and apply the law, to order its enforcement, and to settle disputed points on which individuals or groups do not agree" (Hemphil and Charles 1978). The court plays a pivotal role in the criminal justice system. The adjudication of cases in which there is reasonable cause to believe that an accused person has violated a specific law or laws is a basic role of criminal courts. When a crime is committed,

formal action must be channelled through the courts. It is only the courts that determine the guilt or innocence of the accused person, and the decisions of the courts have important consequences for the other components of the criminal justice system. According to Pound (1952), the administration of justice revolves around the court system. A person who violates the criminal law is brought before the court and provided with a trial in the court, and it is followed through with the disposition or judgment made by the court accordingly.

Courts generally have a very important symbolic role. As the symbol of justice, depicted by the justice scale, the public sees the court as the platform for fairness and impartiality. Courts are impartial to the extent that they allow each side the opportunity to present its cases. Courts provide the forum for resolving disputes through the application of the law, although not all disputes are brought before them. In resolving disputes, the courts must enjoy judicial independence, free from outside pressure, and judging their cases dispassionately, most especially because citizens perceive them as the guarantors of their fundamental rights. A very important characteristic of the court is the fact that it has asserted the right to be authoritative interpreters of the constitution. Critics are quick to point out that criminal courts actually undermine respect for law through the haphazard way they handle their affairs; others contend that files are misplaced; accused persons are brought to court on the wrong day; victims and witnesses are not notified of the date on which they are to appear (and when they are notified, they arrive in court to find that the case has been adjourned); prosecutors and defence lawyers are poorly prepared. If the courts are to contribute to reduction in crime, it will not be by stuffing more people in to already overcrowded prisons. Rather, it will be by encouraging respect for law. For that to happen, the courts will have to change; they will have to become models of fairness and due process - living demonstrations that justice is possible, that human beings can be treated with decency and concern (Siberman 1980). The main actors of the criminal courts are:

- The accused, the person accused of a crime, charged and brought to plead;
- The police, who are also regular users because they always appear to request charges to be filed against suspects, sometimes to prosecute, testify at hearings, and serve as witnesses during trials;
- The judge, who listens to the charges, analyzes the facts as they relate to the law, and determines guilt or innocence; and
- The prosecution, who represents the state and carries the burden of proving the case beyond reasonable doubt in order to earn the accused conviction; and the defence, who represents the accused and rebuts the case presented by the prosecution in order to earn the accused discharge and acquittal.

In Nigeria, the judiciary exists at two levels of court systems: the federal courts – which are basically the appellate courts and the courts with jurisdiction over matters contained in the exclusive list; while the state courts exercise other judicial powers not covered by the Federal courts. The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria lays down provisions for the establishment and powers of these courts in Nigeria. The judicial institutions are:

- The Supreme Court
- The Court of Appeal
- The Federal High Court
- The High Court of Federal Capital Territory Abuja
- The High Court of a State
- The National Industrial Court
- The Sharia Court of Appeal of the FCT Abuja
- The Sharia Court of Appeal of a State
- The Customary Court of Appeal of the FCT
- The Customary Court of Appeal of a State.

There are other courts as may be authorized by law to exercise jurisdiction at first instance or on appeal on matters with respect to which a House of Assembly may make laws. The courts as listed

above, explains Olatokunbo (2008), "represents in a strict sense what may be regarded as the Nigerian judiciary based on the constitutional provisions." He contends that the powers conferred on the courts (the judiciary) under the 1999 Constitution include the following:

- to hear and determine all disputes involving citizens,
- to hear and determine disputes involving citizens and non-citizens with jurisdiction, and
- to hear and determine all disputed cases involving citizens and government and agencies of government.

In view of the above analysis, the courts apparently stand at the centre of the judicial process.

The Prisons
Introduction
In the triangular relationship of the criminal justice, the third leg carries the prison. The prison is responsible for the custody of the final product in the criminal justice process. Maintaining custody involves carrying out measures to prevent escape, such as erecting high walls or chain-link fence, placing armed guards, constant checks of cells, providing a system of passes for movements within the prison, constant surveillance, and such stringent measures which may be applied from time to time to prevent escape, riot, and so on.

The Nigerian prison system was modelled after the colonial prison administration, with emphasis on punishment and deterrence. This contradicts the fundamental objective of prison establishment as a corrective institution, for reformation, rehabilitation and re-integration of inmates. The position of prison in criminal justice administration in Nigeria today can best be regarded as an endangered sub-sector, occupying an inferior position in government priorities. Poverty, socio-economic and other constraints constitute bottlenecks to reformation effort. It is illogical that the difference between prison life and living in the "free" Nigeria society today is fast closing up, as the inmate in some instances feel better off in prison than outside prison. Ex-

prisoners move from a life of hell typified by overcrowded cells, feeding, poor healthcare, maltreatment by prison officers, life full of denials to another life outside the prison walls that tend to have some semblance of what they had gone through in prison. As it stands today, the institution is generally inefficient and ineffective means of treating and rehabilitating offenders, especially through its use as an all-purpose repressive quarantine system (Ajayi 2012).

Prisons in Nigeria are total institutions. Inmates locked within their walls are segregated from the outside world, kept under constant scrutiny and surveillance, and forced to obey a strict code of official rules to avoid facing formal sanctions. Their personal possessions are taken from them and they must conform to institutional dress and personal appearance norms. Many human functions are strictly curtailed – heterosexual activity, friendship, family relationships, society, education, and participation in groups become seriously restricted or cut-off (Senna and Siegel 1981). It is an institution designed to keep people who have been convicted of crimes. These individuals, known as prisoners or inmates, are kept in continuous custody on a long-term basis. Individuals who commit less serious crimes are sent to prison for one or more years; the more serious the offence, the longer the prison term imposed. For certain crimes, such as murder, offenders may be sentenced to prison for the remainder of their lifetime.

When individuals are accused of violating the criminal law, they are tried in a court and either convicted (found guilty) or acquitted (found not guilty). A person who is convicted is then sentenced—that is, assigned a specific punishment. The sentence may involve fines, probation [supervised release], or incarceration [confinement]. Judges may sentence first-time offenders to probation instead of incarceration. Offenders convicted of more serious crimes and those who have prior criminal records may be sentenced to incarceration in either a jail or a prison, depending on the nature of the crime.

Prisons are also called penitentiaries. The word penitentiary was coined in the late 1700s because certain groups believed that through solitary religious study of the Bible, prisoners would become penitent [remorseful] and reform their behaviour and

possibly be integrated back to society. Although prison structures existed in ancient civilizations, the widespread use of long-term confinement as a form of criminal punishment began only in the 15th century. Today, every industrialized nation has prisons, and the role of prisons throughout the world is to punish criminals by restricting their freedom. According to Tappan (1960), retribution is a major ingredient of penal law and correctional systems; the effects of retributive legal and moral tradition will persist for a longer time, though increasingly mixed with other purposes of correctional treatment.

The prisons are institutions of the state and are expected to serve as correction units as assigned to them by the law (Sections 1 and 3 Prisons Act Cap. 366, Laws of the Federation (LFN 1990). The Nigeria Prisons Service is charged in Law with the following responsibilities:

(1) Taking into lawful custody all those certified to be so kept by courts of competent jurisdiction;
(2) Identifying the cause of their anti-social dispositions;
(3) Setting in motion mechanisms for their treatment and training for eventual reintegration into society as normal law abiding citizens on discharge; and
(4) Administering prisons farms and industries for this purpose and in the process generate revenue for the government.

Challenges Confronting the Administration of Criminal Justice in Nigeria

The police, the court and the prisons as actors in the administration of the Nigerian criminal justice are faced with several challenges which have impacted on the prevalence of kidnapping in Nigeria. Some of these are discussed below.

The quick dispensation of criminal justice arguably remains the most perturbing aspect of criminal justice administration. Faultless criminal rules are destined to become redundant unless adequate safeguards exist for substantial minimization of delays in the criminal justice system. Hornby (2001) defines delay as a period of time when somebody/something has to wait because of a problem

that makes something slow or late or a situation in which something does not happen when it should: the act of delaying. In *Justice Akpor & Ors v Ighorigo* (1972), the Supreme Court set aside a judgment because there was a delay of two years and nine months between conclusion of trial and judgment. In *Ekiri v Kemiside & Ors (1976)*, the Supreme Court set aside a judgment which was about 16 months late. In *Joseph Ozoma & Ors v M. Osanwuta (1969),* the judgment was given 17 years after the institution of the case. The Supreme Court ordered a retrial. In *Agiende Ayambi v The State (1985)*, Olatawura held that a criminal trial which lasted for over two years could not be said to have been conducted within a reasonable time. The machinery for criminal justice administration consists principally of rules of criminal law, criminal procedure and the law of evidence. Whilst criminal law lays down the basic rights and corresponding obligations within society, criminal procedure and the law of evidence seek to provide machinery for the enforcement of rights and duties as laid down by various rules of criminal law. In spite of the machinery for criminal justice administration, the problem of delay has rendered the quick dispensation of criminal justice more of a myth than a reality. Experience has revealed that delay is often encountered in the dispensation of criminal justice. The trend of delay in the system runs through pre-trial, trial and post trial stages (Olong 2010).

However, some kind of delay is inevitable in the criminal justice system. Consequently, the distinction between avoidable and unavoidable delays must be made. While the criminal justice system disapproves of unnecessary delays, it condones delays which are necessary and desirable. Even where the grant of request for adjournment will result in delayed trial, such request should at least, in the interest of fair trial, be granted. Mbanefo JSC (as he then was) expressed this view thus:

> It is necessary in dealing with matters of this kind to bear in mind the justifiable anxiety of the Magistrate to see that the cases are disposed of with minimum delay. It is in the accuser's interest that this should be so. After six months and several adjournments, one can

> understand the Magistrate's desire to dispose of the case. But this should not be done at the expense of giving the accused person adequate opportunity of defending himself.

What emerges from the careful analysis of the views reflected above is that, while justice must not be delayed, there is hardly any virtue in hurried justice. This implies that, the criminal justice system must seek to strike a balance between delayed and hurried justice. The unfortunate menace of delay in dispensation of criminal justice in Nigeria has been decried and condemned by many commentators at different forums. A few of such instances are worthy of mention. Justice Nikki Tobi observed that:

> One perennial problem in the administration of justice in any legal system is the question of delay… there is so much delay in the administration of justice in Nigeria that one wonders whether the parties get value justice at the end. A situation for instance where a litigation at times takes some six years or more to be completed in the High Court is not good enough… cases of delay must be addressed if the rule of law is to have any meaning.

Delay Caused by Inadequate Courtrooms, Inadequate Infrastructural Facilities and Poor Working Conditions

It is very unfortunate that the judiciary has always been starved of required funds, and has, therefore, suffered considerable neglect from successive Nigerian governments. This has had the concomitant effect of reducing the influence and impact of this very important arm of government. In most cases, court rooms are inadequate. This has resulted in the use of all sorts of undignified places as courts. Essential items of office stationery are usually lacking and libraries are filled with outdated books. This situation has greatly affected the efficiency and proper functioning of the machinery of justice, and the blame is always at the doorstep of government.

The trials of accused persons, who are remanded in prison custody, are often adjourned owing to either the lateness in the arrival or the non-arrival of such accused persons in court on dates fixed for trial. The lack of readily available vehicles with which to convey accused persons to court during trials account for such lateness or non-arrival of such accused persons in court. There is also the problem of inadequacy of infrastructural facilities. The courts, especially at the Magistrate level, lack adequate library facilities with which to promptly discharge their judicial findings. Consequently, cases suffer long adjournments during trials where there is need to write well-considered rulings. Some states lack adequate courtrooms. The facilities of such courtrooms are shared by more than one judicial officer. Some magistrates may therefore find themselves sitting for only two hours, out of the expected six hours sitting period in a day (Olong 2010).

Delay by Legal Practitioners
Legal practitioners also cause delay in the administration of criminal justice. One major cause of delay on their part is lack of industry. Most counsel have professional expertise; the problem is that some counsels do not sufficiently involve themselves in pre-trial preparations so, they can hardly keep up with the tempo in court. Some defence counsel deliberately delay trials by requesting for adjournments, purposely to ensure the full payment of their professional fees, prior to the conclusion of the trial. Some defense counsel, who are paid on the basis of the number of court appearances consciously delay criminal trials with a view to beefing up their fees. The structural organization of the legal profession further contributes towards the delay of criminal trials. Most law firms are, basically, sole practice in outlook. Private legal practitioners with sole practice, personally handle most of their cases. They either refuse to employ junior counsel or where they employ such counsel do not entrust them with the cases. Such legal practitioners frequently experience conflict of dates in different courts (Abati 2002).

Where the conflict in the cases arises within the same magisterial or judicial division, such private legal practitioners subsequently ask for some of their cases to be stood down to enable them to attend to other cases. Such requests are either

granted or refused. The practice of requesting for stand down or adjournment constitutes a major factor in the delay of criminal trials. The case of *Ndu v. The State (1990)* is very instructive here. This case was bedevilled with several adjournments at the instance of defence counsel, giving various reasons, such as his fees not being paid, ill-health, trying to procure witnesses and having to travel out of jurisdiction, among other frivolous reasons. The accused then appealed on the ground that he was not granted fair hearing. Honourable Justice Obaseki did not hesitate to show his displeasure at the lackadaisical attitude of the defence counsel, when he said in his judgment that:

> The attitude of the defense Counsel from the time the prosecutor closed his case has been one showing an unwillingness to proceed with the defense. The frequency of applications for adjournment was sickening and unbecoming of Counsel instructed to conduct the defense of an accused person charged with murder. The learned Justice further stated that: Murder is a capital offence once a trial of an accused person has opened, any defense counsel in the proceedings is not only bound to appear but also bound to perform his duty to his client, the failure of his client or inability of client to pay his fees notwithstanding. Indeed, the attitude of the learned counsel is despicable and ought to be condemned in no uncertain terms. Lawyers are ministers in the temple of justice and must discharge their duties with utmost sense of responsibility. It is appreciated that adjournments are needful sometimes to ensure adequate preparation of cases but this must not be abused or be allowed to cause unnecessary delay.

Delay Caused by Prosecuting Counsel/Office of the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP)
In the criminal justice process, it is the state that prosecutes on behalf of the complainant. Thus, whether or not a case would be disposed of timorously depends largely on the efforts of the

prosecuting counsel. Under the Nigerian criminal justice system, an accused person is presumed innocent until proven guilty. Consequently, the burden of proving his guilt rests on the prosecutor and not the accused to prove his innocence. The police, after conclusion of investigation of a case, send the case file to the Director of Public Prosecution's office for advice. When eventually the trial is commenced, the case may suffer incessant adjournments which prolong the case unduly. This is because, sometimes, the counsel are not ready with their evidence or that they lack the required infrastructure or fund to prosecute the case (Craig 1988). Thus, there is the need for more manpower and modern gadgets to enable them to prosecute their cases diligently in court without undue delay.

Delay Caused by the Police
Substantial delay occurs at the stage of investigation of crimes. A section of the police known as the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) is usually in charge of investigation and detection of all crimes in Nigeria. Where investigation has been properly conducted, effective administration of criminal justice is enhanced. The judiciary can hardly function without the cooperation of efficient police officers. Often times, proper investigation of cases are hampered by a number of factors. Some of them are examined below:

The Nigeria Police is a federal set-up. This means that all officers in the force are subject to transfer to any part of the federation at anytime. Most times, especially in rural and semi-urban areas, police officers serving in police stations or divisions are very few, and are transferred without any regard to the assignments which they have at hand. They might be at different stages of investigations. If they have gone far with investigations, the cases might be handed over to another officer. But if the investigations are already completed, this would mean that the officer would have to return to the particular court at his former serving post to which the case was charged for trial, to testify whenever he is required to do so. However, most of the time, it turns out that the prosecuting police officer would inform the court that he has sent hearing notice to the Investigation Police Officer

(IPO) but is yet to get any reply. At some other time, the Investigation Police Officer (IPO) himself might send a reply to such hearing notice to the effect either that he is already billed to appear before another court of co-ordinate or higher jurisdiction or that he would not be available to give evidence because of other urgent matters assigned to him in his new station. These excuses, whether genuine or not, have always caused delay in trial (Olong 2010).

Delay Arising from Prison Authorities
Prison authorities also contribute to the problem of delay in the administration of criminal justice. This often arises in the area of pre-trial detention. In certain cases, accused persons are remanded in prison awaiting trial. There seems to be constant deviancy and criminality in the Nigerian society, as such, the number of pre-trial detainees has become very large. Most intriguing is the fact that armed robbery, kidnap and culpable homicide cases top the list of suspects awaiting trial. The general excuse for their remand is that investigation into their cases is yet to be completed. Some of the accused persons have been in prison custody for more than five years without trial.

It is common to find trials being held up for days, weeks and even months because of the unavailability of accused persons in court to stand their trial. A number of reasons are responsible for this situation. First, the lack of communication between the prison authorities, and prosecutors. Such a situation may occur when prosecutors do not give proper notice to prison authorities of the date of trial. Second, vehicles are hardly available to convey the accused persons to court (*Effiong v State* 1998). Third, the poor medical facilities available to pre-trial detainees result in the deterioration of their health while awaiting trial. The result is that, on the day of trial, an accused person is reported ill. Fourth, prison officers and police personnel are often reluctant to provide accused persons in court to face trial. This means that trials are delayed or protracted. This leaves the magistrate or judge with no option other than the issuing of the usual bench instructions or orders which may not even be obeyed. In view of the adjectival system of trial under the Nigerian legal system, the trial court cannot proceed in

the absence of the accused, the judicial process is slowed down and most of the time, to the detriment of the accused (*Commissioner of Police v Emmanuel* 2004).

There have also been reported cases of prison officials colluding with awaiting-trial inmates to escape from custody either while they are in transit en route to the court of trial, or by leaving prison doors loosely closed or improperly guarded and feigning jail break among the detainees to enable them to escape. This usually frustrates the entire trial and prematurely throws the accused persons back into society to commit more havoc.

Corruption

The most worrisome and destructive problem facing law enforcement agencies and the judiciary remains corruption. Corruption has so permeated the criminal justice system in Nigeria that it has transcended and diffused all institutions and organs of government. So palpable is corruption. Transparency International rated Nigeria as the sixth most corrupt country in the world in the year 2006. Corruption is neither peculiar to nor indigenous to Nigeria's justice administration. What is, however, peculiar to Nigeria is the bizarre mind and reckless manner it is perpetrated and orchestrated (Tarhule 2007). The principal actors in the administration of criminal justice have repeatedly been accused of corrupt practices and this had a way of sustaining the menace of kidnapping.

Conclusion

This chapter examined kidnapping and the administration of criminal justice in Nigeria. The examination of the nature and meaning of kidnapping indicates that there are factors which underlie involvement in kidnapping and that these impart negatively on the administration of criminal justice in Nigeria. In addition, to its incidence and prevalence are on the increase despite the existence of statutory provisions against the social menace. In exploring the nature and function of the principal actors of the administration of criminal justice in Nigeria, it was shown that the fight against kidnapping is being severely hampered by the challenges confronting the administration of criminal justice.

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5

The Impact of Maritime Insecurity on Logistics in Nigeria

Freedom C. Onuoha and Olufolahan P. Koledowo

Introduction

The maritime domain – which includes defence, commerce, fishing, sea-bed mineral resources, laws governing navigation and sea-based transportation – is the backbone of the globalized word (Felbab-Brown 2013). These, among other factors, have made the preservation of maritime security a critical issue to all the stakeholders in the maritime domain. Given the importance of the maritime domain to sea transportation, resource exploitation and global trade, coastal states have a common interest in achieving two interrelated and mutually reinforce security objectives: to facilitate vibrant maritime commerce that underpins economic prosperity; and to protect against security threats related to terrorism, piracy, pollution and other dangerous acts that could undermine effective use of the domain for revenue generation, transportation and development.

As a coastal state, Nigeria's maritime domain is not only endowed with enormous natural resources critical to economic mainstay, but is also strategically positioned in the Atlantic Ocean with unfettered access to the global economy. These advantages suggest that Nigeria's security, economic prosperity and overall development are partly contingent on effective exploitation of the sea and its maritime resources. However, these endowments have not translated to a formidable economy due in part to the prevalence of maritime insecurity. In recent times, Nigeria's maritime domain has become one of the world's dangerous zones in terms of the safety and security of persons, infrastructure or conveyances making use of, or located in, the sea. The level of insecurity is evidenced by the escalating incidence of sea robbery, piracy, sabotage of offshore facility, dumping of waste, and kidnapping, among other maritime vices. Consequently, the

prevalence of maritime insecurity in Nigeria is undermining logistics with adverse effects on the overall business environment.

This chapter, therefore, examines the impact of maritime insecurity on logistics in Nigeria. It is organized into six parts. Following this introduction, Part II conceptualizes the terms 'maritime insecurity' and logistics. Part III provides an overviewing Nigeria's maritime domain, highlighting its strategic position and natural resources endowment. Part IV focuses on some of the major security threats that plague Nigeria's maritime domain. Part V highlights the various impact of maritime insecurity on logistics in Nigeria, while part VI concludes the chapter.

Conceptual Discourse
For us to gain a shared understanding of the thrust of this chapter, the issue of conceptual explication of the terms 'maritime (in)security' and 'logistics' as used in this work is apposite. It is logical to proceed with the meaning of the term 'maritime security' in order to gain a better understanding of the idea of maritime *insecurity*. The issue of maritime security is one that is of growing concern to seafarers, insurance firms, shipping companies, states, international organizations and indeed the international community. However, the search for an understanding of maritime security as a concept is easily frustrated by the absence of an agreed general definition.

Gilpin (2007), for instance, defines it simply as the "prevention of unlawful acts in the maritime domain, whether they directly impact the country or region in question, or the perpetrators in transit". In other words, maritime security "incorporates unhindered oceanic trade, safe navigation, the safeguarding of coastal communities and their livelihoods, protecting the food chain and preserving the oceanic contribution to the health of the planet" (Pugh 1994: 24). According to Onuoha (2009: 32), maritime security is the "freedom from or absence of those acts that could negatively impact the natural integrity and resilience of the maritime domain or undermine the safety of persons, infrastructure, cargo, vessels, and other conveyances legitimately existing in, conducting lawful transactions on, or transiting through territorial and international waterways".

Maritime security has two principal dimensions. The first is the intrinsic dimension, which is concerned with the natural integrity of all elements that form the basic and essential features of the maritime domain, such as the pristine quality of the waters and the quantity of fish and other marine resources. Logically, the degradation of the natural integrity of the marine ecosystem by such activities as dumping/leakage of toxic or e-waste and poaching constitute threats to the intrinsic dimension of maritime security. These negative developments directly undermine the lives and livelihood of coastal communities. The second dimension, the extrinsic dimension of maritime security, covers the safety of all "foreign" objects existing in or making use of the maritime limit. This then concerns the safety of among others vessels, persons, and infrastructure that do not form part of the basic and essential features of the marine ecosystem but that are of value to a state or entity that has the legal right to make use of the maritime environment (see table 5.1).

Table 5.1: Summary of Dimensions of Maritime Security and Associated Common Threats

Dimensions	Core Element	Primary Beneficiary	Major Interest Promoted	Common Threats	Culprits
Intrinsic	Integrity of the pristine state of waters and marine resources	Local people and their livelihood	Livelihood security	Pollution (Oil Spill and dumping of toxic or e-wastes) Poaching	State Actors; Multinational corporation; Foreign shipping companies
Extrinsic	Safety of Foreign Assets/ Persons	States/Foreign Capital (multi-nationals, Shipping Companies)	Property/ Personnel Security	Piracy, Terrorism, Accident	Criminals and Non-State Armed Groups – militants, pirates, terrorists

Source: (Onuoha 2014:3)

The extrinsic dimension of maritime security has gained renewed emphasis in recent times, partly for two reasons. The first reason is the increasing threat of transnational organized crimes – maritime piracy, drug trafficking, and arms smuggling, among others – that are facilitated through maritime channels. The second and more critical reason relates to the growing threat of terrorism, especially since the 11 September 2001 (often referred to as the 9/11), attacks. Against this backdrop, an alarm was raised that the next 9/11 could occur at the sea (Burnett 2005). This has necessitated the adoption of some measures to enhance maritime security, including the introduction of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Container Security Initiative, and the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism.

It is pertinent to also note that the concept of maritime security is often used interchangeably with maritime safety. To be sure, the concept of maritime safety is closely related to maritime security, but they do not mean exactly the same thing. While the words safety and security are synonymous in some respects, a distinction is often made because each from the perspective of some organizations such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) represents protection against different types of threat to life and property at sea. One form of protection (*Safety*) involves accidents caused by unsafe ships and unsafe ship operations while the other (*Security*) involves crimes perpetrated by humans against the crew, passengers, cargo, or the ship itself (Mukherjee and Mejia 2005: 34). Thus, Mejia and Mukherjee (2004: 317) define maritime safety as "those measures employed by owners, operators and administrator of vessels, port facilities, offshore installations, and other maritime organizations or establishments to prevent or minimize the occurrence of accident at sea that may be caused by substandard ships, unqualified crew or operator error".

In the light of the above, therefore, *maritime insecurity* could be defined as the prevalence or persistence of threats or acts that negatively impact the natural integrity and resilience of any maritime domain or undermine the safety of persons, infrastructure, cargo, vessels, and other conveyances legitimately existing in, conducting lawful transactions on, or transiting through

the domain (Onuoha 2015). Thus, maritime insecurity hampers *good order at sea* critical for freedom and safety of navigation, transportation, communication and resource exploitation. To this end, maritime insecurity has implications for logistics.

The term logistics could mean different things to different people. Given the diverse fields of human endeavour that the term has been applied, it is difficult to arrive at a single definition that is generally accepted. The meaning of logistics therefore is as diverse as the context it has been used. Etymologically, the word logistics could be traced to the Greek word '*logisticos'*, which applies to someone who is skilled in calculating or reckoning. So the term has ubiquitous usage in military profession as well as such fields of study like business administration and transport management. From a military viewpoint, for instance, the United States Department of the Army (1995) defined logistics as "the process of planning and executing the movement and sustainment of operating forces in the execution of military strategy and operations. It is the foundation of combat power – the bridge that connects the nation's industrial base to its operating forces". This definition concentrates so much on military strategy and operations neglecting the relevance of the concept to the business environment.

Kress offers a similar definition of logistics as "a discipline that encompasses the resources that are needed to keep the means of the military process (operation) going in order to achieve its desired outputs (objectives). Logistics includes planning, managing, treating and controlling these resources" (Kress 2007: 7). This definition also puts logistics into a military context. Kress' definition focuses on logistics mainly as a 'discipline', while overlooking the process element inherent in management or business environment.

From the perspective of business administration, Helsinki (1996) defines logistics as "a planning framework for the management of material, service, information and capital flows. It includes the increasingly complex information, communication and control systems required in today's business environment" (cited in Van Wassenhove 2006: 478). Helsinki restricts his definition to the business environment making it less applicable to

other sectors, such as the military and transport sector. A comprehensive definition of logistics by the Institute of Logistics captures it as:

> The time related positioning of resource or the strategic management of the total supply-chain. The supply-chain is a sequence of events intended to satisfy a customer. It can include procurement, manufacture, distribution, and waste disposal, together with associated transport, storage and information technology. Logistics relates to goods, people, manufacturing capacity, information being: in the *right* place, at the *right* time, in the *right* quantity, at the *right* quality, at the *right* price (Council of Logistics Management 1993: 40).

This definition is encompassing to accommodate the variety of human endeavour that have element of logistics in them. More importantly, it conveys the idea that product flows are to be managed from the point where they exist as raw materials to the point where they are finally discarded as finished items. Logistics is also concerned with the flow of goods and services. Understood in this way, logistics is therefore a process that includes all the activities that have an impact on making goods and services available to those who need them (customers) when and where they wish to have them. This definition includes inbound, outbound, internal, and external movements meant to make goods and services available to users in the *right* place, at the *right* time, in the *right* quantity, at the *right* quality, at the *right* price. Central to this definition is the idea of the *supply chain* which encompasses all activities associated with the flow and transformation of goods from the raw materials stage (extraction), through to the end user, as well as the associated information flows. It covers the system of organizations, people, activities, information, and resources involved in moving a product or service from supplier to the consumer.

Given this clarification, it is obvious that the maritime domain offers not only the source of some raw materials for providing

goods and services but also routes for making them available to users. To this end, it is important to highlight the geo-strategic position of Nigeria's maritime domain. This is crucial before proceeding to the discourse of security threats that pervade this environment.

Overview of Nigeria's Maritime Domain
The maritime domain of a littoral state is usually a vast layer of zones that require effective surveillance and policing to maintain security. From a standpoint of international law, figure 5.1 reveals the maritime limit of a coastal or littoral state. It includes territorial waters, measured as 12 nautical miles (nm) from the coast; the contiguous zone or coastal waters, calculated as 24 nautical miles from the coast; the exclusive economic zone, which is 200 nautical miles from the coast; and, last, the continental shelf, which can extend out to 350 nautical miles from the coast (van Rooyen 2007: 112).

Fig. 5.1: Maritime domain of a Littoral State.

Source: US Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security and US Department of Defence, *"Gulf of Guinea Maritime Criminal Justice Primer"* (Washington DC: A/GIS/GPS, 2015: 8)

This maritime limit also applies to Nigeria. Nigeria has a long coastline stretching 420 nautical miles (nm) between its boundaries with the Republic of Benin in the West and the Republic of Cameroon in the East (see figure 5.2). Nigeria progressively increased the width of her territorial waters from 4.83 kilometres (3 miles) in 1964 to 19.30 kilometres (12 miles) in 1967; and then to 48.27 kilometres (30 miles) in 1971 and finally to 32.8 kilometres (200 miles) in 1978, after the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea III in 1977 (Okon-Ekpeyong 1983: 1044). Thus, Nigeria has four zones that it must protect from incursion to ensure safety of transportation, navigation, communication and sustainable exploitation of resources. These include; the territorial waters, the contiguous zone, the EEZ, and the continental shelf (Ajomo 1983: 1034). With a coastline of about 420 nm, these translate into about 5,040 sq nm of sovereign territory and 84,000 sq nm of EEZ over which Nigeria has sovereign rights to all living and non-living resources therein. This maritime area compares to about one-third the land size of Nigeria (Ezeoba 2013).

Fig. 5.2: Map of gulf of guinea region showing Nigeria's maritime domain.

Nigeria's maritime domain is positioned almost at the centre of the Gulf of Guinea. The Gulf of Guinea can be geo-strategically defined to include the oil producing (and potential oil producing) states along the coast of West, Central and Southern Africa (Obi 2011: 102). The region encompasses over a dozen countries, namely Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. The region's over 6 000km coastal arc, stretching from Senegal in West Africa through Cameroon in Central Africa to Angola in Southern Africa, highlights its value as an area of global geo-maritime importance.

The Nigeria's maritime environment is replete with numerous rivers, creeks and estuaries, especially in the Niger Delta region. The nation's maritime domain is endowed with abundant resources such as hydrocarbons, fisheries, manganese nodules, cobalt and nickel among others, which it depends on for her revenue base and trade with other countries. Although Nigeria's maritime domain is surfeit with natural resources, it harbours no shortages of threats that undermine maritime security. It is pertinent therefore to briefly highlight the nature and manifestation of some of the critical maritime threats.

Major Threats in Nigeria's Maritime Domain
Criminal activities, such as piracy, human smuggling, sabotage, sea robbery, kidnapping, oil spillage, Illegal Unregulated and Unreported fishing (IUU), illegal oil bunkering, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, dumping of toxic wastes, environmental degradation and poaching, constitute some of the security threats in Nigeria's maritime domain (Chatham House 2013). To these should be added the potential of maritime terrorism. Due to want of space, the trend and threat of piracy, kidnapping, sabotage of oil facilities, arms smuggling, oil spillage and maritime terrorism are discussed subsequently.

Sea Robbery and Piracy
The escalation of sea robbery and piracy is the most prominent factor of maritime insecurity off the coast of Nigeria. Although sea

robbery and piracy are two closely related forms of offshore criminality, they do not mean exactly the same thing. There is no single definition of piracy that is accepted by all states, organizations and scholars. According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), piracy consists of any of the following acts:

> (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
>
>> (i)   on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; and
>> (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State.
>
> (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; and
> (c) any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b).

Therefore, for such an act to qualify as piracy, which is an international crime, it must be carried out on the high seas, which is outside the twelve-mile limit of the territorial waters of a coastal state (Vogt 1983: 1039). The above definition shows that acts of violence against ships, especially those that occur in ports or territorial waters are not regarded as "piracy" under international law. They are therefore classified as "armed robbery" or sea robbery, because they occur inside twelve miles, which lies within the coastal state's responsibility.

The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) defines piracy as "an act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act" (IMB 1997). Although this definition does have some loopholes

(conflicts with UNCLOS definition), it serves the useful purpose of providing a context for finding evidence and statistics on reported attempts or actual boarding of a vessel by an individual or group with the intent of stealing the vessel's contents or for achieving other personal benefits.

The latest IMB global piracy report reveals that there were 98 pirate incidents in the first half of 2016, compared with 134 for the same period in 2015. Of the 98 incidents reported worldwide, the Gulf of Guinea region accounted for 30 incidents with Nigerian alone having 24 cases of pirate attacks (IMB 2016: 5). Obe (2015) has identified three types of piracy that is in vogue in the Gulf of Guinea, namely; product theft, kidnapping for ransom and mugging. Product theft is the act of maritime violence by gangs directed at seizing product (refined petroleum) tankers, to steal the cargo which is then sold on the black market. Kidnapping for ransom entails the act of boarding a vessel with the intent of abducting members of the crew and detaining them in safe place to be released after receipt of ransom. The third type, which is maritime mugging, is the act of forceful boarding of a vessel to steal computers, laptops, phones, and anything that is valuable.

In terms of prevalence, it is widely believed that over 70 percent of all piracy-related incidents in the Gulf of Guinea are directly related to attacks mostly originating from the Niger Delta region. Pirates operating in Nigeria's waters are known to be violent, as they usually deploy sophisticated arms such as AK-47s in their operations. Statistics in figure 5.3 shows the trend and incidence of piracy recorded in Nigerian waters between 2000 and 2015. It shows that Nigeria has recorded a total of 367 pirate attacks within the period, with the highest incident reported in 2007 (IMB 2016). This was the period that militancy in the region was nearing its peak, before the introduction of the presidential amnesty programme led to a decline in hostility.

Fig. 5.3: Incidence of piracy in Nigerian waters, 2000–2015.

Source: Adapted from IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Reports, 2000-2015

In terms of trend, pirate attacks had previously concentrated on fishing vessels and general cargo ships. With the emergence of sophisticated bandits specializing in hijacking oil vessels beginning from 2010, pirate gangs gradually modified their tactics by using 'motherships' to launch attacks targeting largely oil vessels and product/chemical tankers. Analysts dubbed the growing concentration of attacks on oil-laden vessel to steal the cargo 'oil piracy' (ADF Staff 2011; Onuoha 2012; Arnold 2013). There were at least 93 tanker attacks in the Gulf of Guinea between December 2010 and May 2013, resulting in some 30 hijackings (Bridger 2013). The focus on oil vessels is not unconnected to the hike in oil price, especially in Nigeria, which presents a ready market for the (re)sale of stolen oil cargo. However, a changing trend has emerged in the first half of 2016. While tankers were targeted in more than 50 percent of attacks in 2014, this percentage dropped to 18 percent in 2015 (Ocean Beyond Piracy 2015). Rather than oil tankers being hijacked for their cargo, there is an increasing number of incidents of crew being kidnapped for ransom, especially in Nigeria.

Kidnapping and Abduction

Related to the problem of piracy in Nigeria's maritime domain is the threat of kidnapping for ransom. Kidnapping for ransom is defined as an unlawful act of seizing and transporting a person or persons to an undisclosed place against the victim's wish and threatened with harm in order that money or object of value can be extorted from either the victim or those associated with the victim in exchange for the safe release of the victim(s) (Onuoha 2011). Those associated with the victim could be family members, relatives, friends, employers or government, among others.

Kidnapping for ransom is one of the fastest-growing criminal activities, both offshore and onshore in Nigeria (Osumah and Aghedo 2011). Popularized by ethnic militants in the Niger Delta beginning from 2006, the menace has spread to virtually all parts of the country. At its initial stage, youths in the Delta region abducts or kidnaps oil workers, particularly expatriates, as hostages for the purpose of drawing attention to the devastation of their environment caused by oil extraction by the multinationals. Those held hostage are usually released after few hours or days without ransom being demanded or paid.

Over time, the idea of adopting abduction as a tool to draw attention to the plights of the region gave way to a more structured and organized form of taking people for ransom to be paid by oil multinationals and governments. For instance, on 3 October 2006, a militant group, the Niger Delta Freedom Fighters (NDFF), abducted seven expatriate oil workers of contracting firms to Mobil Oil, in Akpan Estate in Eket, Akwa Ibom State. They demanded $10 million ransom for the release of the hostages (Ajaero and Azubuike 2006). Consequently, hostages were released after ransom has been paid to the militias. Overtime, the criminal act became a window of business opportunity with network of interests involving government officials, community leaders, corrupt security agents, and various individuals who pose as negotiators.

Since then, kidnapping has assumed heightened dimension and frequency off Nigerian coast. At the 18th African Reinsurance Forum of the African Insurance Organization, it was disclosed that

Nigeria accounted for a quarter of kidnap for ransom cases reported worldwide in 2012 (Popoola 2013). Following the escalation of pirate attacks off the nation's coast in 2012, the Nigeria government has advised cargo ships to desist from making provision for ransom, claiming that "payment of ransom on board ships is one of the factors responsible for the reported armed attacks in recent times" (Ebosele 2013: 14). Off the coast of Nigeria, seafarers (fishing or shipping crew) and oil workers have become major target of attacks by organized criminal gangs who specialized in hijacking ships and abducting crew for ransom.

Ship hijackings have become more frequent since May 2015 when President Muhammadu Buhari took office and started winding down the presidential amnesty programme to former militants in the Niger Delta region. This has partly contributed to the resurgence of militancy in the Niger Delta, triggering a spike in the level of kidnap for ransom in Nigerian waters. For instance, of the 44 crew captured for ransom in the first half of 2016, 24 of them were abducted from Nigeria waters. The region saw 16 crew kidnapped from chemical and product tankers in 4 separate incidents (IMB 2016). It is believed that this figure is hugely underestimated given that many assaults go unreported by ship owners or oil companies.

According to the Denmark-based Risk Intelligence, about 44 Nigerians and 30 foreigners have been kidnapped from boats and ships working in, and transiting through, Nigerian waters in 2016 (AFP 2016). Most of the victims are released after ransom has been paid. For instance, A maritime security report confirmed that ransoms of up to $400,000 was paid to gangs that hijacked the MT Kalamos on 3 February 2015, around a sea area between Cameroon and Nigeria (Shipping Position Online 2016). The ship had 23 crew members on board when it was hijacked. The amount paid for the release of the victims underscores the highly profitable nature of this criminal activity which takes place mainly in the oil-producing areas off Nigeria's coast. The increase in kidnapping off the coast of Nigeria remains a major cause for great concern to Nigerians, the federal government, regional shipping companies, and international oil interests.

Illegal Oil Bunkering

The pervasion of oil theft (illegal oil bunkering) is another crime that features strongly in any discourse on maritime insecurity in Nigeria. Although several countries produce and export oil in the Gulf of Guinea region, with Nigeria and Angola being the leading exporters, illegal oil bunkering appears to be largely, if not exclusively, limited to Nigeria (Obasi 2011). The main actors involved in oil smuggling include, but are not limited to, militants, traditional ruler, cult groups, oil company staff, politicians, serving and retired security agents, government officials, shipping lines, international oil dealers, and youths conscripted by bunkering cartels to puncture the pipelines as well as provide security during the transportation of the oil to the point of exchange (black market).

The exact quantity or true financial value of oil lost to theft in Nigeria is difficult to ascertain. On principal reason for this is that Nigeria does not know how many barrels of oil it produces despite more than fifty years of oil extraction. In June 2012, it was estimated that about 150,000 barrels of crude oil, valued at $13.5 million was being stolen. However, on 16 June 2013, the Minister of Finance, Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, estimated that 400,000 barrels of crude oil are being lost daily to illegal bunkering, vandalism of infrastructure and halt in production (Ameh 2013: 29).

In Nigeria's coastal region, three dimensions of oil theft feed into the broader criminal enterprise called illegal oil bunkering. First is the small-scale operations perpetrated by some loosely organized youth groups, which initially began with bursting or vandalizing pipelines to siphon petrol, diesel and condensate for domestic use. Industry sources estimate that low-scale oil theft amount to no more than 30,000 barrels per day. Although the Niger Delta region remains the hotbed of this form of organized crime, pipeline vandalization cuts across the entire length and breadth of Nigeria where crude oil and petroleum product pipelines transverse. For example, a total of 2,832 vandalized points were recorded between February 2015 and January 2016 (Okere 2016).

There is also the large-scale oil theft perpetrated by well organized and entrenched groups. Their operations involve a little

complex process and are quite organized; individuals transfer illegally extracted oil from pipeline and wellheads into containers, and onto barges, and then to the oil tankers, from where it is transported to the ports for sale, usually at a lower price than the international rate. The well organized groups employ all the necessary tools to facilitate their trade – barges, *Cotonou* boats, training manuals, surface tanks, speedboats, pumping machines and generators, to mention but a few. There is no exact industry estimate of the quantity of oil lost in this level of oil theft, but it "is much more significant—not just in terms of the money involved but because of what the crude oil is often exchanged for: illegal weapons and drugs. There are large international syndicates involved in this operation, which also handle the money laundering for the international players" (Asuni 2009: 5).

The third level of oil theft, *grand* oil theft, is the highly organized resource pillaging perpetrated by syndicates or cartels, involving corrupt government officials, security agents, and foreign collaborators. Groups operating at this level do not require oil gangs to puncture oil pipelines or uncork wellheads to procure crude oil. The cartels are assisted by disreputable ship owners, oil company staff, corrupt government officials and security forces that benefit from the illegal trading. The syndicates use ships or vessels to transport large quantities of oil stolen from the loading jetties in the region. They are highly international, including not only other West Africans, but also Moroccans, Filipinos, Venezuelans, Lebanese, French and Russians, to name but a few. For instance, in July 2016, the Central Naval Command, announced the seizure of a vessel laden with 600,000 litres of suspected illegally refined automotive gas oil also known as diesel (Eziukwu 2016). Estimates on how much oil is lost to grand oil theft is hard to come by, but it is obvious that the collusion, connivance and complicity of corrupt government and oil company officials underpin its persistence in the oil sector in Nigeria.

The illegal trading on stolen oil is carried out in what experts call the "spot market", where transactions do not require the necessary documentation, or documents are not subjected to stringent scrutiny, since the pricing does not follow market forces (Yusuf 2008: 28). The illicit nature of oil theft or smuggling

"makes it difficult for the government not only to determine the exact amount of revenue being lost, but more importantly to track where and how the proceeds are laundered or invested" (Onuoha et al. 2016: 801). The Nigerian security forces have sought unsuccessfully to combat the oil thieves, despite the recent establishment of the joint taskforce on anti-pipeline vandalism, code-named Operation *Awatse* – a Hausa word for 'to scatter'.

Sabotage of Offshore Facilities

Sabotage of critical national infrastructure such as offshore oil facilities is another maritime threat that Nigeria has long grappled with. The situation has become worse with the resurgence of militancy in the Niger Delta. Since the 1990s, the oil industry has come under destructive and disruptive attacks mainly by disgruntled youths and militants in the Niger Delta, seeking for more benefits from the government or oil companies operating in the region.

Following the return to democracy in 1999, tension has grown across the Niger Delta region over the management of oil exploitation and the distribution of oil wealth. These tensions erupted into violence in 2006 when militants such as the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Niger Delta Freedom Fighters (NDFF), and Coalition for Militant Action in the Niger Delta (COMA), among others, bombed several critical oil installations and kidnapped expatriate oil workers (Onuoha 2016). Prominent among such past audacious attacks was the invasion of the Royal Dutch Shell's Bonga field on 19 June 2008 by MEND operatives. The Bonga field, which is Nigeria's biggest offshore facility, is located about 120 kilometres (75 miles) offshore. It has a daily production capacity of 200,000 barrels of oil and 150 million standard cubic feet of gas. The attack resulted in the shut in of about 200,000bpd, amounting to about 10 percent drop in Nigeria's daily production of about 2 million barrels of oil per day (bpd) in 2008.

The insurgency came to an end when President Yar'Adua offered amnesty, vocational training, and monthly cash payments to nearly 30,000 militants, at a yearly cost of about $500 million

(Onuoha 2016: 4). This programme brought relative peace to the region, and petroleum exports increased from about 700,000 barrels per day (bpd) in mid-2009 to about 2.4 million bpd in 2011. Several ex-militant leaders were rewarded with lucrative contracts to guard pipelines. The amnesty programme was intended to end in December 2015, but was later extended to December 2017 by President Muhammadu Buhari.

Despite the programme's early success, however, tensions resurfaced following President Buhari's May 2015 inauguration speech, which revealed his plans to significantly curtail the programme. In June 2015, President Buhari terminated the ex-militants' pipeline security contracts and the government began prosecution against the former militant leader, Tompolo, for contract fraud. At the same time, President Buhari cut funding for the amnesty programme by around 70 percent in the 2016 budget, citing corruption (Onuoha 2016). With these developments, the region again relapsed into another round of militancy.

Since January 2016, several new militant groups have emerged in the region. These include the Adaka Boro Avengers (ABA), Asawana Deadly Force of Niger Delta, (ADFND), Concerned Militant Leaders (CML), Ekpeye Liberation Group (ELG), Joint Niger Delta Liberation Front (JNDLF), Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), Niger Delta Greenland Justice Mandate, NDJM, Niger Delta Red Squad (NDRS), Red Egbesu Water Lions (REWL), and Ultimate Warriors of Niger Delta (UWND), among others. These groups have been attacking oil facilities in the region, and threatening to cripple the oil industry unless the federal government meets their demands.

The NDA has claimed responsibility for the majority of high-profile attacks. For example, on 14 February 2016, the NDA launched a devastating attack on one of the most strategic pipelines in the nation's energy network, the Trans Forcados Pipeline (TFP), which transports oil, water, and associated gas from fields in the western Delta to the 400,000 bpd Forcados oil terminal. Owing to renewed attacks on critical oil infrastructure, Nigeria's oil production has plummeted from 2.2 million bpd to about 1.1 million bpd in May 2016 (Alohan 2016). More attacks on oil and gas facilities had since then been launched by militants,

pushing output further down. This has compounded government revenue losses caused by the fall in global oil prices since mid-2014. Attacks on oil facilities by militants is designed to inflict serious damage on the infrastructure, disrupt production, and discourage both local and foreign investors, among others.

President Buhari initially adopted aggressive military crackdown on the militants, which failed to stem the tide of attacks on oil and gas facilities. In June 2016, his administration began engaging the Niger Delta militants in talks in order to end the spate of destruction of crude oil facilities in the region.

Arms and Weapons Smuggling

The use of waterways to traffic and transport Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) is another defining feature of maritime insecurity in Nigeria. Out of approximately 500 million illicit weapons in circulation worldwide in 2004, it was estimated that about 100 million are in sub-Saharan Africa, with eight to ten million concentrated in the West African sub-region (Bah 2004). More than half of these SALWs are in the hands of non-state actors and criminal groups.

Nigeria has been identified as one of the countries that is experiencing some of the most devastating effects of the proliferation of SALWs. This is largely due to the spill-over effect of the recent crises in Libya, the insurgency in Mali, and unresolved internal conflicts in different parts of the country especially in the North East, Niger Delta and Southern regions. As result, Nigeria with over 350 million SALWs accounts for about 70 percent of an estimated 500 million weapons circulating in West Africa (*Premium* Times 2016). Most of these SALWs are smuggled into Nigeria largely through her porous land and sea borders.

A high-profile interdiction of arms smuggling into Nigeria using maritime channels was recorded on October 2010 when a combined team of security agents impounded 13 containers loaded with various sizes of grenades, rocket launchers, explosives, assault rifles, heavy machine guns and ammunition at Apapa Wharf in Lagos (Ohia 2010). Additionally, the large quantity of sophisticated arms and ammunition surrendered by Niger Delta

militants in the amnesty programme in 2009 shows the alarming level of illicit weapons in the country and the grave implications for security and business environment in Nigeria.

Although they do not in themselves cause the criminal activities in the maritime domain, the proliferation, easy access and misuse of SALWs endanger the security of people operating in the maritime space such as oil workers, ship crew, seafarers, traders, and even residents of coastal oil communities in Nigeria. Thus, SALWs are the commonest instrument of violence used in offshore criminality such as sea robbery, kidnapping, piracy, and sabotage in Nigeria's vast maritime zone.

Oil Spillage

Oil spillage is one common accident that is associated with the oil industry; from exploitation through transportation to storage. It is estimated that more than 10,000 accidental discharges of oil in the fresh water or saltwater environment occur annually. These discharges vary from several million litres from tanker accidents or a drilling platform blowout that happens occasionally to the many small accidental spills that occur daily. Unknown sources, such as deliberate and unreported discharges from tanker ballast operations, could add millions of litres per year to the marine environment (*Africanjoe* 2013).

In Nigeria, the problem constitutes a major ecological damage in the maritime domain which is largely associated with the operation of the oil industry. Oil-related disasters at sea are a major source of concern to most coastal communities in the Niger Delta and Lagos area of Nigeria. Several factors account for why oil spills happen so frequently in Nigeria's maritime environment, especially in the Niger Delta where much of Nigeria's oil reserves as well as oil facilities are located. Oil spills result from corrosion of oil pipes, poor maintenance of infrastructure, leaks during processing at refineries, human error and deliberate vandalization or theft of oil. Data in table 5.3 shows the various causes of oil spills in the Niger Delta between 2004 and 2011. Acts of sabotage accounts for majority of the oil spill (44 percent), followed distantly by equipment failure (27 percent) and corrosion (9 percent).

Table 5.3: Major Causes of Oil Spills in the Niger Delta, 2004-2011

Causes of spill	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Sabotage	3	23	107	167	220	252	258	54
Operational Maintenance	0	21	33	17	36	20	10	6
Equipment Failure	0	44	65	149	165	125	96	18
Corrosion	0	11	16	42	60	41	43	9
Yet to be Determined	0	9	13	0	8	0	4	0
Others	0	7	10	71	69	81	48	12

Source: NOSDRA, *Oil Spill Report*, Abuja, February 2012

Experts have classified oil spills into four broad categories, namely; minor, medium, major and disaster. Minor spill takes place when the oil discharge is less than 25 barrels in inland waters or less than 250 barrels on land, offshore or coastal waters that does not pose a threat to the public health or welfare. In the case of the medium, the spill must be 250 barrels or less in the inland water or 250 to 2,500 barrels on land, offshore and coastal water while for the major spill, the discharge to the inland waters is in excess of 250 barrels on land, offshore or coastal waters. The disaster refers to any uncontrolled well blowout, pipeline rupture or storage tank failure which poses an imminent threat to the public health or welfare.

For example, there was a disastrous offshore oil spill on 20 December 2011 at the Shell Bonga field oil facility, located some 120 km offshore Nigerian Coast. The leak occurred during a routine tanker loading operation, spilling about 40,000 barrels that impacted approximately 950 square kilometres of water surface. The spill which lasted for an upward of seven months before Shell contained it, affected great number of sensitive environmental resources across the impacted area. It also severely undermined the livelihood of people living in 100 oil communities in Bayelsa and Delta states, whose primary occupation is fishing.

The consequences of oil spilled into the environment vary from minimal damage to extensive deleterious effects on the ecosystem. For the sustainability of the ecosystem, oil spills which detrimentally affect the value of natural or man-made resources must be removed from the environment. Preferably, this should be

done through the mechanical removal of the oil from the water surface rather than the use of chemical dispersants or biological additives that only spread the spill rather than remove it from the environment.

Maritime Terrorism

Globally, maritime terrorism is seen as a huge threat to logistics. However, some analysts contend that the maritime domain does not naturally constitute an attractive arena to terrorists compared to the aviation and land transportation domain. This is partly because terrorist groups seek publicity and their preference would be to attack a high-profile, visible symbol like an aircraft or airport rather than a ship that is often 'isolated' in the sea. In view of this, terrorist groups will attack a maritime target only if it is attractive or profitable. In such case, their preference will be to attack a target near the waterfront or port (Gunaratna 2009: 89).

Although Nigeria has not been a victim of maritime terrorism, it is feared that terrorist groups can exploit the opportunities created by lax maritime, land and air security to launch attacks on critical maritime infrastructure such as ships, sea ports, tank farms and other offshore oil facilities in Nigeria. The criminal exploits of militants targeting offshore facilities or conveyances within Nigeria's maritime domain coupled with the existence of terrorist groups such as the *Boko Haram* has led to a hyping of the threat of maritime terrorism in the country. In this light, it had been warned that "successful forays of pirates reveal to terrorists that maritime infrastructure in the region is vulnerable to successful attack, should they turn attention to this area of strategic interest" (Onuoha 2013: 289). For such attack on a maritime target to be possible and successful, the terrorist group will need more in terms of planning, expertise, capabilities and resources than it will otherwise require should the target be on land domain.

Notwithstanding, maritime infrastructure or conveyances within Nigerian waters are thought to be vulnerable. The ultimatum in June 2013 by the U.S. government that it will stop the sailing of vessels into Nigerian ports if the Nigerian government fails to improve its port security within ninety days should be understood in this light (Oritse 2013). Given the expanding ties

with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syrian (ISIS), the *Boko Haram* may be inspired, directed or enabled by the global jihadist group to undertake acts of maritime terrorism in Nigeria. Although the threat of maritime terrorism for now is considered a high-impact but low-probability risk in Nigeria, it is certainly worth monitoring.

Impact of Maritime Insecurity on Logistics in Nigeria
Across the globe, maritime security is of critical importance to logistics because the world maritime industry contains a plethora of participants ranging from importers and exporters to carriers and intermediaries involved in one or more of the supply chain flows of physical, information, and financial (Young et al. 2013). Therefore, in the era of globalization in which the maritime domain is key to transportation, economic mainstay of states and livelihood of peoples and communities, maritime security is fundamental to logistics in sustaining world trade, global prosperity and international security. This account for why states, especially littoral states and international organizations have continuously evolved measures to deal with threats that could undermine safety and security in the maritime domain.

Maritime domains that are plagued by security threats constitute a clog in logistics wheel in many forms. Hence, the discussion on the impact of maritime insecurity on logistics in Nigeria is subsumed under the following thematic headings.

Escalates the Cost of Transportation
Escalation of transport cost is one of the major impacts of maritime insecurity on logistics. More than 90 percent of world trade is carried by the international shipping industry, with some 50,000 merchant ships trading internationally, transporting different kind of cargos. The growing efficiency of merchant shipping and advances in ship building technology (development of gigantic vessels) have made international shipping an increasingly efficient and swift method of transportation. Consequently, the use of Very-Large Crude Carriers (VLCC) and containerization helped to reduce the (freight) cost of shipping goods (The Economist 2009: 52). For instance, between 1980 and 1999, the value of world trade

grew at 12 percent per year, whilst total freight cost during this period increased by only 7 percent, demonstrating the falling unit costs of marine transportation (Ugwu 2008). The expansion of merchant shipping with the concomitant lower freight cost has made seaborne transportation the predominant and often preferred mode of global commercial transportation.

Waters that are known to be insecure due to the prevalence of maritime threats are usually designated as 'high risk area'. The attacks in recent times and the increasing cases of kidnapping of crew members of ships coming into Nigeria have made Nigerian waters a war-risk zone for ships and ship owners. The implication is that the nation's waters are treated the same as the high risk areas in the Gulf of Aden due to increased pirate attacks. It also means that seafarers have the right to refuse to enter these waters and are entitled to double the daily basic wage and of death and disability compensation while within the areas of risk. From logistic point of view, this has impacts on the economy and the cost of consumer goods in Nigeria. Because of the risk involved in transporting goods through Nigeria's insecure waters, insurance premiums have been escalating as shippers are beginning to factor in higher risks into their operating costs.

As at May 2016, it was reported that the risks associated with ships calling at Nigerian waters have made the shipping business to incur insurance more than three times the insurance of every other place in the world. Apart from insurance on goods, ship owners take additional war-risk insurance, kidnap and ransom insurance. The associated risks have further surged the insurance premium on vessels and crewmembers by almost 60 percent (Enejeta 2016). The result is that the supply of goods and services are not only delayed but made available to consumers at higher price. Maritime insecurity occasioned by piracy therefore undermines logistics because it increases the cost of transportation of goods and services.

Disruption of Production
As noted earlier, logistics is concerned with time related positioning of resource or the strategic management of the total supply-chain. This covers a sequence of activities such as

procurement, manufacture, and distribution, intended to satisfy a customer (Chopra and Meindl 2015). In this wise, an activity such as production or manufacturing of a product is fundamental to the supply chain. The goods or services have to be first produced or procured before transfer to the intended customer. One major consequence of maritime insecurity in Nigeria is the disruption of oil and gas production process in Nigeria. Acts of sabotage of offshore oil facilities has significantly hampered the ability of oil companies to meet their contractual obligations to their customers.

Attacks on oil facilities belonging to major oil multinationals – Shell, Mobil, Elf, Chevron, Agip and Texaco – which account for about 95 percent of oil production in Nigeria, had compelled them in the past to declare *force majeure*. This entails their inability to deliver oil to external clients due to production shuts-in resulting from the activities of militant groups who destroy oil facilities or abduct oil workers (Leadership 2017). From a logistics standpoint, this has far-reaching consequences for the stability of the global oil market in terms of reliability of supply and prices of available products. Due to the series of pipeline vandalism, Nigeria has suffered setbacks in meeting its gas obligation to Ghana and other West African countries through the West Africa Gas Pipeline Company (Okere 2016).

The local economy feels the impact too. Such production deferment or shut-ins leads to shortage of crude oil or gas supply to power plants. The new wave of militancy in the Delta has choked the supply of gas to local power plants, thus hobbling Nigeria's power grid. Electricity generation in Nigeria has declined from about 4,800 megawatts in August 2015 to 1,000 megawatts in May 2016. Disrupted or dismal power supply in turn seriously undermines overall productivity and service delivery in the economy, as industries and other manufacturing enterprises rely on generating sets as alternative for power supply. This leads to escalating operating cost and low productivity. The net effect is that the *right* goods and services cannot be rendered to the consumer at the *right* time, place and price.

Shortage of the Right Quantity of Goods
As earlier noted, logistics relates to goods, people, manufacturing capacity, information being in the *right* place, at the *right* time, in

the *right* quantity, at the *right* quality, at the *right* price. Whatever hinders the attainment of these core principles hugely compromises logistics. In this light, insecurity in Nigeria's maritime domain has hampered the supply of some goods, in the *right* place, at the *right* time, in the *right* quantity, at the *right* quality, at the *right* price.

For instance, the escalation of piracy in Nigerian waters has in the very recent past caused a disruption of fishing, leading to the right quantity, quality, and price of fish not supplied to the right place, for the right people at the *right* time. In February 2008, for instance, the Nigerian Trawler Owners Association (NITOA) recalled about 200 vessels from shore due to spiraling piracy. This resulted in a temporary work stoppage for an estimated 20,000 workers and over 100 percent increase in the prices of seafood in the local market. At Adaranijo market in Lagos, for example, Titus fish which was formerly sold for ₦100 (naira) went up to ₦250; Croaker fish increased from ₦500 to ₦1,000; and shrimp which hitherto cost ₦500 jumped to ₦900 (Odita 2008).

Increases the Risk of Maritime Accident
Insecurity in the maritime domain impacts on maritime transportation and logistics in terms of increasing the risk of maritime accident with consequences for safe transportation of persons, goods and services (Dong-Wook S. and Photis 2012). For instance, hostage-taking of ship crew raises the spectre of maritime accident. This is essentially because in "cases where vessels are out of control because the crew is detained or locked up by pirates, the risk of collision, grounding, spillage and fire are increased" (Pugh and Gregory 1994:84). In the Niger Delta region, for instance, a tugboat, the Lamnalco Waxbill, which was attacked by gunmen in January 2009, was later found drifting with a dead body onboard and its crew apparently abducted (*ABC News* 2009). The media did not carry news on what eventually became the fate of those abducted, but militants and criminals operating in the region are known to release their hostages after collecting ransom.

Also, in October 2013 the captain and chief engineer of a US-flagged oil vessel, C-Retriever, were kidnapped off the coast of Brass in Bayelsa State. The 222-foot oil supply ship was later seen

apparently abandoned at the outskirts of the Port of Onne. Incidents like this and many others that go unreported are propitious to serious disaster because such unmanned vessel can easily collide with other vessels with devastating consequences for safe and timely transportation of people, goods and services.

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on Nigeria to illustrate the impact of maritime insecurity on logistics. Nigeria's maritime domain is strategically located and enormously endowed with resources that the country can leverage to attain economic prosperity and overall national development. As a littoral state, Nigeria has near limitless access to the world to pursue its strategic, economic, military, diplomatic and political interests. However, insecurity in her maritime domain has added to negative trends that have made Nigeria an area of global security concern.

For the foreseeable future, the maritime domain will remain a zone critical to national prosperity, global interdependence and international security. Thus, individuals, communities, firms and states will continue to depend on it for survival, business, transportation and communication. Given the centrality of the sea to resource exploitation, transportation and global supply chain, *bad order* at sea or maritime insecurity has direct implications for logistics. As a result, insecurity in the maritime domain negatively affects logistic by causing severe commercial and financial consequences, such as delays in transportation, high transportation costs, and default in meeting contractual business obligations, among others.

In order to achieve *good order at sea*, there is the need therefore to involve "increasing awareness of this important issue, creating a robust overall policy at all levels, and its execution by navies and other maritime agencies to enhance maritime security" (Till 2007: 570). This is essentially because the maritime domain is vulnerable to various security threats ranging from terrorism, sea robbery, piracy to accidents. The prevalence of these maritime vices greatly undermine logistics at the local, regional and international levels.

There is the need for the Nigerian government to evolve new measures as well as strengthen existing ones to improve the level of security in the maritime domain. Such measures will include enhanced funding of the navy to improve its training and platforms to maintain continuous presence at sea towards combating maritime crimes; installation of more maritime domain awareness infrastructure; and deepening of inter-agency collaboration in combating maritime crimes. Others include the strengthening of the rule of law to ensure that maritime violators are brought to book; re-invigorating anti-corruption drives in all agencies in the maritime domain to ensure judicious use of public resources to deliver the expected quality of service in this critical sector; and initiating broad governance reform to improve on the capacity on the Nigerian state to deliver basic services to the citizens as a hedge against them resorting to or facilitating crimes. This will guarantee sustainable maritime security critical for logistics that underpins effective product and service delivery to end users.

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6

Arms Smuggling and Insecurity: Combating Destructive Entrepreneurship in Nigeria

Ayobade Adebowale

Introduction

Security is freedom from threat or from the type of violence capable of destroying lives and properties. Ibidapo-Obe (2008) defines security as the situation that exists due to the establishment of measures for the protection of persons, information and property against hostile persons, influences and actions. The United Nations Development Programme Human (1994) has defined security as protection from hidden and hurtful disruptions in people daily activities, at homes, offices or communities. Security is, therefore, the state of being safe and secure from danger, a protection from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression (Adegbami 2013). Omoyibo and Akpomera (2013) described security as a concept prior to the state, and the state exists in order to provide that concept. Hence, Section 14(2)(b) of the Nigerian 1999 constitution states clearly that "the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of the government". When the government cannot guarantee security then people become vulnerable to the insecurity originating from external sources or from disgruntled internal constituents.

The resurgence of large-scale insecurity in Nigeria within year 2006 and now has stoked issues such as poverty, homelessness, hunger, premature deaths and millions of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The insecurity has led to socio-economic and political instability and disruption of civic processes. Recently, the Chairman of Nigeria's Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) cited insecurity as the principal reason for postponing the 2015 general elections by six weeks in the hope of recovering geographic territory lost to insurgents. Both the growing insecurity and the election postponement take their tolls

on the nation's integrity across the globe. For example, obtaining visas to other countries abroad remains a major challenge due to the negative impression Nigeria government exhibits to the world at large (Nadabo 2015). In particular, the foiled 2009 terrorist attempt by Nigerian-born Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, famous as the "Underwear Bomber" brought Nigeria to the global spotlight as a hub of terrorism. Based on the stated challenges above, the paper will focus on how agents of insecurity created income generation opportunities for arms smugglers. Attempt at having a better understanding of this phenomenon is the reason I choose to explore the "business" dimension of arms dealings for its entrepreneurs in this paper. In other words, I ventured into how arms smuggling enterprise becomes a lucrative and attractive business for those I call "destructive entrepreneurs" who profit in and through conflicts.

Generally, academics and researchers agreed that entrepreneurship represents an essential source of innovation and economic development (Glaeser, Rosenthal and Strange 2010). Entrepreneurship drives most national economies; it constitutes the engine through which innovation translates into businesses and growth in financial capital. Entrepreneurs create wealth by converting ideas into products and services, which in turn reduce unemployment (David 2005). It is also an ability to profit from risky endeavours parallel to incentives of individuals with good intentions, which leads to innovations that improves their society. Another perspective to entrepreneurship was by Baumol (1990) who argued that entrepreneurship is not necessarily productive, but rather, that entrepreneur's act in ingenious and creative ways to increase their wealth, power, and prestige without considering the effects such activities might have on others and/or the economy.

Some scholars postulate that entrepreneurs embrace activities with the highest private returns on investment, regardless of possible negative impacts to the society (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 1991). When business enterprises shouldered by an entrepreneur failed, ventures that could make society worse off are likely to be pursued by him/her (Nathan 2013). Individual entrepreneurs makes their decisions within the social context that cannot be changed, but their actions can have diminishing effect on

conflict while destructive entrepreneurs provide jobs to young men who may join a rebellious group (Naudé, Brück and Verwimp 2013). They explained further that these actions may stimulate conflict when entrepreneurs mobilize potential recruits, provide or trade weapons to fund rebellious activities. The question is, if some entrepreneurs are destructive, why would any investors provide them with capital? Part of the answer is represented in the notion of vested interest.

Statement of Problems

While the idea of human insecurities is varied and complex, I focus, for the purpose of this chapter, on internal human insecurity because it encourages destructive entrepreneurship through suppliers of illegal arms and ammunitions to insurgents and rebellious groups. Although this is not peculiar to Nigeria alone, countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, Mexico, Iran, etc., confront insecurity challenges as a part of the national problem. The difference between these countries and Nigeria is how patriotic and united the citizens are against the threats of insecurity (Akintokunbo 2011).

This failure has consistently ranked Nigeria low in the Global Peace Index (2012), indicating a worsened state of insecurity. Despite several initiatives embarked upon by the Inspector General of Police to increase emolument, provide equipment, and boost morale, the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) charged with providing security is ill equipped and unprepared when duty calls (Sunmonu, in *The Guardian*, 18th July, 2012). The Nigerian military is equally not absolved from the blame of incompetency in fighting the insurgents. Until the recent synergy between the Nigerian military and troops from neighbouring countries to fight *Boko Haram* insurgents, their efforts have been dismal. Although they have blamed their ineptitude on lack of modern equipment and inadequate arms and ammunition to combat insurgency. Insecurity in Nigeria takes a different face from the Niger Delta militancy with its kidnapping and robbery; insecurity now entails a new wave of threat such as suicide bombing and terrorism (Radio Nigeria, Ibadan Zonal Station 2014). The emergence of terrorism confirmed the prolonged failure of the Nigerian State to deliver

good governance, which has reduced Foreign Direct Investment and hindered greater productivity (Akpan, Onwuka and Onyeizugbe 2012).

Several probabilities is associated with the advent of insecurity and these affect marketing of finished products as there is an exodus of people from unsecured areas. Additionally, this situation causes an increase in security spending since businesses operating in Nigeria spend so much in maintaining private security outfits, restoring damaged infrastructure like office buildings, properties and equipment; these translate into loss of capital (Achumba, Ighomereho and Akpor-Robaro 2013). On a broader scale, rising youth unemployment, the politicization of ethnicity and religion by political elites provides a fertile ground for breeding extremism, intolerance, ethno-religious violent conflicts and a perpetual cycle of revengeful killings (Ladan 2012). These constitute triggers to the type of insecurity that leads to destructions, which this paper will explore. Although, these entrepreneurs oftentimes stimulate conflicts in societies in order to provide readymade market for their arms and ammunitions. The objective of this paper, therefore, is to examine the role of destructive entrepreneurs in aiding and abetting insecurity in Nigeria societies. To also exhibit how Nigerians are made to become Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) within their own country through the business activities of these entrepreneurs'. Examine why illicit business thrives during conflicts because peaceful atmosphere contradicts destructive entrepreneurs' business motives. The paper will serve to sensitize policy makers on the magnitude of destructive entrepreneur's activities who sabotage government efforts to perpetually remain in business.

Review of Literature
Causes of Insecurity
Sometimes ago, Asari a militant kingpin in the Niger Delta region made public statements linking key government officials and armed groups as being those causing election violence and other conflicts in Nigeria. He claimed that these officials were the sponsors and financiers of armed groups in order to ensure that the ruling Party (PDP) won 2003 elections (NDPEHRD 2004).

To curb insecurity, we should understand the causes of insecurity and investigate the sources of social disorder and instability. Sources of insecurity in Nigeria have been classified into external and internal factors, as well as beyond the external-internal dichotomy. The challenge is not so much insecurity of external sources in Nigeria, as it is of internal sources (Achumba, Ighomereho and Akpor-Robaro 2013).

Terrorism is a predisposing factor capable of leading Nigeria with existential threat, because several bomb attacks with explosives in major cities have been attributed to *Boko Haram* activities who preach against literacy. *Boko Haram* was an ideology initiated by illiterate Northerners who says woe to formal education. Ethnicity and religious bigotry alongside criminal activities by individuals and groups collectively create insecurity and breach of peace that stifles legitimate socio-economic activities in society. Illiteracy is one of the major causes of insecurity and is a very strong factor motivating people to fight their country (Akintokunbo 2011). Similar causes of insecurity in Nigeria needing urgent attention include:

(a) Poor implementation of the Constitution in resolving past socio-economic and political injustices, social inequities, marginalization, discrimination and exclusion of under-privileged citizens from political processes: The issue of immunity clause preventing our leaders from being punished for whatever crime committed while in office, marginalization of minority groups from decision making and governance.

(b) The State's failure to effectively prevent and regulate the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), especially as they circulate to and within militant sectarian and ethnic militia groups: Our porous borders are responsible for this development, corruption by some law enforcement agents who aid and abet crime is also an issue in this circumstance, we have seen them playing the role of an escort to vehicles illegally loaded with arms and ammunition to awkward destinations in our society is also a factor.

(c) The culture of do-or-die politics and the struggle for sharing national cake at the center arising from undue concentration of power and resources at federal level to the disadvantage and impoverishment of federating units (States and LGAs): True federalism whereby each region will be given the autonomy to control its natural resources will resolve this quagmire.

(d) Rising unemployment rate among youths: Nigeria unemployment rate was recorded at 12.1 percent in March quarter of 2016, up from 10.4 percent in the fourth quarter of 2015, reaching the highest since December of 2009. The number of unemployed persons rose by 18 percent to 9.485 million, employment grew a meager 0.12 percent to 69 million and labour force went up 2 percent to 78.4 million. Meanwhile, youth unemployment increased to 21.5 percent from 19 percent. Unemployment Rate in Nigeria averaged 9.04 percent from 2006 until 2016, reaching an all-time high of 19.70 percent in the fourth quarter of 2009 and a record low of 5.10 percent in the fourth quarter of 2010. Unemployment Rate in Nigeria is reported by the National Bureau of Statistics, Nigeria (Trading Economics 2006-2016).

(e) Politicization of ethnicity and manipulation of religion by ruling elites for selfish interests constitutes a fertile ground for extremism, intolerance, ethno-religious conflicts, and a perpetual cycle of recriminations or revengeful killings. This is a recurrent decimal in Nigeria usually used to silence critics and opposition voices.

Insecurity and Destructive Entrepreneurship

Current understanding of entrepreneurship is incomplete without recognizing the role of destructive entrepreneurship. Desai, Acs and Weitzel's (2012) observation shows that scholarly works on destructive entrepreneurship is not paramount in literature. Hence, the understanding of entrepreneurship is incomplete, and this renders existing knowledge insufficient. Destructive entrepreneurship has negative effects on GDP and destroys rents through effects on inputs for production, because the activity is not rent-

seeking but rent-destroying. If entrepreneurship endeavours are preferred for profit intensions, it is not essential that they must be of good type. Hence, they can be involved in activities of questionable value to the society (Baumol 1990). In this sense, destructive entrepreneurship is contextual, entrepreneurial act may be rent-creating in one place but rent-destroying elsewhere (Desai and Acs 2008). This is an accurate trend during insurgency, suppliers of small arms and ammunitions remain in business with maximum profit while the innocents die untimely. Weitzel, Urbig, Desai, Sanders and Acs (2010) provided experimental evidence for Baumol's (1990) submission that entrepreneurial talent is mostly selfish. These scholars ran a computerized economic laboratory experiment with several variations of the classic dictator game and found that individuals with stronger business-oriented (creative) component of entrepreneurial talent are more likely to accept collateral damage by engaging in privately profitable but socially unproductive, or even destructive, activities. More specifically, they observe that individuals, who are both more business-talented (BT+) and less creative (C-), behave significantly more selfish than other without these qualities.

A similar conclusion was drawn in a study conducted by Douhan and Henrekson (2010), in which they questioned the dichotomization of entrepreneurial activities into productive and unproductive or destructive. These scholars argued that in highly bureaucratic environments not conducive to standard productive entrepreneurial activities, contrary activities may substitute for the role of the State to achieve desirable outcomes. Organized crime and rent seeking might become the acceptable norms instead of traditionally accepted notions of entrepreneurship. In the same vein, Desai, Acs and Weitzel (2010) provided their game theoretic model which shows that destructive entrepreneurs can receive (voluntary) funding from capitalists if rule of law is weak and entrepreneurially talented people are impatient.

Under this circumstance, some entrepreneurs find it profitable to misappropriate their investment to satisfy personal, temporary benefits. This becomes a possibility because capitalists do not know who behaves destructively. It may therefore be profitable for them, if they take the risk and fund potentially destructive

ventures. Entrepreneurial activity that benefits from conflict is often linked to sourcing funds and other resources to sustain conflicts, and/or to overcome the adverse broader impacts of conflict (Naudé 2007).

Existence of Destructive Entrepreneurs

Destructive entrepreneurship cannot be discussed in the isolation of proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs). It has increasingly and dangerously becomes a transnational organized crime in Nigeria with *Boko Haram*'s insurgency, re-emerging Niger Delta crisis and escalating kidnappings, communal crisis and armed robbery in the South East serving as hubs or impetus for arms trafficking (Sagir 2013). He stated that perpetrators of this acts are destructive. Some border towns particularly in the North Eastern verge of Nigeria serve as locus for trafficking of arms and hostages perpetrated by criminals, terrorists with the assistance of their informants.

Illicit trade in SALWs occurs globally but is concentrated in areas afflicted by armed conflict, violence, and organized crime where there is high demand for illicit weapons (Cholewa 2006). Arms trafficking fuels civil wars and regional conflicts; stocks the arsenals of terrorists, and other armed groups which contributes to insecurity (Stohl and Tuttle 2009). Another dimension is that insecurity may create more opportunities which some entrepreneurs exploits (Brück, Naudé and Verwimp 2013). It is for this reason that (a) entrepreneurs may benefit from conflict situation; and at the same time (b) contribute to peace and post-conflict reconstruction (Brück, Justino, Verwimp and Avdeenko 2010).

Globally, more than 1135 companies, in more than 98 countries are involved in some aspect of production of SALWs and/or components and majority of these small arms producing companies are located in West European countries. At least 60 of them are involved in legal export of small arms, the figure is still souring (Amnesty International and Oxfam International 2003) because the number of countries producing small arms had doubled in the last 40 years. By year 2011, gun trade worth was $ 4 billion annually, and up to $ 1 billion are likely to be unauthorized

or illicit. Eight million new guns are manufactured every year by at least 1,249 companies in 92 countries globally. They manufactured ten to 14 billion units of ammunition every year which is enough to kill every person in the world twice over (Stohl and Tuttle 2009; Nte 2011). Evidence of arms and ammunitions illegally going into the hand of terrorists, rebellious groups or militants through destructive entrepreneurs has been established because out of the 640 million small arms circulating globally, it is estimated that 100 million are found in Africa. About 30 million in sub-Saharan Africa and 8 million in West Africa. About 59% of these SALWs are in the hands of civilians, while 38% are owned by government armed forces, 2.8% by police and 0.2% in the hands of armed groups (Nte 2011).

The origins and transit countries of illicit SALWs flows into Nigeria are from Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, South Africa, Turkey, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Kosovo Serbia, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Cameroun and within Nigeria. Harzen and Horner (2007) noted that given the difficulty to legally own a gun makes it difficult to track flows and possession. They confirmed sources through which people access small arms include arms dealers, serving and retired military and police officers, returning peacekeepers, armed groups across borders, and other individuals. Studies and reports estimated the number of SALWs in Nigeria at between 1 and 3 million since 2002 (Small Arms Survey 2007). This includes arms with members of the armed forces and the police, and those in the hands of terrorists or people of questionable characters. Despite the fact that these weapons are produced to protect lives and properties, but it usually finds its way to people that uses it for self-enrichment, personal aggrandizement and ultimately for destructive purposes including destruction of human lives. Nigeria is yet to deal with the demand factors of SALWs proliferation, dwelling on symptoms rather than causes. Whereas, the demand factors are the causes of SALWs proliferation, reason being that if there is no demand, there won't be supply (Okeke and Oji 2014).

It is not debatable that SALWs also have legitimate and illegitimate functions in Nigeria and the legitimate uses are principally for the purpose of national security which is the responsibility of the armed forces (Section 1(2) of the Armed

Forces Act Cap A20 LFN 2004) and the police (Section 4 of the Police Act Cap P19 LFN 2004). Under Nigeria law, civilians are not entitled to possess arms as of right regardless that right of self-defense is recognized (Section 6 of the Firearms Act). Zebulon (2004) acknowledged that gun possession by civilians in Nigeria is not strange and literature sources indicate that guns were first introduced by the Europeans before and during colonial period because it has always been used as part of traditional hunting activities in rural communities. Government efforts have failed to produce desired positive result in curbing insurgency in contemporary Nigeria society and this encourages illicit arms dealing. Below are evidences of destructive entrepreneurship in Nigeria:

- In 2011, a ship load of arms and ammunition was discovered in the Nigerian port by Iranian arms agents. There are guns produced locally by illegal craft gunsmith (Nte 2011).
- It was reported in June 2007, that the Nigeria Police confiscated 40 pistols from a local blacksmith in Niger State (Nte 2011).
- A blacksmith in Plateau State who in 2004 with the assistance of a Nigerian politician travelled to Ghana for training on gun, pistols and shotguns manufacturing (Vines 2005).
- Nigeria's secret service agents were scouring the neighbouring Benin Republic for Mr. Adesegun Banjo, an anatomy University lecturer of Obafemi Awolowo University at Ife-Ife, Nigeria's and his wife Ngozika Iwunze who were convicted of gun running (The Heart of Higher Education Debate, 24th March, 1997).
- Aftermath of various police and military raids of militant groups' in the Niger Delta armouries and hideouts, government initiated disarmament or cash-for-arms programmes, weapons have been recovered in droves. These weapons vary from AK-47s, Czech SAs, Light Machine guns, Czech model 26s, Stem MK 2s, Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG), MAT-49s, MG 36s, Berettas, HK G3s, FN-

FALs, Home-made guns, Pump-action, Shot guns and other sophisticated European-made assault rifles and explosives were in their hands (Wellington 2007).

- Lagos police discovered more than 8,000 pieces of live ammunition in 26 cartons hidden among bales of clothes. Apart from these items, some military uniforms, an identity card, and badges of the rank of a Warrant Officer of the Nigerian Navy were found in the vehicle. These items were brought in through the border with Benin Republic (Sunmonu, 18th July, 2012, *The Guardian*).

- There was a court case involving unauthorized importation of 13 containers loaded with bombs, grenades and rockets allegedly from Iran into Lagos port. Several reports of arms arriving by air, road and water were becoming rampart. International borders in the Northern region appears porous and with Libyan war that ended, it was feared that many lethal arms entered Nigeria from across the Sahara desert (Sunmonu, in *The Guardian*, 18th July, 2012).

- Police arrested a Ghanaian, Daniel Ofori, and one Nigerian Olufunmilayo Adeyemo, both residing in Accra, Ghana, for gun-running. They were arrested at Idiroko, Ogun State, a border town between Nigeria and the Republic of Benin, for supplying arms and ammunition to criminal groups operating in Nigeria. A total of 5,564 rounds of live cartridges were recovered from these suspects, the Deputy Public Relations Officer (DPRO), Mr. Frank Mba, said the recovered cartridges were concealed in the engine compartment and the inner crevices of the chassis of a Mercedes Benz 420 SE saloon car with registration No CC 270 FKJ in Lagos. They were intercepted by a Police Border Patrol Team while on Anti-crime operations along Atan-Idiroko road, Ogun State on 20th January, 2013. "These suspects claimed to have taken off from Ghana via Benin Republic, *en route* Lagos, were investigated by detectives from the Force Criminal Investigation Department (*http://247nigeria-newsupdate.com-#sthash.PIsxcWow.dpuf*, 30th January, 2013).

- Edo State Police Command raided a local arms manufacturing factory responsible for supplying lethal weapons to armed robbers, kidnappers and other violent criminal gangs in the South-West, South-South and South-East axis. Items recovered from two male suspects, Abiodun Odiri (aka 'was born') and Ohikhuemen Alexwere were two double barrel gun pipes, two double barrel gun butts; three single gun butts, nine single barrel gun pipes and locally made double barrel cut-to-size gun pipe. Others were single barrel gun engines, seven expended cartridges, one drilling machine and a bag of weed suspected to be Indian hemp and other incriminating items (*http://247nigerianewsupdate. com#sthash.PIsxcWow.dpuf*, 30th January, 2013).
- Bot Jack, a Comptroller in the Inspectorate Division of the Customs Service was fingered in an investigation for illegal procurement of weapons from the Police Armoury. The offence was allegedly committed in Minna, Niger State in 2002, when Jack was an Assistant Comptroller of Customs. A junior officer, Shehu Ahmed, who worked with Jack as his orderly was an alleged accomplice in the crime was also handed over to the Police. Both officers were suspended from the Service pending the outcome of investigations (Nigerian Custom Services, June 8th, 2012).
- Illegal Arms: Nigerian Army arrests gun runners in Nasarawa State published on 25th July, 2012 by Channels Television.
- A syndicate of gun runners, led by a native doctor, Daniel Danladi, were nabbed by a team of the State Security Service (SSS) in Lafia, Nasarawa State. The team recovered three AK47 rifles and a sub-machine gun (*Hir, in* 5th Nov, 2012, *The Daily Trust*).
- Recently, the Marine police in Badagry intercepted a boat carrying cache of arms, moving it from other West African countries into Nigeria. The moment Nigeria Police tightened security at the land borders, it becomes impossible for illicit movement of arms through these borders. These criminals opted for waterways for their illicit business (Ships and Ports, 27th March, 2013).

- In flagrant disrespect to the newly elected King of Agrisaba, King Walter M.S. Obanema of Agrisaba Agiri VIII, who connived with some Chief loyal to him to procure a huge cache of weaponry and dumped them in the bush. A young man named Ingonamondi Canus discovered the place where the weaponry were kept while hunting for snail and confided in the former Regent of what he discovered in the bush. In an apparent move to keep his mouth shut, Chief Douglas Awudulu and Barr. Denis Otiotio held a meeting with him and promised to pay him money (Basoene, on 30th Aug, *The Nigerian Voice* 2013).

- Three suspected gun runners heading to the North from Imo State were intercepted at Nsukka, Enugu State, by the Nigerian Military officers. Items recovered from them include 40 AK47 magazines, 4 boxes of AK47 live ammunition, 100 pieces of live cartridges, one piece of Denim Mopol khaki and charms concealed in a cap. One of the officers told Daily Post under anonymity that a serving police corporal in Imo State Police Command was involved in the arms running. When they asked occupants of the vehicle to come down, the police corpora among them pretended to be pressed and ran away. Three persons, including a retired Deputy Superintendent of Police, DSP, and a corporal, Abu Haruna, Solomon, respectively were arrested for illegal trafficking of arms and ammunition. The third suspect, Onuwa Attaka, was the driver of the arms laden vehicle (Jaga 2014).

- Taraba State police command arrested three suspects attempting to procure arms and illegal possession of firearms. The suspects whose names are Boderi Adamu, Yahaya Adamu and Philip Akuji from Adamawa and Taraba States respectively were apprehended by team of detectives in their attempt to procure two pistol guns at Sabon Gari, Jalingo with the sum of ₦229,645. Kwaji further told newsmen that during search, two locally made pistols, two live ammunition and three charms concealed in a brief case were recovered (Andrew, 14th June, 2014, *Leadership Newspaper*).

- Kaduna State Commissioner of Police, Umar Ambursa, paraded suspects at command's headquarters, at about 11:30 p.m on 20th October, 2014, the Command's armament officer, Nanbol Audu, a deputy superintendent of police, came to the armoury with two unknown persons in a private vehicle to steal arms and ammunition. The car was discreetly parked behind the armoury as the officer and the two other suspects loaded arms into it. Other police officers on guard suspected foul play and stopped the vehicle from leaving. Upon interrogation, the armament officer could not give satisfactory account of his action and led to his arrest with two other occupants of the vehicle, one Zingkur Joseph of Trade Centre Jos, and Samuel Adamu of Kuru Jos-South Local Government Area of Plateau State, respectively, During search, the Commissioner said. 11 G3 Rifles already concealed under the vehicle's seat were recovered." further investigation revealed that one of the two civilian suspects was a blacksmith who specializes in manufacturing locally made firearms (Abdulahi, Thursday 5th Feb, 2015, *Premium Times*).
- Lagos State Police Command on Tuesday 5th February, 2015 paraded two men for smuggling and selling 10 AK-47 rifles in Lagos and Oyo States. Commissioner of Police, Lagos State Command Umar Manko, said the suspects, Olatunji Olatubosun and Abdulazeem Amao smuggled the guns into the country from Mali, Burkina Faso through Benin Republic. Manko said the bubble bursted when Special Anti-Robbery Squad officers arrested Olatunji, in Ikorodu, Lagos State (Obiora, 5th February, 2015, *Nigerian Current*).
- The life and times of TK, the militant, pipeline vandal and robbery kingpin felled by police Special Intelligence Response Team (SIRT) bullets in his last robbery. Toweki Joseph, a.k.a. TK, was a 32-year-old native of Arogbo in Ese Odo Local Government Area of Ondo State. He was the leader of one of the most notorious and dreaded criminal gangs terrorizing States within the South-West and South-

South regions of Nigeria. Members of his gang were mainly Ijaw natives who lived in the creeks of Ishawo in Ikorodu and Ijegemo areas of Amuwo-Odofin Local Government Area of Lagos State. They were said to be responsible for most of the bank robberies that took place in Ondo and Lagos States in year 2015 where several residents including security personnel died during their operations. The deadly gang were also linked to the abduction and killing of several security operatives in Ikorodu area of Lagos State. TK and 10 members of his gang met their waterloo when they attempted to rob some banks and bureau de change operators at Seme, a border town between Nigeria and the Republic of Benin. Their target was to make up to the sum of ₦1 billion but TK, who lead a 17-man gang was ambushed by the security operatives on arrival at Seme through the waters in four speed boats, armed with heavy assault rifles such as two General Purpose Machine Guns, GPMG, seven AK-47 and 49 rifles, two LAR rifles and one automatic pump action gun. Other items found on him alongside his bandits were: Three speed boats, one with inscription "Castina Marine", 22 pieces of dynamites, 3,678 assorted live ammunition, 28 magazines, eight live jackets, three 50 litres jerry-can of fuel, two 100 litres jerry-can of fuel, assorted pieces of charms and military magazine jackets (Okolie 2016).

All the above incidences point to the alarming level of insecurity in Nigeria, It has fuelled and compounded crime rate and terrorism in different parts of the country, leaving unpalatable consequences for the nation's economy and its growth (Ewetan and Urhie 2013). These scholars stated that the Federal government made a huge allocation to security in the 2013 budget; the National Assembly also passed the Anti-Terrorism Act in 2011 in order to address threats to national security and combat the increasing waves of crime. The low ranking of Nigeria in the Global Peace Index confirms the level of insecurity in the country is still high (GPI 2012). Former Chief of Army Staff, Lt. General Ihejirika

raised alarm over proliferation of SALWs among misguided people in Nigeria society. He exclaimed that people acquire heavy machine guns and AK 47 rifles and that the proliferation of these arms is so worrisome that its circulation is as commonplace as owning a walking stick (Omonobi 2012). Hence, the Nigerian government was compelled to request foreign assistance from countries such as The United States, Israel, and the European Union in order to combat the rising waves of insecurity in Nigeria.

Cholewa (2006) suggested that the large-scale small-arms production is one of the factors feeding the uncontrolled grey market in small arms and their availability to questionable recipients. In Nigeria, local small arms factories are located in Katsina, Kaduna and Calabar, and more were discovered in Borno and Yobe States where some *Boko Haram* sects produce their bombs (Hazen and Horner 2007). Discoveries of additional bomb making factories is still ongoing as the military recovers lost territories to *Boko Haram*. Therefore, sources of illicit and illegal SALWs in Nigeria include cross-border smuggling, black marketeering and illegal arms rental services. The illegal sources also include local manufacturing, organized gunrunning, air and land transportation agents, arms broker and blacksmiths (Vines 2005; Chuma-Okoro 2011).

Territorial borders are not spared because along the Western border, Nigeria has 770 kilometers of shared land border with the Republic of Benin; in the North around 1,500 kilometres with Niger and 90 kilometres with Chad; and in the East, 1,700 kilometres with Cameroun. Along the Southern coastline it also shares 853 kilometres of maritime border with the Atlantic Ocean known as the Gulf of Guinea. These gives about 4, 910 km of borders (Yacubu 2005; Stohl and Tuttle 2009; Nte 2011). These scholars agreed that Nigeria's borders are porous, as it allows for illicit arms trafficking which results in proliferation of SALWs. Nigeria is a source/origin, transit and destination of illegal arms trafficking. This source of proliferation of SALWs is well connected to local manufacturing and even the legal acquisition of SALWs for different security agencies by government eventually finds their way to militia groups.

Why Destructive Entrepreneurship in Nigeria?

Boko Haram sect successfully exploited the nation's already-weakened security to its advantage. Is it that the Nigerian Army cannot combat terror or the Army chiefs have become conflict entrepreneurs? (Doki 2014). The answer is that the porous nature of Nigeria's border with Cameroun in Borno State is a major challenge because this border is routinely crossed anytime by various means of transport particularly during dry seasons. It is obvious that Nigeria's borders are expensive to police by law enforcement agents. The Nigerian Navy, on the other hand, cannot effectively cover or monitor the countries maritime borders. Combined efforts of the Army, the Police, the Customs and the Immigration Service cannot effectively control the extensive land borders due to sparseness of road network (Adejo 2005; Fall 2005; Hazen and Horner 2007).

Destructive entrepreneurship thrives because of demand factors, which include mass unemployment, poverty, corruption, excessive militarization, bad leadership, state violence etc. (Okeke and Oji 2014). It was reported that between 1999 and 2003, there were over 30 communal clashes, sectarian violence and ethno-religious conflicts with each claiming hundreds of lives and properties, and producing Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The proliferation and use of SALWs in ethno-religious clashes and armed robbery had killed more than 10,000 peoples, an average of 1000 people per year since 1999. About 66% of the victims in the 2004 Kano riot were targets of SALWs. Some of these people sustained permanent disabilities in urban Nigeria and most homicides were committed using SALWs (John, Mohammed, Pinto and Nkanta 2007; Nte 2011). Investigations reveals that SALWs were brought into the Delta region from various locations and most of the assault rifles like the Russian AK-47, the German G3, the Belgian FN-FAL, the Czech machine guns and the Serbian RPGs were supplied by Nigerians illegal dealers and sellers (Wellington 2007). This development prompted President Jonathan to order the committee on SALWs in National Assembly to dismantle the template upon which insecurity thrives in Nigeria. He argued that they cannot resolve the issue of insecurity, without first dealing with the proliferation of SALWs in Nigeria. Ukaeje warned that Nigeria had more weapons at the disposal of the people than food (Irhoegbu 2014).

Conclusions and Recommendations

Nigeria remains vulnerable and susceptible to all forms of insecurity, anarchy and conflicts across the six geo-political zones. The presence and activities of destructive entrepreneurs has scale up the numbers of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The negative impact of this type of entrepreneurship on Nigerians and non-citizens is unimaginably fatal because it leads to untimely death, homelessness, hunger and absolute poverty and this is worrisome. The most critical to Nigeria as a nation state, is that insecurity has significantly affected oil production as a result of kidnappings and hostage taking of oil workers and this has adversely reduced government revenue (Adegbami 2013). Currently, the security challenge in Nigeria looks hopeless, but must be curtailed regardless of the cost, or else, the scenario in Syria, Yemen, Egypt and other conflicts zones around the world would be a child's play. Since SALWs do not cause conflicts on their own, except there are underlying factors giving rise to, criminality, insecurity, religious intolerance, poor governance and other socio-economic factors creating anarchy (John et al. 2007).

The paper has sufficiently exposed the availability and usage of SALWs in Nigeria in terms of loss of lives and destruction to properties caused by firearms are probably the most visible impacts (Chuma-Okoro 2011). It is not out of place therefore, to state that, proliferation of SALWs in Nigeria has destabilizing effect. Whether or not an entrepreneur ends up being a victim or a profiteer of conflict depends on the characteristics of their entrepreneurial activity and their relation to the conflict environment (Collier 1999). Despite government efforts, the rate of SALWs accumulation is increasing and becoming endemic as various forms of violence and casualties are witnessed. Lack of strong legal or effective institutional frameworks to regulate and combat SALWs proliferation in Nigeria, particularly Northern part of Nigeria (Chuma-Okoro 2011) is partially responsible for the spread. If the problems of arms proliferation in the North East, Niger Delta regions and other parts of Nigeria are not tackled, the armed insurgents and warlords will undermine Nigeria and plunge it into a dangerous conflict zone where criminal gangs will rule at the expense of legitimate authority (Naagbanton, ND). Based on

the various issues highlighted above, the following recommendations are suggested:

- Illegal dealings with arms and ammunition should attract heavy penalties to discourage destructive entrepreneurs in Nigeria.
- There should be death sentence policy for illegal arms suppliers caught trading in ammunitions, because it should be preferred to loose one trafficker than several hundreds of potential lives these entrepreneurs would terminate untimely through their illicit businesses.
- State security agents should comb all nooks and crannies to identify where locally made arms are manufactured and the owners face full wrath of the law.
- Nigerians should be encouraged through given of incentives to provide information that can lead to the arrest of destructive entrepreneurs.
- Nigeria government must strive to attain the height where crimes will be nibbed in the bud before they escalate to hydra headed level.

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7

Mass Media, Security Challenges and Expectations of the Press in a Terror-afflicted Society: The Case of Nigeria

Ahmad Muhammad Auwal

Introduction

The contributions of mass media to Nigeria's socio-economic-cum-political development in the 21st century cannot be overemphasized. The press helps to keep the public informed, it entertains, educates and sets standards and establishes values for public conduct (Akinwale 2010: 63). The primary functions of media in the society are to inform, educate and entertain. Beyond these, they serve as watchdogs of the society, agenda setters, force multipliers and above all, catalysts for national integration and development. Through these functions, the media sensitize, enlighten and persuade members of the public to participate actively in developmental activities. However, press freedom is to a large extent, very crucial to the effectiveness of mass media in any society. This denotes that the ability of the media to carry out these functions effectively depends on the amount of press freedom guaranteed in societies where they exist and operate. Although, censorship and regulation of the media is necessitated to some extent, by the consideration of the fact that the messages and information disseminated through the media could either be useful or harmful to the society, because it is believed and acknowledged by experts, that journalists and the media have the power and capability to effect changes in the society; good or bad. Therefore, it could be said that mass media play functional and dysfunctional roles in the society.

Buttressing the earlier assertions on the powers of journalists and mass media which they exhibit in the society through their information, education and entertainment functions, Sambe (2008: 27) writes that "as a reporter, you have a lot of power. What you

write can influence decisions, help form public opinions of people and contribute to the general attitude of your readers and life in general." Similarly, Akpede (2011: 48) points out that "journalists have enormous power in their hands. With the stroke of a pen, they can bring a warring community or country together, and with the same pen they are capable of bringing about disintegration of a nation." In addition, Friday Je (1986) explains that mass media have the power and capability to bring about change in the society for the improvement of the quality of life According to him, "because the media have this ability to report and inform so effectively, it could be said with great confidence that as change agents, they have the power to alter, even where resistance is strong the way of life of a community positively or negatively (Utor 2009: 124)."

At this point, the issue of regulation of the media comes to play, but the challenge they are likely to face is that, some of the regulatory mechanisms put in place are detrimental to the effective contribution of mass media in the fight against insecurity and other developmental issues in Nigeria and other parts of Africa. This and other matters that may arise in the course of discussion are what the subsequent pages of this paper will provide analytical answers to, but before delving into the core, it is instructive to make clarification on key terms which are central to the subject matter, such as: "mass media," "press," "security" and "national security."

Mass Media
The definitions of mass media or press are diverse. Scholars and media experts have made attempts to explain these terms from different angles. Mass media or press refers to the vehicles or devices that are used to relay information from a source to a large, scattered and heterogeneous audience. Prior to the advent of broadcasting, the term "press" was used only to describe newspaper and the print industry. It has however, gained a wider meaning as it is contemporarily used interchangeably with the term "media" which covers all spheres of the mass communication industry. Accordingly, McQuail (2005) defines mass media as a means of communication that operates on a large scale, reaching

and involving virtually everyone in a society to a greater or lesser degree. In a similar note, Asemah (2011: 18) defines mass media as channels or technological devices through which messages are conveyed to a large and heterogeneous audience. They are the vehicles that are used for conveying messages from a source to a large destination. He adds that mass media are the devices for moving messages across distance or time to accomplish mass communication.

The media of mass communication are broadly categorised into two groups—the electronic and print. Newspapers, magazines books, journals and other documented means of conveying messages and information to a large number of people, fall under the category of print media. The electronic media is further categorised into two, namely: the broadcast and new or social media. The broadcast media comprise of two channels: radio and television. The new or social media constitute of the Internet and other digital, computerized electronic gadgets and means of information dissemination (Auwal 2016: 19), the Internet, satellite and other electronic means of disseminating information that work with the aid of computer and the World Wide Web (WWW) are fast gaining popularity as 'new' forms of the electronic media. It is the combination of these different means that constitute the mass media – a phenomenon whose importance in society is virtually inestimable.

In essence, mass media constitute of all the means through which messages are relayed from different aspects of the society such as education, entertainment, health, politics, economy, and so on, to a large, heterogeneous and anonymous audience at the same time.

National Security
The term security simply refers to the state of being free from danger or threat. National security on the other hand, is a concept or corporate term covering both national defense and relations which connotes that a government, along with its parliaments should protect the state and its citizens against all kinds of national crises through a variety of power projections, such as political power, diplomacy, economic power, military might, and so on. The

International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1968) describes security as "the ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external threats." National security however, represents different thing to different individuals. This results to lack of consensus among researchers from various disciplines who often define or view the term from different perspectives. Lippmann (1943) says "a nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war." Wolfers (1962: 149) observes that "security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked."

National security has a more extensive meaning than protection from physical harm, as Jordan and Taylor (1981) explain. According to them, "it also implies protection, through a variety of means, of vital economic and political interests, the loss of which could threaten fundamental values and the vitality of the state." From a different perspective, national security is best defined as the capacity to control those domestic and foreign conditions that the public opinion of a given community believes necessary to enjoy its own self-determination or autonomy, prosperity and well-being (Maier 1990 cited in Olayiwola 2013: 31). In addition, Olayiwola states that it is now widely acknowledged that without a safe and secure environment, there can be neither sustainable, poverty reducing economic and social development nor political development. According to Ali (2013: 56), national security means the protection of the lives, rights, dignity and property of citizens. It also means the protection of resources, cultural integrity, territory, sovereignty and lawful institutions of a country. The aim of national security is to secure just and equitable living conditions for all the citizens of the country. National security includes the means at the disposal of the government for protecting the state and its citizens from external aggression and internal insurrection. The state exists for the interest of defense, public safety, public morality. The freedom of expression and the press is an aspect of national security and it is necessary for a democratic society.

The seven dimensions of security or human security as identified by the United Nations Development Programme-UNDP

(1994: 24-33), include economic security (assuring every individual a minimum requisite income), food security (the guarantee of physical and economic access to basic foodstuffs), health security (the guarantee of minimum protection from disease and unhealthy lifestyles), environmental security (protecting people from the short and long-term ravages of nature, man-made threats in nature, and deterioration of the natural environment), personal security (protecting people from physical violence), community security (protecting people from loss of traditional relationships and values and from sectarian and ethnic violence), and political security (ensuring that people live in a society that honours their basic human rights). Bamidele (2012: 28) remarks that national security should be seen, in the sense of protection of the polity through ensuring that the national interest is known, sustained, promoted and preserved. In a division of labour setting, national security is ensured through security agencies. Bamidele adds that national security is the decision-making process concerned with the identification of potentials and actual threats, and the mobilization of resources in frame that promptly ensures the safety and stability of the nation state, while simultaneously, enhancing the promotion of national development. According to him, the issue of national interest is settled in chapter two of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as amended. The chapter deals with fundamental objectives and directive principles of the state policy. It deals with fundamental obligations of the government—the government and the people, political objectives, educational objectives and foreign policy objectives. Other issues that deal with fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy are environmental objectives, directive on Nigerian cultures, obligations of the mass media, national ethics and duties of the citizens.

From the foregoing, it is clear that national security goes beyond the protection of the citizenry from danger or threat, to encompass the preservation of national interest, defense, economic and political relations with the international community. Shinkaiye (2004: 4-17) visualises national security as "the protection and preservation of the territory, sovereignty and stability of a country from threats. It entails the freedom to pursue its core values and

interest without let or hindrance." Nnoli (2006: 16) corroborates this when he notes that national security is a cherished value associated with the physical safety of individuals, groups or nation-states, together with a similar safety of their other most cherished values. It denotes freedom from threats, anxiety and danger. Nnoli also observes that leadership and good governance eradicate insecurity of nations and sees this as a "re-conceptualisation of national security." The author states further that this re-conceptualization of national security moves it away from a narrow focus on defense against external threats and anchors it on threats from domestic environment. Its elements are usually associated with good governance, human rights and democracy, what the Nigerian constitution refers to as the "fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy."

In a nutshell, national security means the protection of a nation's resources, territory, sovereignty and lawful institutions from domestic and foreign threats or anything that undermines their values. The aim of national security is to secure the just and equitable living conditions for a country's citizens. It is the aggregation of the security interest of the individuals, communities, ethnic groups, political entities and institutions which inhabit the territory of a country. At this point, this paper is however constrained to state that the absence of these security indices in a country, as stated above denotes a state of insecurity. In other words, when a government fails to secure just and equitable living conditions for its citizens, in addition to the protection of its national resources, territory, sovereignty and lawful institutions from all kinds of threats, it could be said that the country has no national security. The former president of Nigeria, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo in 2001, identified the primary objectives of national security as "to strengthen the Federal Republic of Nigeria, to advance her interest and objectives, to contain instability, control crime, eliminate corruption, enhance genuine development, progress and growth, improve the welfare and wellbeing and quality of life of every citizen" (Ali 2013: 56).

An Overview of Insecurity in Nigeria
From independence to the present democratic dispensation, Nigeria has witnessed series of ethno-religious and politically-motivated

crises which pose serious threats to the country's security, political and economic development. The country has also witnessed in the past, scores of insurgent activities in its different regions. Insurgent, ethnic militia and/or terrorist groups with different political and economic objectives emerged and unleashed violence, resulting to the death of thousands of people and destruction of properties worth millions of naira in the northern, eastern and western parts of the country. Among these groups are the Odua People's Congress (OPC) in the western region, the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and of recent, the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) in the eastern region and the *Boko Haram* insurgent group in the northern region. The violent acts of these groups pose serious threats to the security of life and property in Nigeria.

To explain the foregoing from a different viewpoint, Obafemi and Galadima (2013) succinctly affirm that Nigeria, the biggest and one of the most influential countries in Africa, is confronted with daunting challenges to its political stability occasioned by terrorism. According to them, the nation is now caught in the frenzy of terrorism in degree and intensity never experienced before in the country. While terrorism is hardly a new phenomenon in Nigeria, its impact has been wide-ranging and far-reaching. Today, terrorism poses a great threat not just to life, property, human rights, dignity and democratic values but to the very fabric and existence of Nigeria as we all know it. The authors explain further that insurgent groups in Nigeria, as identified above, have emerged at different points in the country's political history and assumed different forms.

Once the word "insecurity" is mentioned while referring to Nigeria, as Nwabueze and Ebeze (2013) point out, the first words to come to mind are *Boko Haram*, kidnapping, Niger Delta crises, and ethno-religious crises. These words constitute a brand used in identifying the nature of insecurity peculiar to Nigeria among other African nations. Before the public manifestation of *Boko Haram* terrorist activities in 2009, Nigeria has witnessed series of kidnapping of mostly foreign expatriates by militants in the Niger

Delta region of Nigeria. The militants were said to be agitating against what they saw as injustice against their region. They were initially operating in the creeks but once their activities extended to the streets, they constituted palpable insecurity in the south-southern region of Nigeria. According to Nwabueze and Ebeze, the state of insecurity in Nigeria is made obvious by the alarming trend of anti-social acts prevalent in the nation which in the not-so-distant past, were unthinkable and could not be associated with the country.

Acts of terrorism by *Boko Haram* insurgents, incidents of kidnapping in the southeast and south-south parts of the country (which now happens all over the country), including agitations by militants in the Niger Delta have become "brands" of crime that have given a negative identity to Nigeria. This is in addition to other conventional crimes—theft, arson, violent ethno-religious conflicts—which the law enforcement agents battle daily. These acts, particularly those that involve threat to life have contributed in creating an alarming state of insecurity in some parts of the country. Various reasons have been adduced as the root cause of violence across the nation. Among these are the multidimensional, multicultural personality of Nigeria, corruption, poor governance, unemployment, mismanagement of diversity and conflict issues in the country (Nwabueze and Ebeze 2013).

Acts of terrorism constitute a great threat to the security and development of nations where they are perpetrated. Therefore, there is the need to take practical measures to combat insecurity by government and major stakeholders; and the institutions of mass communication are no exception in the crusade. The question that comes to mind at this point is: bearing in mind their influential powers in the society, how can the institutions of mass media contribute to national security in Nigeria?

Theoretical assumptions on the Relevance of Mass Media in Combating Insecurity
To understand how the contributions of mass media could play significant role in combating insecurity in Nigeria would require theoretical analysis and explanation. This is so because the mass media are powerful instruments that inform, educate, enlighten,

sensitize and entertain the public; and are also with the capability to affect the society positively or negatively. The media play functional and dysfunctional roles in the society. This could be ascertained from the powers which belong to them and from their functions of informing, educating, sensitizing and entertaining the public, through which they direct, mobilize, shape and set different agendas in the society.

Bearing in mind their influential powers in the society, the mass media have been described as "double-edged sword," implying that the performance of the media affect the society and its populace in multiple ways. According to Asemah (2011: 13), "the media in an attempt to educate, inform and entertain, have some negative effects on the audience. This therefore, means that the media play functional and dysfunctional roles (that is, positive and negative roles in the society)." In the same vein, Akpunonu (2010) points out that the instruments of radio, television, Internet, print, though wonderful inventions, can become double-edged sword producing war inducing features, life-denying counter values, images of human hatred that arouse vengeance, violence, disaffection and war. Broadcasting with its audio-visual characteristics has the power to stir up feelings of anger, fear and insecurity and these becloud our reasoning.

For the purpose of understanding the functional and dysfunctional roles of the media in the society, certain theories termed "media effects or social scientific theories" have been used over the years to explain the likely effect of the media (through their various contents) on the society. This discourse is anchored on the agenda-setting theory.

Agenda Setting Theory
The media possess the power to influence and shape attitudes through their ability to inform and set agenda for public discussions in the society. Agenda setting (Folarin 1998: 68) implies that "the mass media pre-determine what issues are regarded as important at a given time in a given society." As one of the foremost functions of the media, a theory which explains how the media set agenda and shape the direction of public discussions and concerns (Asemah 2011: 176), was propounded in 1972/1973

by Maxwell McCombs and Donald L. Shaw. The theory of agenda setting by the media proposes that the public agenda or what kind of things people discuss, think and worry about is powerfully shaped and directed by what the media choose to publicise. Thus, if the news media chose to give the most time and space to covering national security, this issue will become the most important item on the audiences' minds (Wimmer and Dominick 2000).

The basic tenets of the agenda setting theory is that, through frequent coverage of issues, the messages disseminated by the media are stored in our heads, and most of the things we think or worry about and the issues we discuss are based on what we read, listen to or watch in different mass media. Although this theory does not ascribe to the media the power to determine what we actually think; but it does ascribe to the media the power to determine what we are thinking about; and the elements involved in agenda setting include: the quantity or frequency of reporting; prominence given to the reports—through headline display, pictures and layout in newspapers, magazines, films, graphics, or timing on radio and television; the degree of conflict generated in the reports; and cumulative media-specific effects over time (Folarin 1998: 68).

The agenda setting theory was used in this chapter with the presumption that the media can play a dual-role in contributing to Nigeria's national security. Through frequent and conscientious coverage of security issues, the media can on one hand sensitize individuals (the citizenry) on the need to be security conscious and to participate actively in the efforts at providing a secured society. To achieve this (Umuerri and Galadima 2012: 17-18), the contents should be on behaviours to shun terrorist acts that constitute insecurity, imbibing habits that are accepted in the community based on national objectives and goals.

Secondly, the agencies of mass media can be utilized with the aim of emphasizing to government and stakeholders in the security sector, the need to ensure safety of lives and properties in the country. By so doing, the media would be seen as setting policy-agenda for government and other stakeholders to follow, especially on matters of security in the country. The media (Asemah 2011:

39), can do this by raising salient (security) issues in our society thereby making people (government and the citizenry) to think along that line; and by agenda setting, we mean that the media "play their drums" and whenever they "play their drums," we begin to "dance to the tune of their music." This implies the ability of the media to mentally order the world for us. When we say that the media set agenda for the public, we simply mean that the media have the ability to choose and emphasize certain topics, thereby causing the public to perceive these issues as important.

In essence, the agenda setting function is a three part process (Littlejohn and Foss 2008: 294); first, the priority of issues to be discussed in the media, or media agenda, must be set. Second, the media agenda in some way affects or interacts with what the public thinks, creating the public agenda. Finally, the public agenda affects or interacts in some way with what policy-makers consider important, called the policy agenda. In the theory's simplest and most direct version, then, the media agenda affects the public agenda, and the public agenda affects the policy agenda.

The Relevance of Mass Media in Combating Insecurity in Nigeria

The mass media carry out their conventional functions of informing, educating and entertaining the people through news items, articles, editorials, etc. While this approach remains acceptable in reporting the events, it has become seemingly difficult to rely wholeheartedly on this pattern especially on this vexed issue of insecurity in Nigeria. While insecurity prevails, and lives and property are destroyed with reckless abandon, the mass media would be failing if it is centered with merely reporting the news and editorializing for action by government. To make any meaningful impact, the mass media must be structured differently because of the unwieldy nature of Nigeria (Umuerri and Galadima 2012).

It is evident from the foregoing that the mass media have the power and capability to contribute enormously to national security and development in Nigeria. As stated earlier, this can be achieved through the discharge of their social obligations to the society in accordance with the ethical values of the profession and

constitutional provisions. In other words, for the media to contribute meaningfully to national security, there is the need for strict adherence to the ethics of journalism profession.

As watchdogs of the society, the media set agenda for public discussions on issues of national interest, as well as putting such issues in proper perspectives. The press is regarded as the 'fourth estate of the realm' and as 'watchdog' of the society. This is because it possesses the potential power to influence not only an individual, but the society in general. The press shapes the direction of public thoughts on issues that concern and affect the society. In fact, the news media are agents of attitudinal and behavioural change in the society and also serve as major sources of information from which the people make decisions about their lives. Owolabi and O'neill (2013: 246) were right in their analysis of the powers of the media and the impact of the information they disseminate to the society, when they state that "decisions are made on the basis of the quality of available information at one's disposal."

Because of their influential power to affect the way people think, feel and behave, the mass media have been credited with incredible persuasive ability to change attitudes and behaviours. Like a bullet, the message emanating from the media would be received by the audience directly and such message would have an immediate and powerful effect on the recipients, persuading them to behave exactly the way the message advocated. This process is called "the hypodermic syringe or needle theory" because it is believed that the media message acted like the content of a hypodermic syringe which, when emptied into an audience member, would have an instant effect like the drug from a real syringe. Mass communication messages are passive, and the mass media can therefore, control and influence members of the audience. The mass media are powerful and persuasive, and members of the mass communication audience are seen as weak and in danger of having their values and behaviour changed by mass media messages (Okunna 1999).

In fact, the media are major actors in nation building and the promotion of national security. Ali (2013: 57) explains that the

media function as watchdogs capable of blowing the whistle to call attention to serious national issues. This implies a clear recognition of the fact that the mass media play an important role on issues of national security. The power of the media to decide what the people should read, see or hear has never been in doubt. Reiterating this, Sambe (2008) cited in Asemah (2011) notes that the mass media in Nigeria set agenda for national discourse. They have the capacities to manipulate vision and get the people constantly fixed to issues that are given prominence in their agenda. The issues they give prominence are those issues we worry about. According to Sambe, "the press is a product of mass opinion." In a similar vein, Neuman cited in Asemah, submits that "to a large extent, it is the media which create opinions." The media shape people's thoughts and perceptions on issues of national interest through their agenda setting power. Individuals are bound to form different opinions on such issues, positive or negative.

One of the basic assumptions about the media, according to Ate (2008: 81-82), is that the mass media have an important influence on people's lives and sometimes change their beliefs and opinions." Daramola (2003) cited in Ate, points out that "a whole nation could become revulsed and react adversely to some national issues. The media can induce panic especially in periods of insecurity." Okunna (1999: 115) postulates that "mass media serve as forums for public debate and discussion of important issues in the society. This is one of the ways in which the mass media help in the formation of public opinion, which is made up of what the majority of the people in a society think about a particular issue of public importance."

The provision of national security should be seen as a collective, rather than an individual or institutional responsibility. The public enlightenment campaigns on the need to be vigilant and security conscious, which is ongoing in virtually all the media in Nigeria, is an indication that the press is dedicated towards combating insecurity. Examples of such campaigns include the "Nigeria Unite against Terrorism" sponsored by the Federal Ministry of Information and Culture and many of its kind by the

National Orientation Agency (NOA), the Nigeria Police Force and the Defense Headquarters, respectively on AIT, NTA, FRCN, among other channels of communication in the county. It could be said that at present, the Nigerian media are setting positive agenda for government, relevant stakeholders and are also sensitizing Nigerians on the need to combat insecurity through frequent coverage and discussions of security issues in the country.

Basically, the role of the media in the society can take two different and opposed forms. It is either the media play positive role in nation building and be responsible for increased development, or serve as impediments to the development drive of a nation by impacting negatively on the society. However, the media have been accused of contributing in worsening the state of insecurity and conflicts in Nigeria due to reportage primarily aimed at maximizing profit and increasing audience base. After an analysis of media coverage of diversity and conflict issues by various scholars, Pate (2011) listed out common practices adopted by the media which tend to contribute negatively to crises and security situations as follows:

> Selective reporting of prejudicial stereotypes about groups and individuals; reporting inter-group conflicts out of their fundamental sociological, economic, political and other contexts; shallow and episodic coverage; total blackout on some groups, individuals or community; use of inflammatory, misleading and sensational headlines to attract sales; publishing inflammatory statements against some people or groups as letters to the editor; attributing statements by individuals to groups making generalized statements not supported facts, among others.

In fact, the media must desist from these practices to make meaningful impact in combating insecurity in Nigeria; otherwise they will continue to be seen as fueling conflicts and worsening the state of insecurity.

The misuse of the powers of mass media by owners or political elites for purposes other than national interest could undermine

national security and development. According to Akinwale (2010: 50), "the press organizations which are expected to promote democracy and be promoted by democracy, may also be deployed to protect elites interests to the detriment of the larger society." What has been in the centre of controversy, as Ali (2013: 57) observes, "is the capacity of those in whose hands reside such enormous powers to use that power judiciously and in public interest. Media professionals have the options to use the power of media instruments in their hands either to serve the nation or indulge in self-propelled interest. The media ought to be objective as they carry out their functions." Unfortunately, the media which ought to be the major stakeholders in ensuring the security of the state sometimes trivialize this very sensitive issue. The Nigerian media are yet to grow in maturity. Issues that affect the general well-being of the people of the country but which can cause disaffection and disunity should be de-emphasized or played down. The reverse has been the case in many Nigerian publications wishing to make quick sales on the platform of sensationalism and journalist scoops (Wali 2003 cited in Ali 2013: 59-60).

The existence of a state organ capable of persuasive power under the monopoly of the political elites especially in the earlier years of Nigeria's political history, according to Udeajah (2004: 55-56) led to the use and misuse of such powers for partisan ends. Political elites sought the establishment and operation of the regional and state broadcast stations primarily for self-aggrandizement rather than for common interest, and often to partisan objectives masquerading for national interest. Udeajah explains further that:

> The supposed policies to aid national integration had the contrary effects. For instance, the inadequacies of the strategy were glaring in the area of control of mass media. Before now, all the major broadcast media were owned and controlled either by the regional or federal governments. All were used to fight inter-ethnic and regional quarrels. It is argued that if there had been a well-articulated national ideology expressing the hopes and aspirations of the nation as well as the nation's

perception of itself and social reality, the broadcast media would have easily seen their responsibility as consisting of disseminating that ideology. Unfortunately, the absence of a national ideology resulted in the broadcast stations constructing their different versions of reality dominated by parochial propensities. The bitter fact is that narrow partisan and sectional interests exploited the poor situation to sow seeds of discord and disintegration through the use of regional media.

This situation (of partisan and regional press) as observed by Olayiwola (1991: 40), helped in the intensification of old ethnic antagonisms and the atmosphere of political communication seethed with bitter rivalry and enmity. The press openly supported one political party against another (in the second republic) and fuelled the embers of tribalism, sensationalism, and ethnic chauvinism, all of which culminated in fragmentation and disintegration that again threatened the unity and stability of the Nigerian state.

In situations where the mass media are used as instruments for the promotion of sectional interests rather than for the promotion of peace, unity and development, the rate of crimes and insecurity will likely increase on daily basis in the society. In other words, when the powers of mass media are utilized for the intensification of ethnic and religious sentiments, it often results to political and economic instability, thereby stunting national security and development. Ali (2013: 57-58) supports this assertion when he notes that in recent times the Nigerian media tended to pose inherent dangers to national security in connection with politics, religion, ethnicity, power and revenue sharing which are crucial to a stable and enduring democracy. On the political sphere, newsmen are expected to report about the activities of the politicians and are expected to feed the public with objective information. The newsmen are expected to nose around for information beyond the ovation at political rallies. The media are expected to reflect balanced views of the opposing party. But most

media houses do focus attention mostly on the ruling and bigger parties to the detriment of the smaller ones. Although politicians employ newsmen to give them publicity, the newsmen are expected by the members of the public to do what is right. The mass media could constitute threats to security where they collaborate with the political and bourgeoisie class to further marginalize and exploit the citizenry. This causes a serious problem of poverty, illiteracy, ignorance, diseases, which have brought about the incidence of armed robbery and other violent crimes, youth militarism, ethnic chauvinism, religious bigotry. Media professionals have indulged in self aggrandizement.

It is evident from the foregoing that the security obligations of the press include, to subject government and security agencies to public scrutiny and to question their policies and competences. This obligation is also stated in the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended, under Section 22 which expressly stipulates that: "the press, radio, television and other agencies of mass media shall at all times be free to uphold the fundamental objectives contained in this Chapter and uphold the responsibility and accountability of the government to the people." It is also important that the media and security agencies work together to educate and sensitize the public on the importance of security to national development. This will enable the masses to understand and to question government and relevant stakeholders on the viability of the policies and measures put in place to combat insecurity in the country. Thus, only a socially responsible media can achieve this.

The utilization of the institutions of mass media in combating insecurity and other threats to the socio-economic-cum-political development in Nigeria is not without challenges. There are factors which impede the effective performance of the media. Among these impediments, as Udoudo and Diriyai (2012: 91) observe are "lack of research and investigation, people's reluctance to supply information on terrorists, fear of being attacked by terrorists, self censorship for fear of victimization, lack of insurance policy for journalists, poor remuneration, security threats and lack of access to the scene of terrorist acts." Added to these are ownership

control/interest, politicization of the media, commercialisation of news, ethno-religious sentiment, legal factors, freedom or lack of it, among others.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Mass media serve the society in different capacities; politically, socially, educationally and religiously. Their functions in the society are immeasurable. Whether electronic or print, the media are saddled with so many responsibilities in the society; they contribute so much to the society. The press helps to keep the public informed, entertained, educated and also sets standards and establish values for public conduct. Journalism plays vital role in identifying what is at stake in a particular policy or decision, in framing issues for the public, analysing the issues and identifying possible solutions and alternatives. However, these and other developmental roles of the media were examined in this paper. The chapter also examines the extent to which media personnel adhere to ethical values such as accuracy, objectivity and social responsibility. Journalists encounter numerous challenges in reporting on security-related issues and in performing their watchdog function in the society. Factors such as ownership control, politicisation of the media, commercialization of news, ethnicity, religion, economic and legal constraints, lack of insurance packages for journalists, among others were x-rayed in this piece.

To enhance the positive impact and reduce the negative effects of the use of media in the fight against insecurity in Nigeria, the chapter therefore recommends that:

(i)   The Nigerian media should in their coverage of terror-related issues, be responsible, objective and committed towards discouraging acts of insecurity in the country. Responsible media coverage, as Orhewere and Kur (2004: 56) put succinctly, "suggests that in times of insecurity, the media do not carry inaccuracies, distortions, conflict, confusion and errors of facts in their reports." To guarantee this, there is the need for regular workshops on conflict reporting, peace journalism,

conflict-sensitive journalism, journalism ethics, communication and national development, among others to continually keep media personnel abreast with trends in mass media use in combating insecurity in Nigeria. This is essential to ensure that the media are not used to worsen the problem of insecurity due to lack of knowledge on how to handle this specialized journalism area. The media should rise to expectations and use their powers judiciously to combat security and other developmental challenges in the country. Hence, the media ought to be socially responsible in the way they handle news stories about security in the Nigerian society.

(ii)   Closely related to the call for responsible media coverage, is the need for specialised training, while the welfare of journalists needs to be considerably improved. When dealing with highly specialized subjects such as the military/defence, intelligence and national security, or law enforcement and public security, journalists ideally should receive some specialized training in the subjects. Specialized training on different areas of media coverage will enhance efficient coverage of security and other developmental issues. Journalists must have a sense of national security and seek to improve on it at all times. Thus, whatever does not enhance the perpetration or perpetuation of our established values should be discarded. Pressmen must abide by the rule of law as well as the established ethics guiding their profession. All laws that hinder the performance of the duty of journalists should be repudiated. In addition, the welfare of journalists should be given serious attention, especially the provision of insurance package which would encourage them to engage in investigative and dare-devil conflict reporting in the interest of the public. A journalist, whose take-home pay is nothing to write home about, according to Nwabueze and Ebeze (2013: 869), coupled with the irregular nature of the pay, would not have the zeal to engage in investigations he feels constitutes a risk to his life.

(iii) National security is a collective, not an individual or institutional effort. The media, security agencies and the general public must rise to the challenge of combating insecurity in Nigeria through the use of citizens' journalism as a way of complementing security and media personnel's role in exposing and combating insecurity in the nation. As Olayiwola (2013: 32) observes:

> The media [and general public] should take cognizance of the fact that security is not just about the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Police, the Customs, the Immigration, and so on, but also take into account the whole country's socio-political and economic systems, researches and all activities that go into normal civilian life. The mass media should also cover the totality of security sector and security community, non-statutory security institutions and civil societies, as well as the internal and international processes that are germane to security and insecurity issues including the major aspects of regionalization and globalization of insecurity.

As evident in the war against *Boko Haram* insurgency in the northeast, the civilians (through the civilian joint task force) contributed and eased the tasks of the media and security agencies in fighting against terrorism. Citizens' journalism can also be utilized to achieve national security. This also calls for the need to strengthen the partnership between the media and security agencies in Nigeria as this would contribute greatly to combat insecurity in the country.

(vi) For the media to set positive agendas for government and public discussion in line with security and other related matters, there is the need for diversified coverage of

security issues in the country. At present, a large number of the institutions of mass media are concentrated in urban areas. As a result, the security and developmental needs of rural communities are neglected in media coverage. To ensure adequate coverage and reportage of rural activities, there is the need for diversification of media coverage. Achieving this requires the integration of the traditional systems of communication such as the town crier system, folk theatre, traditional murals, with modern media and employs them systematically for rural and urban security as well as for rural development projects and national development. This would also require the establishment of rural or community-based broadcast media especially the radio, since it remains the most potent means of mass mobilization and education in any society.

It is the conviction of this author that the discourse and recommendations proffered in this chapter be considered and put to optimal utilization by policy makers and other stakeholders in government, private sector and the academia towards promoting peaceful coexistence and national development through the use of mass media.

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8

Gaps in Internal Security Management: Assessing the Role of the Police and the Military in Northern Nigeria

Gulleng Yohanna Daskyes

Introduction

In many African societies that have undergone or are undergoing transition from military dictatorship to civil democracy, the rise in violent conflict and increasing social disorder is widespread. Democracy in Nigeria has brought with it an upsurge in ethno-religious conflict, political unrest and other forms of violent crimes. The violence range from the kidnappings and cases of abduction prevalent in the Niger-Delta (Shettima and Chukwuma 2002), the ethno-religious conflicts that have rocked the north-central Nigeria particularly Kaduna, Jos, Nassarawa and parts of Benue and Taraba states (Alubo 2006; Best 2007, 2011) and the current *Boko Haram* insurgency that has engulfed the entire North East and parts of North Western states of the country (Lengmang 2011; Mijah 2007; Nwanegbo and Odigbo 2013). These have given rise to feelings of fear and insecurity as well as generalised decline in confidence of government's ability to provide adequate security for its citizens. In trying to live up to its expected role of securing lives and property as well as the maintenance of an orderly society, it becomes natural for government to respond since democracy requires stability and order to thrive.

However, the approach government takes to contain the situation appears to be cosmetic as it merely treats the symptoms without addressing the root causes. This is evident in the remilitarization of Nigerian streets by soldiers and increased policing capacity with different name tags like Special Task Force, Joint Task Force among others. While more security personnel armed with military hardware are deployed, the violence become more complex and sophisticated. Part of the problem is the improper grasp of what constitute internal security by the state.

Also, whether such conflicts require only the intervention of the police or that of the military or both or even non state actors are issues to be addressed. Interestingly too, whether the combined forces adhere to international norms of peacekeeping and law enforcement to avoid human rights violation and civilian casualties is another issue for investigation. More importantly, whether there are clearly defined boundaries in terms of what the role of the police are and that of the military are during sectarian violence as is common in Nigeria is one difficult thing to discern. This chapter utilized analysis provided for by both primary and secondary sources of information from existing literature, reports by international research agencies and human right organizations to determine where the security agencies have missed the point and what appropriate steps need to be taken to manage the situation.

The Nigerian State and Conceptual Dilemma of Internal Security

Security and internal security are two sides of the same coin. There can be no internal security without generalised security. Similarly, threats to internal security are a national security challenge. Experts, scholars and international donors have found it difficult to agree on what security is. This is because of the dilemma of whose responsibility it is, to provide security, how it should be provided and who the beneficiaries of security are. According to Hills (2010), security is not a static process but a dynamic and multi-faceted social phenomenon which accommodates the individual, the public and situational contingencies. By implication, individual security is different from public security and calls for differential response.

The focus of any government on security in a society that has not experienced violence is the individual. This is different from the society that is crises ridden or is being overwhelmed by violence or conflict. For example, before the emergence of *Boko Haram* insurgency, the security concern of governments in northern Nigeria would have been on the provision of basic human needs like water, health, education, food, employment and reduction of poverty. Today, it is expected that the continuous activities of the insurgents in that region would have changed the meaning of security to the protection of citizens from attack, how

to provide medical care to victims of bomb blast as well as the provision of shelter and food to the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Meanwhile, there is a link between individual security and public security. Where individual security is inadequate or absent, it provides breeding ground for the collapse of public security. In other words, public security is guaranteed by individual security.

Generally, security has attracted varying interpretations from different fields of study. It has been globally conceptualized to mean safety from harm and danger which may constitute threat to human existence. It is the process of alleviating or assuaging any kind of threat to mankind and his cherished environment and values (Bodunde, Ola and Afolabi 2014). Keizo (1998) view security as the ability of human beings "to lead lives of creativity, without having their survival threatened or their dignity impaired". The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2001) conceptualized security as a:

> condition in which people and communities live in freedom, peace, safety, participate fully in the governance of their countries, enjoy the protection of fundamental rights, have access to resources and basic necessities of life and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and wellbeing (Karim, Donata and Wanjiru 2004:14).

These definitions capture the relevance of the state and the individual in security. It shows that the security of the state guarantees the security of the individual and takes into account all political, economic, social and environmental threats to human existence.

Internal security on the other hand is conceptualized by Buzan (1991) as the act of bringing together the activities of all security agencies and institutions both at national, local and community level into one overall plan to protect and maintain a stable and orderly society. Odekunle (2010) went beyond the activities of security agencies to argue that internal security is the protection or defence against economic want, poverty, illiteracy, disease and ill-health, social exploitation, psychological trauma, oppression and

criminal victimization. It is also seen as the freedom from or the absence of those tendencies which threatens internal cohesion and the corporate existence of the nation and its ability to maintain its vital institutions for the promotion of its core values and socio-political and economic objectives (Imobighe, cited in Nwanegbo and Odigbo 2013). Here, internal security is perceived in terms of the generality of the population. It is seen as a link between basic institutions and democratic principles not just in terms of security of the government of the day.

When economic, political and social institutions as well as security agencies create conducive environment for the realization of personal, group and national goals and aspirations, internal security is guaranteed. The ability of the government to harmonize the activities of the police, the military, the custom, the immigration, Civil Defence Corps, the intelligence agencies (which comprises of the Department of State Security Services, Nigerian Intelligence Agency, Military Intelligence) and all other key institutions like the judiciary, prisons, hospitals and education to respond to emerging needs of people summarizes what internal security is (Bodunde, Ola and Afolabi 2014).

The importance of internal security has further been underscored by the 1999 Constitution. Section 14(1) of the Constitution provides that the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be a state based on the principles of democracy and social justice. Section 14(2) provides that;

(a) Sovereignty belongs to the people of Nigeria from whom government through this Constitution derives its powers and authority;
(b) The security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government.
(c) The participation by the people in their government shall be ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution

These provisions of the Constitution implies that the government is saddled with the responsibility of safeguarding lives, property, welfare of Nigerians and to also guarantee the sovereignty of its

citizens by protecting them from internal and external threats including other forms of danger. It is also incumbent on the government to monitor public order and safety including law and order.

However, the realization of these provisions of the constitution and other conceptual framework of internal security have remained a dilemma and an aspiration than a reality mainly because of bad governance, misplaced priority and the politicization of security matters based on partisan, tribal and religious considerations (Ufot, Abang, Esin and Aniete 2014). This is moreso that Nigeria and most African governments are in a dilemma of what constitute internal security. The dilemma is located within the argument that security has been reduced to the continuous presence of the police and the military on our streets. At the sight of any sign of unrest, the immediate point of call to address the situation by government is either the mobilization of the police or the military regardless of whether what the issues may be. This explains why Nigerian streets are loitered with uniform men (police or military). According to Alemika and Chukwuma (2000) and Alemika (2010), when the security of a society is reduced to the mobilization of armed personnel (whether police or military), that society is only seeking to preserve and protect rulers and to stand as a buffer between elites and the masses.

The implied meaning here is that that when we reduce security to the mobilization of the military, we undermine the responsibility of the state to protect its citizens from the socio-economic deprivations which engender fear and anxiety about their survival and well being. In Nigeria for example, and as argued by Salawu (2010), addressing emerging internal security challenges by increasing the presence of the military on our streets without tackling problems associated with accusations and allegations of neglect, oppression, domination, exploitation, victimization, discrimination, marginalization, nepotism and bigotry which have prevailed due to failure of leadership, amounts to nothing. This is against the backdrop that internal security challenges in form of conflict (whether, ethnic, religious, communal or insurgency) usually occur when deprived groups and individuals attempt to increase their share of power and wealth or to modify the dominant

value, norms, beliefs and ideology. It is also important to note that the failure of the Nigerian leaders to establish good governments, forge national integration and promote what can be called real economic progress, through deliberate and articulated policies, has led to mass poverty and unemployment which have been identified as "nursery beds for many ethno-religious conflicts which warmongers use as mercenary fighters" (Salawu 2010).

Arising from the dilemmas of the conceptualization of security and internal security, this paper adopts a working definition which takes into consideration, social, economic, cultural, technological and political factors as basis for understanding security and internal security. It therefore adopts McNamara's modern view of security which to him means development. In his words:

> Security is not military hardware, though it may include it; security is not military force, though it may involve it, security is not traditional military activity, though it may encompass it. Security is development, and without development, there can be no security... development means economic, social and political progress. It means a reasonable standard of living (McNamara 1968: 149).

McNamara's view of security is premised on the fact that developing societies are usually characterized by weak and fragile economic base which can hardly sustain any serious military offensive. Such societies are also technologically impotent and this makes them spend a great deal of their scarce resources on acquisition of military hardware to the neglect of human security expressed in socio-economic development of the citizenry. A situation described by Renner (1990: 181) as "dismantling a house to salvage the materials to erect a fence around it". McNamara further argued that any society that seeks to achieve adequate military security against the background of acute food shortage, population explosion, low level of productivity and per-capita income, and a high rate of illiteracy, a fragile infrastructural base for technological development, inadequate and inefficient public utilities and a chronic problem of unemployment has a false sense of security.

Civil-Military Relations and the Political Economy of Policing in Northern Nigeria: Analysing the Theoretical Issues

Civil military relations have different meanings to scholars. Some regard the concept as the relationship between the military and state elites while others regard it as the relationship between the military and civil society organizations. Better still, others view it in terms of the way military contingents liaise with civilians during war or any form of violence that requires their attention. This kind of relationship in global literature is regarded as Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) (Campbell 2006). The relationship is mutually beneficial to both of them. The military can provide support and protection to civilians while they also rely on the support of civilians to be effective in contending with violence. In this paper, the focus is on civil military cooperation. It looks at the functional role of the military and the police in ensuring that the emerging violence and terrorism in the north east and north central is minimally reduced. In clear terms however, civil military relations refer to the relationship between civilians who are members of the society and are armless and the military (the army, navy and air force) that carry arms, either during peace, war, or any form of violence. According to Clemmensen (2013), civil-military relation "encompasses every aspect of social life where people who are defined as soldiers or warriors have something to do with people who are defined as civilians". It is the extent to which the military define themselves, their activities in relation to civilian life.

Proponents of civil military relations are Samuel Huntington (1957) and Morris Janowitz (1960). In his classical work on *The Soldier and The State,* Huntington argued that the nature of relationship between civilians and the military has a lot to do with their effectiveness. According to him, there are basically two factors that shape and determine the effectiveness or otherwise of the military. These are what he regarded as functional imperative and societal imperative. Functional imperatives are special characteristics of the military driven by their need to be capable of defending the state against external threats. Here, emphasis is laid on professionalism that would boost their psychology, make them more effective, minimise tension between officers and politicians while maximizing the state's ability to handle conventional

military threats. Societal imperatives arise from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within society (Nielsen 2005). These forces, if allowed to infiltrate the military may lead to its politicization, making it a tool in the hands of politicians for achieving their personal and or selfish interest.

Janowitz (1960) argued from the same perspective with Huntington but deviated by saying that it is unrealistic to have a military that is completely free from political control, especially where security challenges have become so pertinent in a democracy. Democratic governance has made political leadership so diffused to the extent that civilian politicians have come to assume that the military will be an active ingredient in decision making about national security (Janowitz 1964). He argued that when the military is meaningfully integrated with civilian values, it does not affect their functional role but makes them "responsible, circumscribed, and responsive to civilian authority" (Janowitz 1964: 343). The integration of civilian values according to him prepares the military to be committed to the use of minimum force and "seeks viable international relations, rather than victory because it has incorporated a protective military posture" (Janowitz 1964: 418).

While these two arguments form the basis for assessing military effectiveness in western societies, it becomes very difficult locating it within the context of African societies characterized by varying interest ranging from political, religious, ethnic and individual interest. Globally, the success of the military in providing security in any society is dependent on the support of communities that are affected by violence. The support could be in terms of resources (both economic and social) as well as complete independence. Over the years, Nigerian military has maintained global records of successes in peace keeping in neighbouring African countries of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and the Sudan. However, making references to these successes without pointing out corresponding successes in its own home country faced with similar challenges like the *Boko Haram* in the North East and the ethno-religious violence in the North Central in form of communal conflicts, consistent farmers-herdsmen attack usually tagged 'unknown gunmen' attack is an indication that something

fundamental must have gone wrong. Apart from the allegation of corruption being labelled against the military and the existing leadership in managing the crisis as pointed out by Amosu (2015), the entire process has been politicized. As argued by Huntington (1957), where a military becomes highly politicized to the extent that certain actions that require professionalism are manipulated for political reasons, maintaining internal security becomes a major problem. According to Dorah (2008), the military in Africa have become a string of manipulation being used by many political leaders to attain or stay in power. They are being manipulated to favour individual interests, though clothed as national interest.

Also, African military are equipped to ensure regime and ethnic security rather than state or national security (Buzan 2009). Evidences abound in literature on the manipulation of the security forces drafted to handle some of the crises in the middle belt and the north for either religious or ethnic reasons. In Jos for example, parties to the conflict respond differently to the deployment of the composition of the Joint Task Force (JTF) for the management of internal security. While the indigenous ethnic groups were comfortable with the role played by the Nigeria Police Force where the commissioner was a Christian, the Hausa-Fulani expressed reservations about them and were comfortable with the deployment of the military under the leadership of the General Officer Commanding the 3 Armoured Division who was a Muslim (Samuel, Kwaja and Adeoye 2011).

The political economy approach to policing argues that there is a link between the economy, polity and the dialectical interrelations with policing and other social institutions. This implies that the political and economic structure of any society determines its general values, cultures and norms as well as the direction and practice of governance (Alemika 2003). Arguably, the application of the law by the police in maintaining social order and internal security is a reflection of the way the society is organized. When a society is democratic, police becomes more democratic in maintaining law and order. Also, where the economic structure of the society is skewed in such a way that poverty, inequality, injustices as well as corruption in the provision

of basic human and social services continue to prevail, police will not only have to contend with high rates of economic crimes but much public disapproval, and all forms of hostility and violence.

In Nigeria, for example, especially the northern part, the economy is suffering from widespread poverty, corruption gross inequality, and high rate of unemployment. The National Bureau of Statistics (2012) reports that the north eastern states have the highest unemployment rate in the Federation. Yobe State, for example had 60.6% as at the end of 2011. In another study by Charles Soludo, it was reported that three northern regions had an average poverty incidence of 70.1% compared to 34.9% of the south's three. It was also reported that 70% of the people living in the north live below $1 per day which is equivalent to ₦190 Per day (Alizieuwa 2013). More recently, Amosu (2015) cited a report by the Statistician General of the Federation that North West and North East geo-political zones recorded the highest poverty rates in Nigeria with 77.7% and 77.3% respectively. These have impact on the extent and severity of violence and conflicts as well as the capacity of the police to respond to the security and welfare needs of the citizens. The citizens who live in deprived areas of the country as is the case in the north are more likely to be hostile to the government and the police who are perceived to be agents of the government.

In this circumstance also, the police become more susceptible to all kinds of manipulation and corruption from the few elites who control power (Hill 2007). This has led to a general decline in confidence in governments' ability to respond to fundamental needs as the police become more repressive and exploitative towards its citizens. Confronted by this stark reality, the role of the Nigeria Police in managing internal security crisis has been undermined by a combination of factors. At the level of government, they have been manipulated politically and have never attracted adequate funding. This has affected their effectiveness in terms of their responsiveness to citizens, call for assistance during distress, uncivil attitudes towards the citizens and they have been made to be more corrupt and brutal.

More recently, the Human Rights Watch (2013) asserts that the failure of Nigeria's government to address the widespread poverty,

corruption, police abuse and longstanding impunity for a range of crimes has created a fertile ground for violent militancy. The situation is more pronounced in societies characterized by ethnic and religious crisis. Sensing the level of frustration and distrust by majority of these ethnic groups, and in an attempt to continue to hold unto and exercise power, the police become a repressive apparatus in the hands of politicians to suppress those who may question their legitimacy through protest, demonstration and other forms of democratic and human rights activities.

The Nature and Pattern of Internal Security Crisis in Northern Nigeria

In Nigeria, discourse on conflict and internal security over the years hover around ethnic, religious, political factors and to a very large extent the rampaging *Boko Haram*. Summarising the spectre of ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria, Alubo (2006) stated that ethnic, inter-communal and religious conflicts have become so pervasive that there is hardly any part of the country that has not been affected. The worse hit is North Central and North Eastern Nigeria. Within North central region, there is hardly any state that has not experienced one form of ethnic and or religious crisis or the other. In Jos, the plateau state capital, the crisis between Hausa-Fulani who are predominantly Muslims and the indigenous ethnic groups who are majorly Christians has lasted for over ten years (Best 2011). At the centre of the crises is the perceived feeling of who is an indigene and who is a settler. This has created suspicion among residents which manifest in form of exclusion or inclusion in appointments to political positions and access to resources like land, political power and other opportunities for individual and collective development. From 1994 to 2010, the spate of violence in Jos has increased, leading to wanton destruction of lives, properties and the unofficial and informal partitioning of the city into ethnic and religious divides (Samuel, Kwaja and Adeoye 2011). Early 2010, it was reported that a community in Jos called Dogo Nahawa was attacked by suspected Fulani Herdsmen killing an estimated 400 people with over 20,000 displaced (Think Security Africa 2011).

In Benue, Nasarawa and Taraba States, it is either violence between agriculturalists who are mainly the indigenous Tiv people and pastoralists who are Fulanis, or conflicts over land and political appointments, or inter and intra ethnic groups' conflict. This is evident in the report by Ayuba (2014) of recurring violence between the Fulani herdsmen and Tiv Farmers in Benue and Nasarawa where since 2011-2014, several lives of both Fulani herdsmen and either Tives or indigenous Assakiyo or Alakiyo ethnic groups were major casualties.

The upsurge of Islamic fundamentalism in the North East and North West of the country has given the conflict a terrorist dimension. *Boko Haram* is an Islamic sect that came into existence in 2002 when it was first reported in Yobe State and Borno State. The group was initially described as a homegrown terrorist group that romances with desperate politicians in the north and enjoys support from some well to do individuals, religious leaders, allies, admirers of their ideology (Salawu 2013). Members of the group seek a ban on Western education, culture and science which it deem sinful and anti-Islamic and to establish a society that practices core Orthodox Islam (Lengmang 2011). Indications are that the group was initially formed by Mohammed Yusuf to propagate his Islamic ideology but along the line, politicians in the North hijacked the movement. This view is corroborated by Lister (2012) who argued that it is no longer a sect of Islamic fanatics but has the support of disgruntled politicians who feel aggrieved or abandoned from the political process in the North and hence, mobilize the group as thugs to cause confusion. By implication, *Boko Haram* is a destructive political tool with cosmetic religious coverage (Nwanegbo and Odigbo 2013).

Since the violence started, the target of the group has been major institutions including security agencies like the police and military installations through sacrificial suicide bombing and jailbreaks in prisons assumed to be keeping suspected members of the sect. According to Salawu (2013), *Boko Haram* had launched fifty-three (53) attacks between January, 2009 and February 2012 killing 1157 people with hundreds of injuries. Amosu (2015) further reports that the north has the highest number of Internally

Displaced Persons (IDPs) with about 22% or 82,000 in the North East, 31% or 116,207 in the North West, and 42.4% or 162,281 in the North Central due to identity-based conflicts such as ethno-religious and political conflicts and violent clashes between the religious militia and armed groups (*Boko Haram*) and government forces.

A more sophisticated technique adopted by the insurgents is the tactics of mass abduction of young girls, women and children. The abduction of over 200 Chibok girls who were preparing to write exams in government-owned schools in Borno state in the north further create more security concerns. These tactics have raised a lot of questions on the minds of people on whether the violence is a national threat, an exclusive military or police threat or it is gender based. Table 8.1 below presents a summary of the nature and pattern of activities of the group in the North in 2014-2017.

Table 8.1: Summary of some Terror Activities of *Boko Haram* in the North, 2014-2017

Year and Date	City and State	Event
February 11, 2014	Kodunga, Borno State	Men in trucks killed 39 people and razed down over 100 homes.
February 25, 2014	Federal Government College, Buni, Yadi, Yobe State	59 teenage college boys killed, 24 buildings torched.
April 14, 2014	Chibok, Borno State	16 killed or missing, over 276 school girls abducted. 59 girls managed to escape, while 219are still missing.
April 14, 2014	Nyanya, FCT	Two bombs explode at a crowded bus station killing at least 90 people and injuring more than 200.
May 5, 2014	Gamburu, Borno State	Shooting in a busy marketplace and set of houses on fire, leading to 336 deaths.
May 20, 2014	Jos, Plateau State	Twin bomb explosion killed 118 people.
June 1, 2014	Mubi, Adamawa State.	Bomb explosion at a football field, killing 40 people.
June 2, 2014	Gwoza, Borno State	Militants disguised as soldiers slaughtered at least 200 civilians.
June 3, 2014	Gwoza, Borno State	Attack on church in Attagar, 9 worshippers killed.

Table 8.1 contd.

June 23, 2014	School of Hygiene, Kano State	Dozens of people were killed in a bomb blast.
July 29, 2014	Katarko, Yobe State	Attack on military base, killing 8 residents and blowing up the Katarko bridge which links Damaturu to their stronghold, Buni Yadi, the capital of Gujba Local Government Area.
November 10, 2014	Potiskum, Yobe State	Suicide bomb attack at the assembly ground of a school, leading to 58 deaths.
January 3, 2015	Baga, Borno State	A multi-day raid took place where hundreds of Boko Haram gunmen seized the town of Baga and neighbouring villages as well as a multi-national military base leaving bodies scattered everywhere and as many as 2000 people feared death.
April 25-26, 2015	Damasak, Borno State	Decomposed corpses of at least 400 men, women and children were found in shallow, mass graves and other streets of Damasak.
April 28-30, 2015	Borno State	Nigerian troops rescue about 450 women and girls in Sambisa Forest.
February 1, 2016	Borno State	Militants attacked Dalori, Nigeria with suicide bombs and allegedly burned children alive (86 killed, unknown wounded).
February 6, 2016	Borno State	Two female suicide bombers detonated explosives at a displaced persons camp in Dika, Nigeria (58 killed, 80+ wounded).
October 13, 2016	Borno State	Boko Haram militants handed over 21 Chibok school girls to authorities after a series of negotiations with the Federal Government.
May 6, 2017	Borno State	82 Chibok school girls were released after negotiation with the Federal Government.

Source: SERAP 2014; Global Terrorism Index 2016; CNN 2017; BBC 2017

The height of the violence by *Boko Haram* was the bombing of the Nigeria Police Headquarters and the United Nations Headquarters in Abuja, the nation's capital in June and August 2011 respectively, the March 31, 2014 DSS attack and the April 14 abduction of the Chibok school girls which are assumed to be highly fortified.

At the heart of these ethno-religious and political crises in Northern Nigeria is the legitimacy crisis of governance. The increasing manifestation of illegal antisocial and repressive behaviour of policies by government and its inability to tackle development challenges and to render goods and services to the people appear to be one of the major causes of the violence (Ogundiya 2009). Moreso, Salawu (2010) argued that ethno-religious crisis in the north is a manifestation of the accusation and allegation of neglect, oppression, domination, exploitation, victimization, discrimination and marginalization of citizens by the state. It is as argued by Rotberg (2002: 9) a characteristic of a weak state that is gradually approaching the last phase of legitimacy collapse such that if care is not taken, it could lead to a failed state. In his words, "once the state's capacity to secure itself or to perform in an expected manner recedes, there is every reason to expect disloyalty to the state on the part of the disenchanted and aggrieved citizens".

The idea of social contract as postulated by Plato is very relevant here. According to Clemmensen (2013), all societies rest on an implicit agreement between the ruler and those who have to consent for him to rule. The individual's agreement depends on the reciprocal obligation of the state. In other words, obedience to state laws is contingent on what the state does to the individual in terms of meeting his/her basic needs. Interestingly, most African states are gradually becoming weaker and weaker by the day giving rise to all kinds of internal security threats. According to Buzan (1991), a good number of African states are politically incoherent and they lack legitimacy. Within these states, there exists competing notions of security and patriotism, which, is advanced by contending forces within the society. There are those who have reduced national security to personal interest without any corresponding link to patriotism. This has given rise to regime security which is only concerned with the deployment of the military for protection and support for power extension (Dorah 2008).

At this point, groups begin to transfer their allegiances to their clans and group leaders some of whom gravitate towards rebel movement and terrorism as they try to secure communal mandate. Further arguments have put it that legitimacy crises and state collapse provides haven for terrorists to thrive where they blend

more comfortably in the prevailing chaos (Rotberg 2002). Making reference to Soyinka (2012), Alozieuwa (2013) observed that under this circumstance, politicians who have lost out in the powerstakes resort to the manipulation of the situation to bring society to its knees and to create a situation of total anarchy that will either break up the nation or bring back the military.

From these analyses, the government seem to have resorted to criminal legislation in its effort to overcome the crises by creating a new social order where the military and the police have continued to act unprofessionally. They indiscriminately arrest, detain, torture, and illegally execute innocent citizens under the pretext of law enforcement bringing about large scale of human rights violation.

Internal Security Norms and Gaps in Crisis Management by the Police and the Military in Northern Nigeria

The end of the cold war marked a global decline in inter-state conflict (conflict between nations) and the expansion of democratic ideals. This however came with its security challenges in form of ethnic, religious, political and economic conflicts. Traditionally, the police are responsible for internal security while the military are responsible for defending countries against foreign attack. The police who operate internally and are well trained in the preservation of order, safety and social relation (Alemika and Chukwuma 2003) are ideal to manage internal conflicts. Internal security threats which relate to cases of riots, demonstrations, strikes, communal/ethnic clashes, religious conflicts, terrorism, and the likes, which normally fall outside the constitutional duty of the military should be managed by the police. Section 4 of the Police Act provides the general duties of the police as:

> the detection of crime, the apprehension of offenders, preservation of law and order, the protection of life and property and the due enforcement of all laws and regulations with which they are directly charged and shall perform such military duties within and outside Nigeria as may be required.

However, the military tend to be involved when there is weak democracy or there is a sign that points to some kind of failure on the part the police or civil leadership in managing internal security challenges. Section 217(c) of the 1999 Constitution forms the basis for the involvement of the military in internal security management in Nigeria. It provides that when the country is being suppressed or it is under any form of insurrection, the military may be called upon by the president to act in aid of civil authorities to restore order as may be prescribed by an Act of National Assembly.

More importantly too, Section 305 of the same constitution which empowers the president to issue a proclamation of state of emergency is another basis for military internal security operations. This section provides that state of emergency shall be declared in the following situations:

(i)   When there is actual breakdown of public order and public safety in the federation or any part thereof to such extent as to require extraordinary measures to restore peace and security.

(ii)   Also, if there is clear and present danger of an actual breakdown of public order and public safety in the federation or any part thereof requiring extraordinary measure to avert any such dangers.

(iii)   Or there is an occurrence or imminent danger or the occurrence of any disaster or national calamity affecting the community or a section of the community in the federation, or there is any other public danger which clearly constitutes a threat to the existence of the federation.

These provisions above all refer to the breakdown of public order and public safety and the need to restore same. Though the duty to restore law and order within the country is that of the civil authorities which is the Nigeria Police, the provision of Section 217 of the 1999 constitutions comes into play here as it is to the effect that the military can be called upon to aid civil authorities to restore public order in any part of the country. In connection with this provision in the constitution, the military always performs internal security Operations under states of emergency. Table 8.2

below illustrates the constitutional functions of the military, police and other intelligence agencies.

Table 8.2: Constitutional Role of the Police, military and other Intelligence Agencies in Nigeria

Security agency	Composition	Functions
Nigerian military	Army Navy Air force	1. Defending Nigeria from external aggression. 2. Maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its border from violation on land, sea or air. 3. Suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon by the president, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an act of the National Assembly. 4. Performing such other functions as may be prescribed by an act of the National Assembly.
Police	The Nigeria Police Force	1. Prevention and detection of crime. 2. Apprehension of offenders. 3. Preservation of law and order. 4. Protection of life and property. 5. Enforcement of all laws and regulations with which they are charged. 6. Prosecution. 7. Military duties within and outside Nigeria as may be required of them.
Nigerian Intelligence Unit	State Security Service Defence Intelligence Agency Nigerian Intelligence Agency	Intelligence gathering concerning internal security defence and external subversion.

While the table above illustrates the varying responsibilities of the security agencies, their involvement seem to be shrouded in ambiguity and confusion. This is because of the blurred line between what the police are expected to do and what the military are expected to do. The constitution, though, very clear about what the role of these security agencies are, it did not anticipate this kind

of scenario which we are experiencing in Nigeria of having to incorporate the police and the military into managing internal security challenges. This has resulted to all sorts of clashes of interest arising mostly from the argument of superiority and control. According to Friesendorf (2009), "blurring the line between military and policing tasks has clashed with Security Sector Reform (SSR) norm of separating the military from the police". Where the role of the police and the military are not clearly defined, during ethno-religious conflicts and internal insurgency as is the case in the northern Nigeria, security forces end up not being effective and efficient.

When the responsibilities of the joint task forces are blurred, especially in internal conflict management, applying democratic principles become more difficult, thereby, exposing more civilians to the risk of human rights violation (Friesendorf 2009). The United Nations Basic Principle on the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials (1990) argued that law enforcement officials shall not use firearms against persons except in self-defence or in defence of others against imminent threat of death to life. This implies that in carrying out their duties, they are required to apply non-violent means before resorting to the use of force and firearms. Meanwhile, they may use firearms only if other means remain ineffective or without any promise of achieving the intended result. Further, the International Humanitarian Law (2006) added that states are to respect the principle of proportionality of the use of force which stipulates that attacks are prohibited that may be expected to cause incidental lost of civilian live, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated (cited in Friesendorf 2009).

While the JTF or the STF as they are called in Nigeria are supposed to adhere to these guiding principles, reports show that they are involved in gross human rights violation. The Network on Police Reform in Nigeria (NOPRIN 2008) and the Amnesty International (2009) confirmed that Nigerian security forces have a history of carrying out extra-judicial executions, torture, and other ill-treatment. The massive killings by the military in the North East and North West in an attempt to check sectarian violence and

terrorist activities by Islamic fundamentalist sect, *Boko Haram* are clear indications of human rights violations.

Empirical evidences however abound of the illegal engagement of the military by several governments where such is not necessary. The invasion of ZakiBiam, a Tiv community in Benue State which took place in 2001 leading to the death of no fewer than 100 people by the army in revenge for the killing of 19 soldiers sent to restore peace following an ethnic violence is one example. This operation was recorded by the Human Rights Watch (2001) as one of the highly unprofessional ways in which the military displayed its show of strength without any knowledge of rules of engagement or recourse to constitutional mandate. The report reveals that the soldiers made the villagers to sit on the ground, separating men from the rest and opening fire on the men indiscriminately.

Military in internal security operations have also been linked with extra judicial killings. The Borno State Governor, Kashim Shettima, said in April 2013 that over 100 people were killed in Baga community during the April 16 clash between officers of the Joint Task Force and insurgents. Residents of the village said they buried 185 people after the battle, while the Red Cross has said 187 people were killed ((National Human Rights Commission 2013; *Premium Times* Newspaper 2013). There have also been several reports on extra judicial killings by the military in Nigeria. One of such killings is the September 20 killing of innocent poor squatters in an uncompleted building in Abuja who were believed to be *Boko Haram* members when it was confirmed that they were in no way linked to the dreaded sect as claimed by the spokesperson of the Nigerian Secret Police, Marilyn Ogar (Sahara Reporters 2013).

Worse still, some of the Joint Task Force members who are supposed to protect civilians align with the militias or the insurgents for religious, ethnic or economic reasons to continue to violate human rights. This is alluded to by Hills (2009) that security forces personnel whether military or police may claim to represent the state, yet they all share personal tribal or sectarian loyalties of their peers. Interestingly too, they are being manipulated by politicians for political reasons. Making reference

to African policing, Hills (2007) observed that the police were consistently involved in the output side of the political process. Aside maintenance of order and other paramilitary operations, African police enforce decisions taken by political elites to whom they are accountable. They find it very difficult to operate as independent political actors and as such, attach themselves to other groups hoping to attract favours and resources. This remains the case with Nigeria where policing is an expression of political elite's preference and 'police governance is a president's political calculations' (Hills 2007).

Azinge (2013) summarized the gaps in managing internal security by the military as inappropriate training, orientation, equipment, strategy and tactics as well as mode of operation. Regarding training and orientation, he argued that because the military has been trained to defend the country in times of war, their orientation is to destroy any potential threat whether internal or external. This mindset contradicts the norms of internal security management which requires restrain. Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos (2014) reports that the actions of the Nigeria's security forces have been so repressive to the extent that the gap between members of the communities affected by the violence and the armed forced is widened. It is such that armless civilians who are supposed to seek refuge with security forces run to *Boko Haram* for protection even when they do not initially support or subscribed to the actions and doctrines of the movement.

Further argument by Azinge (2013) reveals that where the military think they have been called upon because of the incapability and inefficiency of the police in maintaining law and order, they feel they are more superior to the police, leading to jealousy, rivalry and distrust between them. Oftentimes, the soldiers involved are not properly equipped to manage such task. When they are only equipped with guns without requisite training in coordinating the complex nature of the insurgency, their deployment does not produce positive result. What we see as the outcome is reports of, failure of intelligence gathering, corruption, complicity and inter-agency rivalry (ICG 2014). The missing gap here therefore is the clear violation of the laws of armed conflict as

specified in the different conventions on the use of force, human rights and rules of engagement of security agencies.

Roadmap to Effective Internal Conflict Management by the Police and the Military

The nature and dynamics of emerging conflicts globally, call for an integrated police and military role in conflict management. The police are major stakeholders in internal security, especially when they have control over local communities and their members. This is crucial in Northern Nigeria considering the *modus operandi* of the *Boko Haram* sect and other unknown gunmen who capitalise on difficult terrains to launch their attacks. Without the cooperation of local communities, the whole idea of internal security will not be effective. Here, community policing is a necessity. In addition, Nigeria police is operating in a democratic society. Without respecting the human rights of all citizens, the police are less likely to have the full trust of the public. The underlying principle of democratic policing asserts that respect for human rights is vital to public order and law enforcement, and it entails police sensitivity to majority opinion as well as a readiness to uphold the rights of minorities (Alemika and Chukwuma 2003).

Nigerian military over the years have been playing strategic roles in guaranteeing African unity. According to Pedan (2011), Nigeria has one of the best trained and best equipped militaries in Africa and has been a central component of the West African commitment to peacekeeping in Liberia, Sierra Leone and other African Union mission to Darfur. With this experience, handling domestic security challenges like the *Boko Haram* insurgency and other sectarian violence should not be an issue. However, when there is no clear division of labour between the police and the military, the use of deadly force to deal with local uprising becomes eminent. In this case, the involvement of the military should be such that appropriate troops are mobilized for specific scenario. If the environment is hostile and aggressive like in the case of Maiduguri, Yobe and Adamawa where so many casualties including the military and the police are recorded, robust military capacities and proper mandate are needed.

More importantly, adequate training on civilian-military relationship should be highly encouraged. This would reduce friction between the military and civilians. It is also crucial for the military and the police to cooperate with Non-Governmental Organizations, traditional rulers, religious organizations and other actors who do not share their coercive outlook, yet whose relief and peace-building activities address root causes of the conflicts. In the case of *Boko Haram*, intelligence gathering is one major weapon that is required from both the military and the police. However, this can only be effective when there is proper cooperation between civilians and the security forces. Above all, government should be mandated to attack the root causes or what is regarded as drivers of conflicts engraved in poverty, unemployment, weak leadership, inequality (both horizontal and vertical) access to political and economic power on the basis of religion, ethnicity or gender.

Recommendations
Given the complexity of the security situation in Northern Nigeria, and the continuous involvement of the police and the military as an inevitable means of managing the situation, the paper provides the following recommendations.

(1) In view of the fact that the triggers of most of these crises are located within the context of Nigeria's economic, social and political woes, the first step towards managing internal security is the delivery of dividends of democracy to its citizens. A situation where many Nigerian politicians are associated with acquisition of wealth and property through corruption as against majority of highly impoverished people will definitely breed these kinds of violence.

(2) Preventive Security Management should be the focus of the government. This is not measured in terms of the quantum of armoured personnel carriers, Hilux Pick-up Vans with sirens, assault rifles, canisters and AK 47 guns that are deployed on major streets as is the case with the

Nigerian situation. It is about intelligence gathering as exemplified in community policing considering the fact that the terrorists and the criminals live with us in our communities. Resources (both financial and human) should be channelled towards empowering intelligent agencies with the skills needed to gather information on any possible security threat within the community.

(3)   A programme should be designed to enhance cooperation among law enforcement agencies and major security institutions to collaborate and interconnect where such threats are identified foe effective coordination.

(4)   Security should be seen as an all encompassing responsibility of community members whose confidence in the security agents should be based on the fact that counter terrorism in a complex society like Nigeria requires sharing of information and protecting the provider of the information that is shared without intimidation.

(5)   The government must also embrace democratic Policing instead of the militarized policing of the Nigerian polity. In practicing democratic policing, all the civil courtesies are accorded to the citizens. By this, we mean our leaders must sufficiently interact and dialogue with the people irrespective of their perceived reasoning and behaviours so that their anger will not result to violence.

(6)   Norms of engagement should be clarified at any point in time that a joint task force is deployed to manage a given security situation. This will enhance effectiveness and civility in the role of the security agents with less civilian casualties.

(7)   Partnership of the government with civil society organizations should be one of the major focuses in Nigeria. Where governments and CSOs collaborate, it helps in issues of arms proliferation, especially small arms and light weapons which are the common weapons used during the violence.

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9

Gender-Based Violence and Human Security: Perceptions and Implications for Development in Nigeria

Yetunde A. Aluko

Introduction

Conceptualization of security has moved beyond preoccupation with the territorial integrity of nation states, and has been reinvigorated by the recognition that concerns for the individual – such as human rights, gender equity and a minimum social entitlement – have much to contribute to our understanding (UNDP 1994). Achieving human security therefore included not only protecting people but empowering people to fend for themselves that is, a concern for the welfare of vulnerable groups in society, particularly women and children. Human security is therefore people-centred, multidimensional, interconnected, and universal (UNDP 2006). Human security involves focusing on individuals and recognizing the diverse factors that pose threats of want and fear, which includes states, internal conflict, human rights abuses, environmental deterioration, poverty and oppression, and disease and malnutrition.

History has shown that women's experience of insecurity is fundamentally different from that of men (Scott 1986; Tickner 1992; Prugl 1999). Gender-based violence (GBV) has long been a major component of warfare. According to Jolly and Deepayan (2006: 7) "women are subjected to specific forms of violence in war because, as women, they are viewed as cultural bearers and reproducers of 'the enemy'. Rape, forced impregnation, sexual slavery and other forms of humiliation take on powerful political and symbolic meanings." However, women are also at risk within the domestic economy, having to endure discrimination in employment, marginalization in the eyes of the law, and the rigid frameworks of socio-cultural expectations.

The consideration of gendered insecurities necessitates a broadening of the concept of security, and human security lends itself well to this conceptual task. This is further corroborated by Jolly and Deepayan (2006: 7), which states that "through gender, security becomes reconstructed on the basis of women's experiences of violence, interrelating violence on the local, national, and international levels, and eradicating structural violence instead of primarily focussing on the direct violence of war."

A gendered approach thus disaggregates the cultural, social, economic and political mechanisms for the distribution of power and control, and recognizes who is affected and how, and what specific forms of protection or assistance are needed by whom (Raven-Roberts 2001). Through the utilization of a human security perspective, it is possible to generate policies that are at once sensitive to the insecurities of vulnerable women and integrate these concerns into a wider narrative of human threats. Gender is therefore a vital component of the human security agenda.

The Problem
Hand in hand with the rising acceptance of human-centred approaches to security has come a begrudging acknowledgement that gender issues are relevant to security. African women and men have voiced their right to security and justice for decades if not centuries: the right to live without violence and oppression and the right to participate in decision-making. Women's organizations, as parts of liberation movements or political parties or as grassroots civil society organizations, have often led the way in advocating for the security and justice needs of marginalized groups. They have struggled to place vital gender issues such as violence against women (the focus of this chapter), human rights abuses by security sector personnel and the impact of small-arms violence upon young African men on the national security agenda.

The concept of Gender-Based Violence (GBV) is violence that mostly targets women due to perceptions about their gender in specific cultural contexts. Thus GBV is an attack on a person's identity, which has devastating consequences for its victims. Several reports have found that there is widespread acceptance of

violence directed towards women (Scott et al. 2013; Human Rights Watch 2013). Sexual violence, although rampant in so many societies like Nigeria, has been labelled a private and domestic matter that falls outside of public discussion and much of the human security discourse (Lewis 2006). Yet the most basic security, bodily and personal integrity, is denied to those women who are experiencing sexual violence. Guaranteeing women's human security requires that we be open about, and challenge, the many forms of GBV in Nigeria. It also involves rethinking the circumstances, practices and relationships that affect the human security of over half the Nigerian population. GBV has direct implications for progress on all the MDGs because it impacts on girls' and women's access to education, productivity, health and well-being, HIV transmission, and it can lead to increased poverty. However, it was not incorporated into the MDGs framework even though addressing GBV is fundamental to realizing the specific MDGs to promote gender equality and empower women.

Many of the practices that determine women's human security are connected to the private realm and to domestic and interpersonal relationships. For example, 'home' for many abused women is a site of profound insecurity, and violence within the home totally contradicts conventional views that associate danger and risk with public spaces. Those familial and marital relationships in which incest and wife-battering routinely occur (Jekayinfa 2012) must encourage us to rethink conventional assumptions about which actions violate human security, and the contexts in which these violations happened. Generally, holistic thinking about security requires us to consider safety within domestic spheres, safety from violence perpetrated by partners, husbands, uncles or fathers, safety at places of work, and the safety that allows women to participate as full citizens.

Nigeria is a signatory to most of the International instruments on Women's Rights, especially The Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (hereinafter called African Women's Protocol). The country has also gone further to domesticate some

of the provisions of the African Charter in the 1999 Constitution (Abdulraheem 2010), and recently passed a bill to the parliamentarians on the Violence Against Persons (Prohibition) Bill (VAPP-BILL) for ratification since 2013. However, despite these provisions in our laws for the protection of women's rights, there has not been commensurate improvement in the protection of the rights of women. There appears to be a gap between the existence of laws pertaining to the rights of women and their implementation in practical terms. It is against this backdrop that this chapter seeks to provide answer to the following questions:

- Are the measures for combating GBV in Nigeria sufficient response to ensure women's security?
- Has the National Gender Policy in Nigeria achieved its aim as regards GBV?
- If yes, to what extent?
- If no, why? What are still the constraints?

An underlying, normative assumption for this chapter is that people have to feel basic security if they are going to be able to contribute to society. By this it is meant that by providing its citizens with basic human security from threats to their daily lives, the Nigerian State will benefit by getting trust from the citizens. My underlying interest is in the capacity of the state, to implement the constitutional rights of its citizens in cases of GBV. The incidences of GBV that are most commonly referred to in the case of Nigeria are rape, wife beating, abuse (human trafficking) and child marriage are used for this chapter. These issues threaten the lives of young girls and women directly and as part of the surrounding structures.

To this end several instances of discrimination against women, which affect the development of the womenfolk, were examined in this chapter. The chapter is structurally divided into four sections. Section I comprises – the Introductory Part and Problem Statements, Section II comprises – Conceptual Issues and Conceptual Framework, Section III comprises – Background Issues to the Development of National Gender Policy in Nigeria, Overview of the Policy Concerns and Policy Goals; Section IV

comprises – The inquiry into whether the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria has been a source of security for women in Nigeria or not, implications of the findings, recommendations and lastly, summary and conclusions.

SECTION II
Conceptual Issues
Gender-Based Violence (GBV)
Numerous international agencies have taken up the cause of GBV. It has gained increasing attention, but there is no consensus on definitions. According to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) GBV is defined as a phenomenon that:

> ...reflects and reinforces inequities between men and women and compromises the health, dignity, security and autonomy of its victims. It encompasses a wide range of human rights violations, including sexual abuse of children, rape, domestic violence, sexual assault and harassment, trafficking of women and girls and several harmful traditional practices (UNFPA 2013).

It is evident here that UNFPA connects GBV to men and women as well as a range of specific issues. The definition is useful for setting some boundaries around the concept, but more information is definitely needed in order for their definition to be operational in relation to this paper. UNFPA does however further elaborate their definition by adding that:

> Gender-based violence also serves – by intention or effect – to perpetuate male power and control. It is sustained by a culture of silence and denial of the seriousness of the health consequences of abuse. In addition to the harm they exact on the individual level, these consequences also exact a social toll and place a heavy and unnecessary burden on health services (UNFPA 2013).

This definition in a way portrays GBV as stemming from patriarchy which is also based on the ideology and exercise of power. The definition identifies structures (culture) that perpetuate male power over women, which is in accordance with most research on GBV, and relates this to the (in) security of women.

Also, the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) states in a summary report that they consider GBV to include "… physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty" (UN Women 2011). What this signals is that GBV is something that mainly concerns women, and that gender is a socially-constructed concept to which people connect certain positive or negative traits. While I agree with this interpretation and focus on women, it is important to note at this point that men sometimes are overlooked as objects of GBV. However, GBV is a structural and physical harm to a person due to socially constructed norms and ideas. The concept GBV is further based on the two concepts of 'gender' and 'violence'.

In Nigeria, as well as most of Africa, (GBV) is legitimized by norms, traditional beliefs and practices (Arisi and Oromareghake 2011). Within Nigeria, GBV transcends region, religion and ethnicity, with physical and sexual abuse affecting as many as 35.1% of Igbo women and 34.3% of Hausa-Fulani women (NDHS 2013). A symbol of patriarchal authority is the extent to which women's human rights are threatened and that choices are limited for women to seek redress. Instances of GBV includes: Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), which is a situation where babies and adolescents are still being circumcized thus exposing them to deadly complications. Although the Inter-Africa Committee (IAC) has been leading the campaign against FGM, about 50% of the mothers would still like to continue the practice (Jekayinfa 2012; Effah-Chukwuma 2012). Other human rights violations such as the widowhood practices, rape, child/human trafficking, discrimina-tory inheritance and male child preference are popular among most cultural groups while wife battering is common, affecting about 50% of Nigerian households (Jekayinfa 2012; Effah-Chukwuma 2012). The NDHS 2013 reports attitude to wife-beating by women and men and shows that this practice is unlikely to abate at a fast

rate. Also is early marriage, which is still widely practiced in the North. Although in the South, there is a growing percentage of young mothers who are driven to it, not so much by culture, but by poverty.

Human Security

Human security as a security perspective fits into the broader fields of social constructivism and liberalism, established in newer times as an opposition to Realism's view of international politics, emphasizing the individual as a referent object complementary to that of the state (Burgess and Jonas 2012). As Hough has pointed out "The meaning of 'security' is not just an arcane matter of academic semantics. The term carries significant weight in 'real world' political affairs since threats to the security of states have to be a priority for governments and threats to the lives of people are increasingly accepted as more important than other matters of contention" (2008: 13). By this Hough refers to a switch in thinking from mere state politics to a concern with threats to the daily lives of individuals.

Human security as it is known today is basically centred on the individual's perception of threats and security and varies according to different social contexts (Burgess and Jonas 2012). Theoretically it stretches from scholars focusing on violent threats to individuals and communities that need immediate intervention capability, to scholars who emphasize a broader definition that includes human rights abuses, poverty and underdevelopment (Burgess and Jonas 2012). Empirically human security can be defined as both 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want', which quite clearly defines human security, as something subjectively perceived (Burgess and Jonas 2012: 91-92).

Hoogensen and Stuvøy have emphasized that they understand security as connected to individual identity in "…an ever-changing process which makes theoretic approaches to security to be susceptible to changing contexts and structures" (Hoogensen and Stuvøy 2006: 214). By saying that security is connected to identity, context and structure they make a point of security and threats to security as being a part of our perception about how the world is and ought to be. As such human security can be said to be

normative and at the same time applicable to a broad variety of events. So, if security is the goal we must analyze threats from the perspective which is most applicable to the level of analysis, the individual or small group.

Gender and Human Security as a Conceptual Framework
The nexus between gender and security can be approached from many different angles. There are a multitude of different understandings of gender issues, from liberal feminist theorists to self-identified womanists. This section draws upon the schools of post-colonial and post-structural feminist theory and the work of various African gender theorists. As such, 'gender' is understood as the socially constructed roles and relationships between men, women, boys and girls. We are often taught to act, feel and think differently depending upon whether we are born female or male (Nzegwu 2001; Oyewumi 1997). These social roles are fluid and vary depending upon the specific ethnic, religious, class and geographic community that we are born into. Context is everything. In contrast, biological differences between males and females, such as hormones, reproductive organs and genetic differences are largely fixed. When referring to biological rather than socio-cultural differences between women and men the term 'sex' is used.

These socially constructed gender roles have determined African women and men's differential access to education, employment, political power etc., all of which influence the security threats that they face and their ability to access security and justice (Okome 2001; Amadiume 1997; Ezeigbo 1996). For instance, African women are much more likely to become victims of domestic and sexual violence, while men are more likely to suffer from gun and gang-related violence. Another example is that women are less likely to have access to formal justice systems due to the feminisation of poverty; women often do not have the resources to cover the necessary transportation costs, bribes or lawyers' fees (Hendericks and Valasek 2010). Gender roles are one of the key factors that construct the different security experiences, needs, priorities and actions of men, women, girls and boys.

In relation to GBV and Human Security, gender is an essential concept. This is because it is a perspective that focuses on people, their experiences, and why they experience things the way they do. It is a bottom-up approach where people's perceptions are in focus (McKay 2004). Some feminist approaches have focused mostly on the 'violence *against* women' and that the existence of a violent and oppressive patriarchy is taken for granted (Shepherd 2008: 37). Shepherd says that theorizing women within this perspective has focused on addressing violence "…perpetrated against individuals who are socially identified as women, perpetrated as a result of this identity" by men towards women (Shepherd 2008: 38). By continuing to point the research towards 'violence against women' the focus is kept on the marginalized women and their stories, and the unveiling of their experiences, which has led to a focus on women as victims (ibid. 39). This is a very interesting approach as it is a focus on the structural violence that surrounds women in many societies and where women are struggling on a daily basis for their rights and freedoms as human beings. Violent structures have not only been addressed by the feminist scholars per se, but also by peace researchers such as Johan Galtung. He refers to *structural violence* as exploitation and repression by social and world structures where "patriarchy is then seen as an institutionalization of male dominance…legitimized by culture…often emerging as direct violence with males as subjects and females as objects" (Galtung 1996: 40). This is not ignoring the possibility of men been victims of violence, but it is an inescapable fact that women are the most marginalized and more often than men are subjected to violence due to their gender.

SECTION III
Background Issues to the Development of the National
Gender Policy in Nigeria
In the year 2000, Nigeria adopted and passed into law the National Policy on Women[1]. The need for the policy was:

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[1] A United Nations Women's Bill of Rights of 1979

> to fulfil the yearnings as well as (promote) the efforts of Federal, State and Local Governments, Non-governmental Organizations, International Development Partners, the private sector, concerned corporate bodies and individuals **to integrate women** fully into national development, in order to remove those gender inequalities that have evolved through structures and processes created by patriarchy, colonialism and capitalism (National Gender Policy 2006: 4).

The document was therefore seen, in the main as a vehicle towards social equity, justice and an improved quality of life. The main guiding principles of the policy are the global instrument on the Convention of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and its optional protocols as well as the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The critical section or constitutional principle which tallies with the core goals of CEDAW is that of achieving equality of rights, obligations and opportunities before the law for women through the application of the anti-discriminatory clause that stipulates that:

> All citizens without discrimination on any group whatsoever have the opportunity for securing adequate means of livelihood as well as adequate opportunity to secure suitable employment (National Gender Policy 2006: 4).

The focus of the policy was therefore, to the largest extent, the pursuance of legal equality for women and men and the removal of all obstacles to the social, economic and political empowerment of women. The face, and indeed, the emphasis of the policy is women empowerment. Page 10 of the policy document, in articulating the goals of the policy, clearly states that it (the policy) draws heavily from national and international initiatives related to Women in Development. To this end, several strategic actions in different sectors were developed to create women-focused programmes in education, science and technology, health, employment, agriculture, industry, environment, legal space, social services, politics and decision-making and media relations (Federal Ministry

of Women Affairs and Social Development 2006). All these were geared to close gender gaps in the status of women and men in these sectors.

Overview of Policy Concerns on Gender-Based Violence
Gender-based violence has become a major issue in recent times. It reflects the extent to which women's human rights are threatened thereby leading to the voicelessness of women in many issues concerning and affecting their lives. Violence against women, particularly domestic violence and rape, is widespread which has increased the vulnerability of women to HIV/AIDS (Aluko 2015). In Nigeria, harmful practices meant to control women's sexuality have led to great sufferings. Notable among them is the practice of female genital mutilation (FGM) which is a violation of basic rights and a major lifelong risk to women's health. Another major violence against women is the insalubrious attitude of wife-beating and women trafficking. The underlying force behind this behaviour is the wrong believe that women are inferior and are supposed to be treated as second class citizens in the society (Effah-Chukwuma 2012). In other to tap the potentials of women for development, gender sensitive policy that entrench equity between men and women is key.

Equal relationships between men and women in matters of sexual relations and reproduction, including full respect for the physical integrity of the human body, requires mutual respect and willingness to accept responsibility for the consequences of sexual behaviour, sensitivity and equity in gender relations enhance and promote respectful and harmonious partnerships between men and women.

Policy Goal
Eradicate all forms of gender-based violence and discrimination, and ensure that women and men enjoy the same rights irrespective of their gender, age, ethnicity, religion, and class.

Objectives and Implementation Strategies
Objective 1: Legislate against all forms of gender-based violence and discriminations.

Strategies for Implementation

- Enforce the Sexual Offence law defined in Section 357 of the Criminal Code against women or a girl. For effective implementation, the practice of requiring corroboration for sexual offences shall be amended.
- Enforce the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act (2003).
- Promote the awareness and enforcement of existing laws against pornography.
- Enforce legislation against child labour as contained in the Child Labour Act.
- Enact new laws to protect the rights of women, adolescents, and children in the following areas –

    - Right of women to secure international passport without permission from husbands or other men;
    - Citizenship rights to foreign men married to Nigerian women;
    - Women's right to bail;
    - Son's preference, which results in harmful and unethical practices as regards female infanticide and prenatal sex selection

- Increase public awareness of the value of the girl child, and concurrently, strengthen the girl child's self-image, self-esteem and status. This could be done through elimination of stereotypes in communication and educational materials, and make the school environment more gender friendly and responsive.
- Ensure the domestication of CEDAW and the AU Protocol on the Right of Women.

Objective 2: Build the capacity of institutions and persons in support of transformatory change that will bring about a society free of all forms of gender-based violence.

Strategies for Implementation

- Advocacy for law and legislative reforms to include new forms of gender-based violence e.g. rape within marriage; harassment of men by ladies (reverse harassment) etc.
- Human rights education at all levels – Primary, Secondary and Tertiary; and within informal structures.
- Capacity building for the judiciary and the extra judiciary stakeholders.

SECTION IV
1999 Constitution of Nigeria – A Source of Security for Women in Nigeria?

In the light of Human Security Theory, an inclusion of women's rights can be understood as aiming at ensuring women's individual security within the state, as it is making women visible as possible referent objects of security, which the state is responsible for protecting. The constitution through the National Gender Policy seeks to ensure women to be treated equally to men in many aspects of their lives. Like many theories related to the concept of gender have done throughout history, the National Gender Policy has included both rights and freedoms of women into current law, making it possible for women to seek justice on their own behalf for incidents that are deemed criminal by law. Women are ensured the right to participate in public life, which means they can hold public office or in other ways be a part of the public debate and express their opinions.

Cases of GBV

According to NDHS (2013), 28 percent of women age 15-49 have experienced physical violence at least once since age 15, and 11 percent experienced physical violence within the 12 months prior to the survey. Also, 7 percent of women age 15-49 report having experienced sexual violence at least once in their lifetime. Overall, 25 percent of ever-married women age 15-49 report ever having experienced emotional, physical, or sexual violence from their spouse, and 19 percent report having experienced one or more of these forms of violence in the past 12 months. Among ever-married women who had experienced spousal physical violence in

the past 12 months, 33 percent reported experiencing physical injuries. However, 45 percent of women who experienced violence never sought help or never told anyone about the violence.

It is acknowledged that it is natural for a husband to beat/ commit violence against his wife in Nigeria. A husband beats his wife over domestic disputes such as burning food, arguing with him, going out without permission or neglecting the children. Much of the blame is placed on the plural legal systems. The law, as currently constituted, does not offer women and girls adequate protection from violence (Mahdi 2011; Nigeria CEDAW NGO Coalition 2008). The literature identifies statutory, religious and customary laws in Nigeria that permit violence against women. The Nigeria CEDAW NGO Coalition report (2008), for example, identifies the penal code Section 55(4), applicable in the Northern regions that legalises 'corrective' beating of a child, pupil, servant or wife, as long as this does not cause grievous hurt. For some, this is the root cause of violence against women. Although progress has been made (for example, the Violence Against Women Prevention, Protection and Prohibition Act, 2002), only four Nigerian states (Ebonyi, Jigawa, Cross Rivers and Lagos) have enacted domestic violence laws, while just six (Enugu, Edo, Bayelsa, Delta, Cross Rivers and Ogun) have passed laws against Female Genital Mutilation (FGM).

Wife Battery
The law on domestic violence is clearly inadequate, particularly regarding wife battery. Domestic violence is currently classified under common assault, which downplays the seriousness of this crime. According to Section 55 of the penal code, wife beating is allowed as long as it does not amount to grievous hurt in the Northern part of Nigeria. As defined in section 241 of the penal code "grievous hurt" include emasculation, permanent loss of sight, ability to hear or speak facial disfigurement, deprivation of any member or joint, bone fracture or tooth dislocation (Imam 2008). This means that a man who beats his wife short of inflicting the above injuries is acting within the law. How then is the woman's fundamental right to dignity is protected under such circumstances? Section 353 of the Criminal Code makes an

indecent assault on males punishable by 3 years imprisonment. A similar offence of indecent assault on females is treated as mere misdemeanour punishable by a maximum of 2 years imprisonment (Section 360), clearly a discriminatory provision. Nigerian law is therefore infused with discriminatory practices against women, apart from the implied legal backing to the assault of a wife in Section 55 of the Penal Code, but also, in Section 6 of the Criminal Code, a lack of legal recognition for rape within marriage.

Rape

Marital rape is excluded from the definition of rape in penal legislation in the North and under the Criminal Code in the South (Nigeria CEDAW NGO Coalition 2008). An Amnesty report, "Rape: The Silent Weapon", makes the point that differences in the definition of rape in federal, State, Sharia and customary legal systems create a plural justice system that potentially will undermine women's rights to seek legal redress in such cases. Indeed, current legislation may penalize the victim rather than the perpetrator. Muslim women can face particular problems when they seek justice and redress for rape under Sharia law, because the need for a witness makes successful prosecution more difficult (Nigeria CEDAW NGO Coalition 2008). What this seem to mean is that the state is protecting its individual citizens from specific GBV cases such as rape, as long as they are not married. Within marriage, it seems, the individual woman's value changes and the state is no longer willing to extend its human security to her. What this means in practice is that security only applies to one group of women, and that women who are married do not have the state's support to bring their case in front of a statutory court, if they are raped by their own husband. The Constitution thus seems to ensure the security only of women who are not married, as they distinguish so clearly between the two groups, but there is no explanation of why this clear distinction is made.

Looking at this from the perspective of Laura Shepherd (2008), the language used to describe women's position as different within a marriage and outside a marriage, has an impact on the formation of ideas about threats and security in a society. There is a clear disparity between what the constitution says about women's value

(equal to men) and the praxis described in the Penal Code Act. Thus although the Constitution looks, at first glance, as ensuring women's security, the whole picture is not visible until the Penal Code Act is examined as well as the Constitution in its entirety. By Shepherd's standards, this use of language confirms more profound beliefs in the local context. The Constitution is mostly written by men, and women have to a great extent been excluded from the process, which is evident in the way women within the marriage is considered something 'less' than those who are part of a family unit.

Abuse

Corporal punishment, bullying and physical abuse can cause girls to drop out of school (ActionAid 2011). Findings from the study reported that corporal punishment is entrenched in school systems and was discussed most by girls in Nigeria. It is often connected to poverty, for example in response to non-payment of fees and lack of uniform or books, and parents and girls complained about this occurring but appeared powerless to stop it.

Recent work by Mahdi and Asubiaro-Dada (forthcoming) documents the kinds of physical punishments reported by students, teachers and parents across Nigeria. Their respondents cite examples of teachers meting out severe, violent and degrading punishments. They also discuss some of the informal and unwritten "rules" that govern relations between boys and girls in and around schools. They refer to "no go" areas for girls that are defined and enforced by boys and may include girls' exclusion from areas of the classroom or school. The respondents also talk about age hierarchies that permit older students to inflict violence on their juniors. These examples underline the importance of understanding, challenging and changing informal rules that are oppressive and teaching girls and boys about power relations between the sexes and between age groups (Mahdi and Asubiaro-Dada, forthcoming).

One other study suggested that abusive behaviour may be learned in teacher training establishments where the opportunity for sexual favours is regarded by male teachers as a privilege of their position (Bakari and Leach 2008). Student teachers in this

environment learn to accept sexual violence against women as normal. It is perhaps unsurprising that in this situation violence against women is also regarded as acceptable by a relatively large proportion of the population. While we focus here on physical violence, the literature acknowledges that verbal abuse or the threat of violence can also effectively exclude, inhibit or deter girls and women from seeking services or contributing to society. The fear of violence hinders development progress in Nigeria. It not only deters girls from going to school, but impacts potentially on every aspect of women's lives as productive and active citizens.

Human Trafficking

Human trafficking is also a serious social problem in Nigeria. The government statistics in 2004 and 2005 reported that about 80 percent of victims were girls and more than 300 children had been forced into the sex industry and domestic labour in 2005 (Federal Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development 2008). In all age groups, twice as many women as men are victims of trafficking (NBS 2009). More worrisome, vulnerable young and adolescent girls in the 6-15 age groups are most likely to be trafficked. Reported cases in this age group show a rise from 12 in 2004 to 353 in 2007, almost a thirty fold increase. Reported cases of trafficked adult women increased eightfold during the same period (from 44 to 368). It is not clear which groups are most likely to be victims of this practice or what their relationship is with the perpetrators, but trafficking was mentioned as one reason why girls dropped out of school in specific areas in the South (Mahdi and Asubiaro-Dada 2011).

These women who are the victims are lured to accompany traffickers based on promises of lucrative opportunities unachievable in Nigeria. They fell as victims to these deceits because of high level of inflationary trends in the society, acute unemployment, and high poverty rate in the country, which majorities of Nigerians found themselves. It is disheartening to know that once these women (victims) reached their destinations, they discover that they have been deceived and learn the true nature of work that they will be expected to do. To some extent, many of the women were deceived with lies regarding the financial

arrangements and conditions of their employment, later to find themselves in coercive or abusive situation form which escape is both difficult and dangerous to these women (Kara 2009). It has also been observed that the victims of human trafficking are not permitted to leave upon arrival at their destination. They are held against their will through acts of coercion and forced to work or provide, services to the traffickers (pimps/madams) whose services may be by bonded, forced labour to commercialized sexual exploitation (Ajagun 2012).

With globalization making national boundaries porous, it is generally recognized that the phenomenon of "clandestine trans-national actors" (associated with drugs and human trafficking, migration smugglers, terrorism, proliferation of small arms and light weapons and oil bunkering), has assumed critical dimensions as a major global security issue in the 21st century. The security implication of this for Nigeria is that human trafficking is a cross-border crime with serious implications for national security and stability. Nigerian policy of good neighbourliness is responsible for transnational threat to the nation.

Female Genital Mutilation

Traditionally also, Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) is carried out although the percentage has gradually declined to a national average of 32.6 percent in 2008 from around 40 percent in 1998. FGM presents not only a physical but a mental danger to females. The risk of bacterial infection is high since FGM is usually conducted at the time suckling. Educational/advocacy activities for the abolition of FGM still needs to be conducted for parents/adults with the long term view of abolishing FGM despite the willingness of girls. According to the Federal Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development (2008), FGM is not so popular in the North East and the North West regions but it appears to be common custom in the South West and the South East region. In those two regions, 50.4% and 60.7% of women are reported to be victims of FGM (NBS 2009). At a state level, Edo State of the South region established a law to prohibit FGM in 2000 and it burdens the FGM conductors with the fine of 1,000 Naira (about 6.5 U.S. dollars)

and imprisonment for six months. Ondo State, which is in the South region, also has a law that prohibits FGM.

Widowhood Rites
In addition, there is a social custom where widows according to Sharia law (Islamic law) can fall into economic poverty when the husband passes away because they traditionally have no right to their property (UNHCR 2000). In the Northern states where many Muslims live, many laws are mixed up such as Sharia law (Islamic law), the federation law, the state law, and traditional customs. In the southeast of Nigeria, in the event of the death of a man, his widow is subjected to a legion of harmful widowhood practices which entails all manner of degrading treatment and dehumanizing acts. For instance, where she is being suspected by her husband's relatives of complicity in her ex-spouse's death, she is made to drink the water that was used to bathe the corpse of her deceased husband, in order to be absolved. If she does not die after drinking the water, her innocence is established. She is equally forced to shave her hair, sleep beside her late husband's corpse. The widow's movement is also strictly restricted throughout the mourning period; these discriminatory cultural practices no doubt render her economically incapacitated to fend for her children. The discriminatory aspect of this practice is that men who lose their wives under Igbo customary law do not undergo these degrading dehumanizing and traumatic practices.

As a measurement of protection for widow's human rights, the Prohibition of Infringement of a Widower's and Widow's Fundamental Human Rights Law, No.3 was enforced in 2001 in Enugu State (Federal Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development 2008).

Early Marriage
Also, in Nigeria women tend to get married at the early age. Every society and culture has some basic norms and beliefs that guide the people. For instance, the Northern Nigeria (Hausa-Fulani dominated) allowed early marriage of the girl-child. Almost half of women get married before 19 years old (Federal Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development 2008; Adebambo 2010;

Aduradola 2013). Early marriage is an important contributor to HIV exposure and other negative Reproductive Health outcomes. This early marriage might also affect the low school enrolment and school attendance rate, as well as the increasing rate of population in the region. Several measurements are taken by states such as Kebbi and Niger State to ban early marriages, and the state of Edo ensures school attendance of the girls (Federal Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development 2008; Nguyen and Wodon 2012). The United Nations recognizes that this grim situation will not be wished away by mere agonizing and rhetoric. It can only be changed through the targeted actions of individuals and institutions; men and women from across all walks of life and endeavour who are courageous enough to persistently stay on a worthy cause such as the fight to end violence against women.

Implications of Findings

In the light of the foregoing, the issue of human security for women has not been given the adequate consideration it deserves even though the constitution provides a protection. However, the nation cannot achieve any measure of sustainable growth and human development without removing gender gaps in productive capacities of all her economic agents, men and women. This is an imperative for policy efficiency in all sectors. Nigerian women are not secure and they are constantly living with threats of GBV, despite the fact that they have a significant amount of rights on chapter, which are supposed to ensure security from such threats. The ever-present spectre of violence, threats and hatred against women is clear evidence that new options in the quest for security for women are long overdue.

The long history of women empowerment in the country is not in tandem with the current situation analysis with respect to all the gender issues suffered by majority of women in Nigeria. The above cases have shown that women were marginalized in the domains designed to guarantee the security of the human person. It can therefore, be said that the inferiority of women and their oppression, exploitation and subjection constitute the basis for the denial of personhood to them and thus also of their insecurity. Most of the cardinal problems confronted by women in the arena

of security arise due to the flux and tensions emanating from the construction of sex and allied sex roles in the constitutional framework.

Violence in the domestic sphere is tolerated, if not positively accepted. It is therefore clear that the insecurity of women arises not merely from the natural hostile features of the external environment, but, more importantly, through the wilful and socially constructed acts of men. Gender still addresses the normative expectations concerning appropriate masculine or feminine behaviour in Nigerian culture. These 'normative expectations' stretch across security, justice, independence and the violation of rights, liberty, peace, etc. These norms and rules hinder the upward mobility between the sexes on an equal basis. Along the pattern of the normative micro-politics of national expectations and attitudes, there is a dichotomized empowering of agents and agencies along gender lines (Adadevoh 2007).

The heightened degree of privacy accorded to domestic violence maintains the culture of victim-hood, simply because a flimsy sentimental approach to the issue, either by the family members or by the police, makes the offender unaccountable to moral or legal sanction. The reason why aggressors elude justice and the victims remain insecure can be traced to an interface of factors. For instance, apart from the emotional, marital or social problems arising from such violence, there are also financial problems, and a lack of resources and decision making powers for community groups and statutory bodies to detect and intervene in family violence which perpetuates the whole cycle. It is for this reason that I contend that the spectre of insecurity looms large in the lives of women and it unleashes debilitating effects on their total well-being. Women's value is strongly connected to their family and husband. In itself that is something which has a negative impact on the life and security of women across the whole state as women are not able to be independent or empower themselves, thus they are deprived of the power over their own lives.

Many women tolerate such abuse because they fear retaliation by their spouse or extended family or both. If they protest, the women's vulnerability to domestic violence is reinforced by their

economic dependence, and worse still, upon men's widespread cultural acceptance of domestic violence and a lack of laws and enforcement to effectively combat it. Therefore, the reality of violence and the pervasive feelings of fear and anxiety are vitally linked to the sustenance of the regime of insecurity for women. The rights and dignity of women have not been adequately guaranteed because they have consistently been molested and brutalized. They face greater insecurity even from within those spaces where it was thought that their safety and sanctity could emerge.

Thus, given that women remain a group that is dominated, marginalized and subordinated, the central feature in the quest for human security cannot just be concern for the mere survival of individuals. The questions therefore are "Do we require that individuals survive as mere stooges or acolytes, without developing their own sense of proportion and well-being? Do we require that individuals unquestioningly accept their oppressed existence and thank their detractors and taskmasters for a job well done?" The answer certainly must be in the negative. Rather, genuine human security should focus on the concern for the peace and progress of individuals and groups in society. The idea is to devise a conception of inclusive security that can operate on the principles of justice and dignity for the female sex.

The continued manifestations of the problems highlighted above points to the need to take a different approach to the current policy framework from that of the National Policy on Women. There is a wrong perception of the concept of gender by policy makers, charged with the responsibility for policies, and the impression that gender issues challenge accepted norms and values of marriage, family and religion is rife. In fact, many stakeholders believe that gender concerns should be addressed only within the Ministry of Women Affairs, hence it is not accorded the seriousness it deserves.

Integrating Gender-Based Violence into Post-2015 Development Agenda: The Way Forward?

It will be very much in the interest of Nigerian State to focus on improving the situation of women as a strategy for development

and human security. Protection and empowerment of women and girls is an area where the quantitative work done so far in relation to the MDGs can be very helpful to future analysis and comprehension in the field of human security. Millennium Goals 2, 3 and 5, which aim to achieve universal primary education, promote gender equality and empower women, and improve maternal health, are explicit on this, and many of the indicators for measuring success in relation to other goals are appropriately disaggregated by sex.

However, gender-based violence has direct implications for progress on all the MDGs because it impacts on girls' and women's access to education, productivity, health and well-being, HIV transmission, and it can lead to increased poverty. Unfortunately, it was not incorporated into the MDGs framework even though addressing gender based violence is fundamental to realizing the specific MDGs to promote gender equality and empower women. Entrenched attitudes and social norms, unequal access to economic resources and opportunities, mean that gender inequality persists in the country.

According to the Irish Consortium on Gender-based Violence (2013), in a new post-2015 framework it will be necessary to agree on specific targets and indicators to make progress towards achieving gender equality and ending violence against women and girls. This will motivate governments to identify the extent of such violence and to take actions against it. Having specific targets will make gender-based violence more visible and enable civil society organizations to build more effective programmes, monitor progress, and hold their governments to account.

A standalone domain is necessary with specific targets to tackle poverty and address underlying structural barriers to gender inequality, such as: unequal power relations, unequal access to and control of resources, and gender division of labour. Gender-based violence reinforces gender inequalities by restricting girls' and women's options and capabilities and must be addressed in the framework. Also, integrating gender equality and gender based violence into all other development domains with specific targets and indicators in multi-sector programmes (health, education, livelihoods, governance, justice, security, and social welfare). This

means including a gender focus in all targets to ensure that women's and girls' poverty and inequality are not hidden and that they are benefitting from development programmes (GAD Network 2012).

Summary and Conclusions

Gender-based violence (GBV) is a complex matter which is specifically evident in Nigeria much because of the very clear differences in how women are perceived in the two legal systems. In Nigeria, as in many other African states, despite the constitutional provisions and commitments to regional and international human rights treaties and conventions, the rights of women and girls are grossly undermined and under-valued. This is overtly evident in the overall low Gender Development Index (GDI) for the country, and exacerbated in low participation of women in paid employment, politics, leadership and decision-making, and an equally high rate of physical and sexual harassment and assault, trafficking, marital rape, early/forced marriage, and different phases of harmful traditional practices against women and the girl child. In the absence of Equal Opportunity Commission in the country, and weak legislative structures to protect the rights of women, development opportunities continue to elude women. Worst still, the existing policy documents (e.g. the National Policy on Women) failed to challenge the structure, which continues to reproduce gender inequality and the overall disempowerment of women. The long history of women empowerment in the country is not in tandem with the current situation analysis with respect to all the gender issues suffered by majority of women in Nigeria. All efforts through special legislation, state bye-laws and gender specific policies at all levels of government and by the civil society though noteworthy have failed to deliver dividends of development to women and men equitably. Human security is a perspective which seeks to uncover issues of GBV and I believe an insertion of such a perspective into policies is essential for abolishing these practices. We cannot expect human security to flourish where GBV is so highly prevalent.

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10

Population Factors and Internal Security in Nigeria

Bilyaminu Suleiman Muhammed

Introduction

Recently, Nigeria has been adjudged by the United Nations as one of the fasted growing population as well as rated amongst the rapidly urbanized with increasing poverty in the world. The reasons alluded to these facts are the combination of population factors. These factors are natural increase, lower death rates, rural-urban migration and advancement in environmental and technological development through improved sanitation and communication and technology. However, the increase in population and Nigeria's diversity has produced tension leading to conflicts be it economic, political and ethnic or religions, which has consequences on the internal security of Nigeria. The conflicts have resulted in internal displacement of persons, prosperities, loss of human lives and high mobility. This chapter examines the interrelationship between population factors and internal security in Nigeria.

Nigeria has one of the largest population and rapidly growing population in the Africa and the world at large. The reasons are as a result of combination of population factors such as high-growth rates as result of natural increase, lower death rates, advancement in environmental and technological development through improved sanitation and communication and technology, rural-urban migration, and rapid urbanization. Since the country's independence in 1960, Nigeria has been bedevilled with internal conflicts such as political conflict of western region of 1962 resulting to Biafra War from 1966-1970, involving the Igbo of the South East and the rest of Nigeria; and the South West political crisis between Awolowo of Action Group and Akintola (then premier) of the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP).

Since the advent of the present democratic governance in 1999, Nigeria has witnessed conflicts and crisis that has effects on internal security and national security. The conflicts have resulted in internal displacement of persons, prosperities, loss of human lives and high mobility. The increase in population and Nigeria's diversity has produced tension leading to conflicts be it economic, political and ethnic or religions, which has consequences on the internal security of Nigeria. This chapter provides the reader with explanation of issues on population factors and its relationship to internal security in Nigeria. It aimed at explaining some key concepts of population such as birth rates, death rates, fecundity rate, population growth, rural-urban migration, age at marriage, population distribution, age composition and urbanization, as well as issues relating to internal security such as conflicts, terrorism, poverty, politics and corruption, religion and ethnicity.

Overview of Nigeria's Population
Modern Nigeria is an entity created in 1914 by Lord Lugard and made up of diverse ethnic groups numbering about 370 (Alubo 2006). Also Otite (2002) Alubo (2006) citing Otite (2002) noted that Nigeria has several kinds of pluralisms, the important ones includes ethnic, religious and political. Nigeria initially was administered as Northern and Southern protectorates and in 1914, the two were united to form one Nigeria hitherto referred to as amalgamation. Later the two protectorates were divided into Northern region, Western region and Eastern region among which the north was by far the largest both in land mass and population. The three regions house the three major ethnic groups as follow the Hausa-Fulani in the North, the Igbo in the East and the Yoruba in the West Aluba (2008). The minority ethnic groups are spread in the three regions. The pluralistic nature of the Nigerian state has further exacerbated differences and division between the constituent parts. Alubo (2008) expressed that; what *is vital is to recognize our social pluralism that from now Nigeria is a federation of ethnicities and nationalities, nothing else. It is an enterprise of possible nation-state a possible unity, but right now, it remains an enterprise.* The differences in the constituents' parts

of Nigeria also involve differences in population size and distribution. Nigeria had a population of 45.29 million people in 1962; 55.66 million in 1963, 65.50 million in 1973, 88.51 million in 1991 and 140 million in 2006 (National Population Commission 1998).

The population estimates for the regions showed that Northern region in 1962 had 22.01 million people which constituted 48.60 percent, the Eastern region had 12.33 million, Western region 8.10 million, Mid-Western region 2.40 million, Lagos 0.45 million. Thus, the Southern Nigeria had a total of 23.38 million people constituting 51.40 percent. In 1963, the Northern Nigeria had 29.78 million people constituting 53.50 percent, while the Southern Nigeria had a population of 25.88 million constituting 46.50%. In 1973 Northern Nigeria had a population of 32.00 million (48.85%) while the Southern Nigerian had 33.50 million (51.15%). The 1962/63 and 1973 censuses though very well planned to satisfy internationally accepted principles of individual enumeration and universality within a defined territory, however, there are problems connected with these two censuses stemming from over enthusiasm displayed by the populace and the regional leaders on the use of the census and undue emphasis on the importance of census figures for political and economic gains of the constituent parts of the federation. The 1973 census generated so much controversy that the figures were never used (Idu 2006). The 1991 census was widely acclaimed to be the best in terms of content, organization, planning and execution. He further noted that there was marked improvement in logistic and questions that could heat up the polity like ethnicity; religion and place of birth were discarded. In the 1991 census, the trend continued with Northern Nigeria having a population of 47.26 million (53.40%) and Southern Nigeria had 41.25 million (46.60) (NPC 1998). The country has been adjudged by the National Population Commission (1998) and United Nations in 2013 to be one of the fastest growing populations with the fastest growth rates of between 2.8 percent in 1991 and 3.0 percent today. At a growth rate of 2.8 percent, it would take the country only 24.5 years to double itself.

The total population of Nigeria in 1991 was 88,992,220 made up of 44,529,608 males (50.04%) and 44,462,612 females (49.96%). The population figure was much less than the speculated pre-census estimate of 120 million based on the 1963 census and also less than the pre-census World Bank estimate of 110 million. At a growth rate of 2.8 percent then, Nigeria has one of the fastest growth rates in the world (NPC 1998). The 2006 population and housing census estimated Nigeria's population at 140,431,790, and a national growth rate estimated at 3.2 percent per annum. With this population, Nigeria is the most populous nation in Africa (NDHS 2008). Nigeria's population is unevenly distributed across the country. Large areas in the Chad Basin, the middle Niger valley, and the grassland plains among others, are sparsely populated. The average population density for the country in 2006 was estimated at 150 people per square kilometre. The most densely-populated states are Lagos (2,607 people per square kilometre), Anambra (868 people per square kilometre). Most of the densely-populated states are found in the southern part of the country. Kano, with an average density of 442 people per square kilometre, is the most densely-populated state in the north (Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey 2013).

Furthermore, The United Nations in 2013 estimated Nigeria's population at 170 million and predicted that Nigeria's population would reach 440 million by 2050. There would be 40 million more than the projection for the United States of America (USA). Thus, the population of Nigeria will be increasing in size over the years. According to the UN projection in 2013, the world's population will increase from 7.2 billion to 8.1 billion in 2025 with most growth in developing countries and more than half in Africa, and by 2050, it will reach 9.6 billion. John Wilmoth, United Nations' Director of the Population Division in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs in 2013 noted that the projected population increase will pose challenges but it will not necessarily cause alarm, except for mostly poor countries whose populations are growing too quickly, including Nigeria and other areas where the populations are aging and decreasing like China. John Wilmoth in 2013 also pointed out that the world has had a great experience

of dealing with rapid population growth. He asserts that; *the problem is more one of extremes and the main story is to avoid the extreme of either rapid growth due to high fertility or rapid population aging and potential decline due to very low fertility.*

In thinking about population of a country, one seeks to look at the population growth and size, its consequences and also of note the kind of effects, and the nature of the causes. It is also of concern to note the time span over which the effects occur and the scale, that is dealing with the entire country, a region, or with the level of the family, village or community.

According to National Academy of Science (1971) rapid population growth has neither prevented overall economic growth nor brought about widespread famine as a consequence. However, rapid population growth has resulted in a slow growth of per capita incomes, food production, and the standard of living while national economic growth rates are rapidly rising. However, in terms of political and social consequences, high population density and rapid population growth are blamed for many disturbing features of the changing world including Nigeria. Social consequences such as urban violence, political instability, poverty, pollution, aggressive behaviour, ethno-religious conflicts, and struggle for power, revolution and hyper rationalism are linked to high population growth. The National Academy of Science (1971) also noted that empirical attempts to relate population growth to these political pathologies have been uniformly unsuccessful. It is also pointing to the fact that there is no evidence that population growth decreases the level of political stability or increases the probability of conflict and violence and aggressive behaviour.

However, Nigeria's high population growths with its attendant concentration of young adults have severe economic and social consequences. Nigeria is going through difficult economic and political transition since the return to democracy in 1999, after political transition of 30 years of economic mismanagement and corruption under military rule. The Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (2008) noted that the proportion of the population which lives on less than a dollar a day is at least 50 percent. Similarly, in the World Bank report of 2013, the figure rose to

more than 70 percent. The fundamental cause of poverty in Nigeria is the economic stagnation that country has experienced for almost two decades. Also percent low productivity in agriculture has resulted in the rural population having limited increase in income leading to rural-urban migration. In addition, stagnation in the non-agricultural economy has resulted in little growth in formal employment, although real incomes for public sector workers have improved because of reform, but they are only a small percentage of the population. Thus, the real challenge lies in how to engage the unemployed, particularly the educated, young, and poor unemployed. Moreso, massive migration of the young from rural areas in search of a livelihood has resulted in the further deepening of slums and crime as well as other forms of urban violence in the urban centres with the incidence of urban poverty now matching that of rural poverty. There is massive transfer of high fertility of young adults from rural areas to the urban centres. The poor idle young men engage in vices such as rape, prostitution, desperation and aggressive behaviour in the urban centers. The youth who become motor bicycle riders (Okada), conductors and drivers, workers of National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW) become readymade band of militants', kidnappers, political thugs and criminals in the urban centres. A new kind of conflict that is making an in-road into the South-South region in Nigeria is that between unemployed youth and prospective landlords. The youth approach a landlord that is just embarking on the development of a parcel of land and demand to be paid before such a development could proceed. Where the landlord chooses recourse to thugs, he/she lures some to dislodge the youth and such scuffles have lead to deaths and bodily injury as well as threaten interval security (Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution Report 2008).

Factors Contributing to High Population in Nigeria
Population growth is influenced by two factors namely; natural increase (that is the difference between births and death) and migration. Both factors could result in either increase or decrease of the population. In Nigeria, these two factors highly influence population growth.

There are factors contributing to high population growth in Nigeria. They include:

Birth Rate: Birth rate is a measure of fertility based on birth which vary with the aspect of fertility that they are describing, their degree of refinement or elaboration, whether they are summary measures or specific measures, and whether they are measures of fertility per se or merely fertility related measures (Siegel and Swanson 2012). Examples of birth rates include crude birth rate defined as the number of births in a year per 1000 midyear population. In a general sense, the principal characteristic of crude birth rate is that all ages and both sexes are represented in the rate. Crude birth rate is a valuable measure of natality or fertility, particularly in indicating directly the contribution of fertility to the growth rate of a country. The general fertility rate is defined as the number of births per 1000 women of child bearing age (15-49 years).

Births have significant role in population change or growth. Birth rates are derived from census data and survey such as the Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey. Sometimes or often times "births" and fertility" are used alternatively and have overlapping meanings. The terms fertility refers to actual birth performance as compared with 'fecundity', which refers to the physiological capacity to reproduce (International Union for the Scientific Study of Population 1982). In one sense, fertility is synonymous with natality referring to the birth factor in population change in the broadest sense. In a narrow sense and more commonly, the term 'fertility' refers to the more refined analysis of natality and to certain more or less refined measures of natality (Seigel and Swanson 2012). One's fertility is limited by one's fecundity. In-fecund persons are also described as sterile. Fecundity refers to the probability of conceiving measured on a monthly basis. Fertility measures include Crude Birth Rate (CBR), Total Fertility Rate (TFR), General Fertility Rate, etc. The Nigerian Demographic and Health Survey (2008, 2013) gave crude birth rates and other demographic indicators for Nigeria in table 10.1.

Table 10.1: Basic Demographic Indicators from Various Sources
Nigeria 1963 – 2006

Indicators	Census 1963	NFS 1981 -1982	Census 1991	NDHS 2003	Census 2006
Population (Million)	55.7	84.7	88.9	U	140.4
Density (Pop./Sq km)	60	92	96	U	150
Percent urban	19	23	36.3	U	U
Crude birth rate (CBR)	66	46	44.6	41.7	U
Crude death rate (CDR)	27	16	14	U	U
Total fertility rate (TFR)	u	6.3	5.9	5.7	U
Infant mortality rate (IMR)	u	85	93	100	U
Life expectancy at birth	36	48	53.2	U	U
Life expectancy (Years)					
Male	u		52.6		u
Females	u		53.8		u

Source: The Nigerian Demographic and Health Survey (2008, 2013)
          u= No information

Death Rates

Mortality or death is the end result in any conflict in Nigeria or any part of the world. Information on the levels, trends, differentials and causes are useful for demographic assessment of the population. The number of deaths that occur during violent conflict in a country, region, state, local government area or a locality has implication for the population and the country's development. Death is measured by rates such as Crude Death Rate (CDR) which represent reported deaths by sex and broad age groups. The CDR for a country is derived from census data or sample survey data. The Age Specific Death Rate (ASDR) measures death by five year age groups up to say 85 years and above. This would enhance the utility of the rate in terms of its relevance for policy formulation and targeting of interventions.

Another important factor inherent during violent conflict in Nigeria is death of persons particularly women and children. Generally, in Nigeria, the key findings of the Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS) in 2013 showed that infant and under-5 mortality rates in the past five years are 69 and 128 deaths per 1,000 live births, respectively. At these mortality levels, one in every 15 Nigerian children die before reaching age 1 and one in every eight do not survive to their fifth birthday. Secondly,

childhood mortality rates are higher in rural areas than in urban areas. Also, childhood mortality is highest in the North West. Thirdly, the neonatal mortality rate is 37 deaths per 1,000 live births, the post neonatal mortality is 31 deaths per 1,000 live births, and the prenatal mortality rate is 41 per 1,000 pregnancies. Furthermore, the NDHS 2013 report found that twelve percent of women and men are likely to die between exact ages 15 and 50. Maternal deaths account for 32 percent of all deaths among women age 15-49. The maternal mortality ratio was 576 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births for the seven year period preceding the survey. The lifetime risk of maternal death indicates that 1 in 30 women in Nigeria will have a death related to pregnancy or childbearing.

Age at Marriage: In most societies in Africa and Nigeria, marriage marks the point in a woman's life when child bearing first become socially acceptable. Women who married early will on average have longer exposure to pregnancy and a greater number of lifetime births (NDHS 2013). For example, the 2013 NDHS report shows that 49 percent of women who married by age 25-49 were married by age 18, and 61 percent were married by age 20. The median age at first marriage increases from 17.3 years among women age 45-49 to 19 years among women age 20-24. This is an indication of gradual increase in age at marriage among the younger generation which can be attributable to long stay in school and unemployment.

Urbanization: This **i**s a process of concentration in large numbers of locality. The World Bank in 2013 refer to urbanization as a population shift from rural to urban areas and the ways in which society adapts to changes. The change associated with urbanization can be quantified in terms of level of urban development relative to the rate at which the urban proportion of the population is increasing. Rural culture is rapidly replaced by predominantly urban culture that is, change in settlement patterns, individualism, distance bloodliness, heterogeneity, unfamiliar relationships and competitive behaviour. Urbanization predominantly results in the physical growth of urban areas, be it horizontally or vertically.

Urbanization in Nigeria is said to be rapid. The essential feature in the country is a steady increase in the proportion of urban dwellers in the population. Urbanization is a component of the process modernization of the economy and society and it is the major factor that affects the redistribution of population in any country (National Population Commission 1998). From 1991 to date, there has been increase in the number of urban centres in Nigeria as well as increase in the share of urban population in the various regions of the country. The people living in urban centres have also increased tremendously.

According to Former Minister of Housing and Urban Development, Mobolaji Osomo in 2004, the situation was alarming whereby the county's urbanization rate was put at 5.5 percent per annum. She noted that the projection of the country's population shows that by 2015, more than 50 percent of the people would live in cities. This rate is expected to rise to about 65 percent by the year 2025. The conclusion is that it is equivalent to adding a city of about 3 million people to the urban population each year. Even though Nigeria is not urbanized but the lack of planning and enforcement of development control and lack of urban infrastructure has resulted in congestion of the urban centres and a breeding ground for social deviants, miscreants and undesirables in our society. They have become centres of slum and criminality, theatre of conflicts be it political, religious or ethnic. In recent years, most of the violent conflicts take place in the urban centres across the country. They are planned and executed there with magnitude of destruction of lives and properties.

Conflict and Violent Internal Conflicts in Nigeria
Conflict is admitted to cause or modify interest groups, unifications organization (Coser and Rosenberg 1976). Conflict is as a result of interaction among men and cannot be carried out by one individual. Infact, factors like hate, envy, need desire are the common causes of conflict. Aaron (1966) pointed out that conflict results when ever two individuals, social groups, or political units covet the same property or seek incompatible goals. However, Boulding (1962) viewed conflict as a form of competition in which

the competing parties recognize that they have mutually incompatible goals. In his own view, Gross (1966) said; *Conflict is the escalation of antagonisms to its more intensive degree, involving a mustering of forces and adversaries…the antagonists become enemies and use various forms of forces to compel the adversary to surrender, subordination, compromise or withdraw.* This view is broader and attempts to bring put the forces of conflict in any society.

According to Coser and Rosenberg (1976) conflict is designed to resolve divergent dualisms; it is a way of achieving some kind of unity, even if it be through the annihilation of one of the conflicting parties. Charles and Wittkoft (1997) argued that conflict is a discord, often arising in international or national relations over perceived incompatibilities or interest. But for Alemika (1999) conflict may manifest itself on a continuum, ranging from avoidance to warfare between groups at extreme ends. Within the poles are to be found expressions of conflicts such as criminality, civil disobediences, riots, military takeover (coups), secessions and terrorism (Alemika 1991). Paradoxically, it is the most violent symptom of a disease which represents the effort of the organism to free itself of disturbances and damages causes by them. Conflict itself resolves the tension between contrasts. The fact that it aims at peace is only one, an especially obvious expression of its nature, the synthesis of elements that work both against and for one another.

The sociological relevance of conflict has both positive and negative sides. Conflict within a group may help to establish unity or to establish unity and cohesion where it has been threatened by hostile and antagonistic feelings among the members. Also, it should be noted that not every type of conflict is likely to benefit group structure, nor that conflict can sub serve such functions for all groups. Internal conflict which concerns goals, values or interests that do not contradict the basic assumptions upon which the relationship is founded tend to be positively functional for the social structure. Such conflicts tend to make possible the readjustment of norms and power relations within groups in accordance with the felt needs of its individual members or

subgroups. Internal conflicts in which the contending parties no longer share the basic values upon which the legitimacy of the social system rests threaten to disrupt the structure (Coser and Rosenberg 1976). On the negative aspect of conflict, the impression is that conflict is anti-peace, resulting in discord or opposition. Since discord unfolds negative, destructive character between particular individuals, groups, it is often concluded that it must have some effects on the total group.

Internal conflict can also serve as means for ascertaining the relative strength of antagonistic interests with the social structure, and in this way constitute a mechanism for the maintenance or continual readjustment of the balance of power since the outbreak of conflict indicates a rejection of a previous accommodation between parties. Once the respective power of the contenders has been ascertained through conflict, a new equilibrium can be established and the relationship can proceed on this new basis. Conflicts in sum, produce associations or coalitions with others, provide a bond between the members, help to reduce social isolation or to unite individuals and groups otherwise unrelated or antagonistic to each other (Coser and Robenberg 1976). The notion that wherever there is social life there is conflict may be pleasant and disturbing. But the absence of conflict is surprising and abnormal, and there is a good reason to be suspicious if we find a society or social organization that displays no evidence of conflict. However, some conflicts are always not violent such as parliamentary debate, strikes, lockouts, but to some extents these conflicts have turned violent.

Internal Violent Conflicts in Nigeria

Alubo (2012) in his book "*Sociology: A Concise Introduction*", noted that one of the critical contours of contemporary Nigeria is rising wave of violence and internal conflict. He argued that most of the violence relates to political differences between rival political parties, struggles for territoriality and control between gang/cult members and plain criminality such as armed robbery, kidnapping and hostagetaking there are also very common, communal and ethnic violence or conflicts involving ethnic groups

contesting boundaries with the other, control of land and other resources, or contestations over who should be entitled or excluded from opportunities that others have. Others struggle for political power with the aid of youth and adults as political thugs and ethnic militias. For example, the Egbesu, Ombatse, militant Oodua Peoples' Congress (OPC), Arewa People's Congress, MASSOB and Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). Other forms of conflicts take the shape of identity such as indigene/settler like the one in Jos, Plateau and Southern Kaduna. In some cases, conflicts assume religious dimensions particularly between Christians and Muslims.

Alubo (2012) further noted that within the first five years of democracy in Nigeria, over 80 different communal disturbances were recorded. From 2009 to date, terrorism by religious sect *Boko Haram* has been on the headline resulting in the death of thousands of Nigerian citizens as well as displacing over nine hundred thousand persons, and causing internal security problem in the North East states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, Bauchi and occasional strikes in Plateau (Jos) Abuja Gombe and Kano metropolis. *Boko Haram* has caused the death of more than 3,000 Nigerians since 2009; it displaced villages and cities in the North East which include Mubi, Goza, Bama, Buniyadi, Madagali, Michika, Potiskum and so on. The displaced persons are spread across the country and neighbouring Chad, Niger and Cameroon. Of recent, in March, 2015 over 9000 persons were displaced and by December, 2015 over 2 million persons were displaced by *Boko Haram*'s terrorist activities. Aside from *Boko Haram* terrorism which has drawn international attention, Akinwumi (2008) pointed out other violent conflicts across the country that has produced more displaced persons. This include Tiv-Jukun crisis 2002, Plateau crisis 2001-2004, 60,000 persons displaced. Adamawa and Gombe crises, 20,000 persons displaced; violence in Kaduna State arising from the introduction of Sharia Law and ethnic clashes in 2000, 2001, 2002, had 80,000, 5,000 and 3,000 persons displaced respectively. The Nasarawa/Taraba crises had 100,467 persons displaced in 2001, while the October, 2001 Kano religious clashes displaced 8,000 persons and the Bauchi ethno-religious clashes in June-August, 2001 displaced 22,000 persons. The reprisal attacks

against Muslims in South-Eastern states in 2000 displaced 40,000 persons. The clashes in Ebonyi State in July 2001 displaced 1,000 persons and Lagos crises in February, 2002 displaced 5,000 persons. Other conflicts in 2012-2014 in Nasarawa State between Eggon and Alago, Eggon and Fulani and Fulani and Alago have also displaced some persons. It is of note that statistics on internally displaced persons most times poor and inconsistent consequently, the reliance on figures from government agencies. The violent conflicts led to the movement of populations to urban areas and other regions of the country. Most people have moved voluntarily or involuntarily from north to south or from the northern states such as Kano, Borno, Adamawa, Yobe, Jos, and Gombe to Abuja and adjacent suburbs in Nasarawa State, Niger State and Kaduna States. While the religious crisis has made the Christians relocate to peaceful states in the north and southern states.

Internal conflicts wherever it erupts leads to loss of lives, destruction of property and infrastructure, insecurity, disruption of normal rhythm of life such as economic activities, school system and social activities. Outbreak of violence set societies back both by destroying physical development and retarding opportunities for further development and aggravate poverty among the people.

Poverty

In a least developed nation such as Nigeria, the poor live a life of penury. The social map by the United State (2007) shows disparities in income among the world's nation. The map showed that Nigeria was ranked 132 nation with income per person estimated at $970, far below central Africa Republic with $1000 income per person and Benin Republic with $1,090 income per person. The income is a country's purchasing power parity based on its per capita gross domestic product measured in its dollars.

Large numbers of people in the developing nations including Nigeria remain illiterate and desperately poor and gruesome conditions. There is not enough food wife abuse, broken homes alcoholism and drug abuse, as well as high rate of crime. Children in most urban centres like Lagos, Kano, Abuja, Jos, and Port Harcourt to mention a few born of poor parents live in slums

having little educations or no education. The massive migration of people particularly the young and poor unemployed from rural areas to urban areas mentioned in search of livelihood has resulted in further deepening of slums and crime in the urban centres, wth the incidence of urban poverty now marching that of the rural poverty (Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution 2013).

Huggin et al. (2002) noted that poverty is so deep that children and adults swarm over garbage dumps to try to find enough delaying food to keep them alive. In a notorious slum of Brazil, Higgins (2002) pointed that the owners of some of the dumps live armed guards to keep the poor out so that they can sell the garbage for pig food. In addition Brazilian police and death squads murder some of these children. Also some shopowners even hire hit men and auction designated victims off to the lowest bidder. Higgins (2002) further provided an understanding of the situation. She pointed out that Brazil has a long history of violence and high rate of poverty with only a tiny middle class, and is controlled by a small group of families who under a veneer of democracy make the country's major decisions. Hordes of homeless children, with no schools or jobs roam the streets. To survive, they wash windshields, shine shoes, beg, and steel (Huggins and Rodrigues 2004).

Furthermore, Huggins and Rodrigues (2004) argued that the scenario in Brazil is that the children are willing tools in the hands of troublemaker and organizations. This situation can be comparable to Nigerian situation today particularly in major cities where children and young adults are willing tools in the hands of troublemakers and organizations such as *Boko Haram* sect. They hurt businesses, the government and people are concern about teenage males and females used for terrorism. Customers in business premises such as business centres, shopping malls, petrol station feel intimidated when they see begging children and adults clustered in front of stores with no effective institution to cater or care for these people. One solution is to crest them to their respective states of origin. Some become victims of ritual/killings resulting in gouging out the eyes, ripping open their chest, cutting off the genitals, rape (girls) and sometimes murder.

Poverty plagues Nigerian cities with the poor living in shims with no running water or access to health service or train physician. As the Nigerian population grows, it places greater burdens on the limited resources and causing the nation to fall further behind each year. Sidi, Ifatimehin and Balami (2015) noted that Nigeria's proportion of the poor has doubled over the last two decades during which time the country received $300 billion in oil and gas revenue. While revenue profile of Nigeria rose from ₦4 billion in 1975 to ₦26 billion in 1980 and GNP per capita from $360 to more than $1000 in the same period, the percentage of the population that was poor grew from 15% in 1960 to 70% in 2010. Nigeria which ranked 6th and 7th in petroleum export and production respectively is 194th in GNP per capita and among the poorest nations in the world. Poverty line is the official measure of poverty calculated to include incomes that are less than three times a low-cost food budget to determine who is poor. The US government drew poverty line in the 1960s. The measure was set when poor people were thought to spend about one-third of their incomes on food, and on the basis of this assumption, each year, the government computes a low-cost food budget and multiplies it by 3 families whose incomes are less than this amount and are classified as poor; those whose incomes are higher, even by a dollar are determined to be "not poor" (Henslin 2007). However Uchitelle (2001) was cited by Henslin (2007) to have argued that this official measure of poverty is grossly inadequate and pointed out that poor people actually spend only about 20 percent of their income on food. Another problem with the poverty line is that some mothers work outside the home and have to pay for child care, but they are treated the same as mothers who do not have this expense. The poverty line more so, is also the same for everyone across America even though the cost of living is much higher in New York than in Alabama. In addition, the government does not count food stamps as income (Henslin 2007). UN poverty line was set at $1 dollar per daily but have now increased to $150-$2 dollars per day.

Corruption: Smah (2014) gave varieties of definitions of corruption from legal to moral/religious and ethical views. Legally, corruption refers to behaviour that contravenes what has been

officially disallowed/proscribed or allowed/prescribed and includes the fact that it is aimed at obtaining some benefits and attempt or effort to evade the consequences of such act. While morally or religious definition is what is condemnable according to moral, dogmatic and religious expectations and standards. Smah categorized what constitute corruption to include electoral fraud, financial fraud, service kickback, political scandal, corporate crime political corruption such as bribery, patronage, nepotism, embezzlement, kickbacks, unholy alliance, involvement in organized crime and regulatory capture. Political corruption according to Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution 2013 report is described as the outcome of inter-ethnic group elite rivalry in 2002 and continues to be the enduring features of governance and political struggles. Corruption in Nigeria is very high and pervasive living a large part of the population in poverty and lack of infrastructure development. Corruption has also plunged Nigeria with economic, social and political problem. These problems continue to stir the populace in the face. For instance, in 2015, Nigerians were told of diversion of 2.1 billion dollars by the former national security adviser, Sambo Dasuki who is standing trial for diverting the monies meant for purchase of arms and other equipment to tackle the *Boko Haram* security challenges in the North East, the former Economic and Financial Crime Commission Chairman, Ibrahim Lamurde, one trillion naira fraud, and millions of naira oil subsidy scam. Others include the 195 billion naira pension fund scam by Abdulrasheed Maina, Stella Oduah 255 million naira bulletproof car scandal. State governors, party officials, ministers, and other categories of politicians are involved in corruption cases of fraud, embezzlements, misappropriation of public funds. There have been several cases of corrupt officials being apprehended by anti-corruption agencies such as EFCC, ICPC, the Nigeria Police and Directorate of State Service (DSS). These cases are pending in courts. The issue is that these monies were meant for public good but ended being shared to politicians and their cronies as patronage thereby denying the Nigerian people the desired development. Infact, monies appropriated to cushion the problems of the victims of natural disasters, ethnic and religious conflicts ended in the hands of

political elites and other influential Nigerians. The bulk of the poor populations were displaced from their homes to internally displaced camps without adequate shelter and food in cities across the country. Millions of the people are literally dying of starvation and wretchedness, disease is rampant and death rate is rising as a result of corruption by government officials. The World Bank as reported in *Punch* Newspapers of August 10, 2012 noted that the 2011 corruption perception Index (CPC) published by Transparency International (TI) ranked Nigeria as 143 out of 183 surveyed countries (Shaidu 2015).

Summary and Conclusion

Nigeria has been engulfed in both ethno-religious, political and economic conflicts with consequences on national security. National security is the requirement to maintain the survival of the state through the use of economic, diplomacy, power and political power. However, it is found that there are serious security threats to national security today. The inability of the government to meet the conditions necessary for national security such as possession of economic security, energy security, and environmental security has resulted in violent conflicts and terrorism the country is facing today.

The study acknowledges the large population size of Nigeria with great differences in terms of ethnicity, religions and resource base. These are supposed to make the country great and self sufficient. But political corruption is found to be clog in the wheel of its progress and development. Corruption has left vast majority of the populace poor, beggars, divided along ethnic, religious, regional lines in decisions that affects politics and resource allocation.

It is also found that lack of good governance, corruption, lack of transparency, ethnicity, selfishness, greed, fear of poverty and unpatriotism on the part of government officials and politicians has fanned the embers of envy, greed, desperation and negativism, hatred and rivalry which continue to threaten the corporate existence and survival of the country. It is undeniable that corruption is pervasive in Nigeria. The public officials continue to engage in looting of public funds despite the fight against

corruption. They continue to engage in corrupt practices mainly because accountability in governance is not taking seriously before the present Buhari regime came to be in 2015. Moreso, competition between ethnic groups for state resources and power it is found to orchestrate conflicts. The concentration of resources in the state makes the possession of power very lucrative and the competition for political position very intense as seen during the 2015 election campaigns and elections.

In conclusion, the issue of population in internal conflict is a topical issue in Nigeria today. Population of a country determines its strength and economy. Moreso, where the population of the youth bias and lots of them remain unemployed and a burden to their immediate society and the country at large. The consequence is that they become readymade agents for violence as tools in the hands of politicians, as militias, political thugs and religious soldiers of war. The various conflicts in Nigeria from 1966 to date have resulted in the death of teeming youth, children and women as well able bodies' men. It also displaced many of these people from their homes, states, businesses, thus to other areas without adequate shelter or care by governments. Thus, they are engaged in social vices such as prostitution, armed robbery, petty theft, and exploitation in manners of ways. There has been a contestant movement of displaced persons apart from the rural-urban migration thereby increasing the population of urban centres with army of young men and women. With the 2015 elections processes, Nigeria has experienced tension and threats to national security from *Boko Haram*, ethnic groups and social groups.

The study recommends that the government should enforce the national policy on population to regulate population growth. Also encourage population education for the young adults in schools. There should be good governance in the polity in order to have equitable development and enduring democracy. The government should create entrepreneurial centres to engage the youths in various skills in order to reduce unemployment. The various anti corruption agencies should rise up to its responsibilities by enforcing offences on corruption.

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11

Education: An Investment in Security

Pai Obanya

Introduction

This discussion is intended as an exploration of the concept and manifestations of Security-Insecurity, going beyond surface manifestations to root-cause propellers. It begins by expatiating on a comprehensive-holistic view of Security. It then goes on to present Education with a capital E, going into some details on how best the nation can meaningfully invest in a genuine education enterprise, the very striking return of which would be an enhanced national capacity for creating an enabling environment in which Security (in its most comprehensive sense) would thrive.

Four Cardinal Angles of Security-Insecurity

Figure 11.1 below shows that there are political, social, economic and technical bubbles underlying a security challenge situation. A neglect of anyone (and in most cases, a neglect of all or any combination of them) will lead to a condition of bubble burst, as a result of which a society experiences generalised insecurity, as highlighted in the centre circle.

Fig. 11.1: Ramifications of security.

Table 11.1 goes into greater details in explaining the social manifestations of each type of security-insecurity bubble and the ill-effects of allowing each type of bubble to burst on Society. Societies are secure or insecure depending on the extent to which they exhibit the manifestations in Column Two. Secure societies would show much less of these manifestations and would suffer from far less of the ill effects in Column Three.

Table 11.1: Deep Roots of Security-Insecurity: Their Manifestations and Ill-Effects

INSECURITY ROOT	MANIFESTATIONS	ILL EFFECTS
1. Political	i. Over-centralisation ii. Denial of civil rights/liberties/opportunities iii. Disenfranchisement iv. Poor governance v. Policy summersault syndrome vi. Weak political institutions vii. Weak regulatory institutions viii. Cumbersome judicial system	(POLITICAL INSECURITY) • Generalized discontent in Society • Erosion of trust in Government • Zero-level of patriotism • System collapse
2. Economic	i. Weak human resource base ii. Unplanned development iii. Hyperinflation iv. Poor economic policies v. High import dependency vi. Unsustainable national debt profile vii. Neglect of agriculture and industries viii. Poor investment in science, technology and innovation ix. Poor national scientifc and technology base x. Weak industrial base xi. Weak national currency xii. Poor business and investment climate	(ECONOMICAL INSECURITY) • Generalized poverty • Generalized corruption • Brain-brawn drain • Stagnation in economic growth • Generalized unemployment • Low national productivity • Food insecurity • High disease prevalence • Low life expectancy

Table 12.1 contd.

3. Social	• Over population • Social exclusion/segragation • Gender inequality • Poor upward mobility possibilities • Lack of/poor education and skills • Poor social services • Poorly conceived/poorly executed social security policies • Gender inequality • Dis-empowered youth • Weak elite class • Up-side-down societal values • Distrust among communities • Worship of mediocrity • Inappropriate policing • Arms/armunition proliferation • Collapse of traditional and religious norms	(SOCIAL INSECURITY) • Generalized anti-social behaviour • Leadership vacuum in Society • Despondency in the population • Generalized loss of patriotic zeal
4. Technical	i. Rabid infrastructure deficiency ii. Poor communication facilities iii. Low ICT penetration iv. Poor maintenance culture v. Natural disasters vi. Environmental degradation vii. Man-made disasters	(TECHNICAL INSECURITY) • Displacement of populations • Rural de-population • Slow pace of communication • Generalized infrastrure decay

Security should therefore be seen as a state of affairs (a condition, not an event) that can be sytematically cultivated and carefully nurtured and rigorously monitored and manitained. The various bubbles have to be carefully guided and guarded, to ensure that the correct political, social, economic and technical bubbles serve the cause of society. When these bubbles are ignored, misunderstood or neglected, they are bound to burst; in which case they assume the disastrous dimension of generalised insecurity. The flip side (Insecurity) is preventable. It can in fact be nipped in the bud, if

sufficient care is taken to ensure the reign of the right political, economic, social and technical fundamentals.

Education in its Holistic and Inclusive Sense
We are here concerned with the primary focus of Education. It is concerned with trans-generational transmission of cultural heritage. This takes the form of systematically encouraging socially acceptable behaviour, while systematically discouraging behaviour that society considers inacceptable. Education also involves the awakening of individual potentials and talents, to be systematically harnessed for common good. Society is expected to create an enabling environment for Education to thrive. This takes the form of the wide acceptance of cherished values, a recognition and reward system for merit, achievement and the existence of an elite class that leads by example.

Education in its holistic and inclusive sense is therefore a much broader concept than schooling. It is a lfe-long and life-wide process that takes a variety of forms:

- *Incidental education:* occuring through some occasional experience.
- *Informal education:* learning in the normal course of life, adapting to societal norms and practices and undertaking one's social responsibilities.
- *Non-formal education:* organized forms of learning outside the formal system.
- *Formal education:* institution-based, regulated learning certified by recognized examinations and diplomas.

These forms of Education are not mutually exclusive; they are in fact mutually re-inforcing. Informal and non-formal methods can be used to enrich formal education, while formal education does help to codify the fruits of informal and non-formal education.

What is perhaps the most important point here is that education out of school has its basic, secondary tertiary and post tertiary (quartiary) levels. Persons out of school belong to all phases of life (early childhood, childhood, adolescent, young adults, adults, middled aged and old aged). Each phase of life has specific needs

and challenges and resposnsiblities. Everyone needs to keep learning in response to these needs, challenges and responsibilities.

Figure 11.2 below estimates the relative strengths of in-school and out-of-school persons in various life cycles in Society. The summary of it all is that there are more citizens out of school than there are in school and this disproportionality increases as we go from childhood through adolescence to old age. A majority of children and a good proportion of adolescents are in school as a result of universal basic education policies.

Fig. 11.2: In-school/out-of-school learners at different cycles of life.

Persons belonging to the other lifecycles are fewer in the school system. The bulk of them would be learning in life as well as through life. Education therefore becomes both holistic and inclusive when it:

- Caters for both the in-school and out-of-school populations.
- Responds to the needs of every cycle of life.
- Is available to, and accessible by all social and geographical segments of the Nation.
- Is systematically developing talents and harnessing potentials for society's continuous regeneration.

Whatever the level of development of a Society, the security fundamentals outlined in table 11.1 must be right for Education to take place. That is a major reason that investment in Education should be seen as investment in national security.

Investing Education to Enhance Security
We would suggest a ten-point strategy with the following strands, all of which can impact positively one another. The ten steps are not sequential; they are issues to be taken together.

(i)   Like it is with Security, it all begins and ends with Politics
(ii)   Education for All means All in Education and for Education
(iii)   Stimulate Demand for Education and Ensure Adequate Supply to meet the Demand Spending versus Investing in Education
(iv)   Governance as Values Promotion
(v)   Recognizing and Promoting Quality as the real thing in Education
(vi)   Promoting Education for All Talents
(vii)   Investing in Educative Schools
(viii) Investing in the Teacher
(ix)   Invest in sustainable human development in all its ramifications
(x)   Discourage mere spending on Education

(i)   Like it is with Security, it all begins and ends with Politics
Figure 11.1 already shows that a nation's political climate is the prime factor in promoting national security and that a weak national political base is a major trigger of the political bubble burst that can lead to insecurity. It so happens that in matters concerning Education, Politics is the all and end all. This is because as the 'bubbles' in figure 11.3 below show the political directions determine the shape of educational policy, which in turn largely influences educational programmes, which are their turns dictate educational processes in schools and classrooms that consequently condition educational products (outcomes/results).

The chain-type influence of politics on Education is a phenomenon that should not be disregarded in all education development efforts.

Fig. 11.3: The chain-type influence of politics on education.

Politics of deceit is very manifest in matters concerning Education in our society. One illustration of this is the over-emphasis on sheer numbers. Numbers of children in school would be bandied as evidence of improvement in access. The number of schools recently renovated would be bandied as evidence of improvement in education facilities, while the number of teachers recruited would be shown as evidence of improvements in education quality. In most cases, governments boast of their huge financial budgets on Education as evidence of their serious commitment to the development of the sector. Governments that engage in politics of deceit would have to be reminded that

(i)   Children passing through school is not as important as the school passing through the school.
(ii)   Buildings are simple hardware; much more is needed to turn buildings into enablers of teaching and learning.

(iii) It is possible to have an admirable teacher-student ratio in a situation in which we are teaching without teachers.

(iv) The quantum of the education budget should not be our major concern; we should rather address the question: 'where does the money go to?'

These are points that are considered in greater detail in the sections that follow.

(ii) Education for All means All in Education and for Education
The Education Sector has a wide variety of stakeholders. In promoting Education for All, every stakeholder group should be fully involved. Table 11.2 below shows two distinct situations of stakeholder involvement in education policy development. Situation A represents current practice, while Situation B represents the ideal.

Table 11.2: Current and Ideal Stakeholder Representation in Education Policy Development

STAKEHOLDER GROUP		SITUATION A	SITUATION B
a.	Education Ministry Bureaucracy	30	10
b.	Other Government Agencies	25	5
c.	Tertiary Institution	15	5
d.	Professional Groups	10	5
e.	Organized Private Sector	10	10
f.	Labour	2	10
g.	Practising Teachers	2	15
h.	Women groups	2	10
i.	Youth/Student Groups	2	10
j.	traditional/cultural groups and authorities	2	10
k.	small/medium entrepreneurs	0	10
	TOTAL	100	100

The prevailing practice tends to side-track the real need bearers in Education. It produces a phenomenon of *Education for them and not for us.* Reversing the situation requires a paradigm shift to the Situation B level, involving more heavy involvement of the genuine need bearers. It is only then that education policy development can be said to be participatory, thus ensuring that

Education for All comes close to becoming the responsibility of All.

There is however a more important angle to the involvement of the need bearer. Figure 11.4 below shows four distinct phases of an education policy development cycle, characterized by 4Cs:

- C1: Conceptualization: Idea is conceived and freshened up for in-depth examination.
- C2: Consultations: Discussions within a wider group to further articulate the newly conceptualized idea.
- C3: Construction: The idea is put in useable form- a structured policy with component programmes and implementation guidelines.
- C4: Concretisation: Implementation with in-built monitoring and evaluation.

Fig. 11.4: The 4cs of an education policy development cycle.

The current practice is for 'persons up and out there' to take full charge of phase C1 to C3. The genuine need bearers would then be 'sensitized' for the implementation phase (Concretization), but to be excluded from activities related to monitoring and evaluation. When therefore the authorities talk of 'people ownership' of an education policy or programme they are simply perpetuating the culture of politics of deceit. Genuine paradigm shift in this case should therefore go beyond simply the number of participating need bearers to involving the fully right from C1 to C4.

(iii) Stimulate Demand for Education and Ensure Adequate Supply to meet the Demand

Table 11.3 below shows that there could be two major types of obstacles to people benefitting from Education. People have to want Education and wish to have it (the demand side of the issue).

The demand would also have to be met (the supply side). In our own specific setting, there are segments of society in which the major obstacle is on the demand side, as seen in cases of a suspicious dislike for 'western' education and boychild progressive dissatisfaction with schooling, or even of the low preference accorded to technical and vocational education.

Government 'sensitization' strategy to address demand-side issues would have to go from cliché-type rhetoric to addressing the social cultural and socio-economic factors that influence demand. In order ones culturally appropriate policy dialogues involving the genuine need bearers should be one side of the demand stimulation strategy. The other side would be economic empowerment of the people.

Table 11.3: Supply-Side and Demand-Side Obstacles Education

DEMAND	SUPPLY
A. *Socio-Economic Factors* ➢ Poverty ➢ High costs (fees, uniforms, transportation, levies) ➢ High opportunity costs/low rates of returns ➢ Children needed for household/ agricultural/petty trading tasks ➢ Residence in remote, sparsely populated areas ➢ Limited employment opportunities for school leavers	**C. *Political/Institutional Factors*** ➢ Budget constraints ➢ Insufficient public support for the poor ➢ Political instability ➢ Inconsistency in educational policies ➢ Poor quality of educational programmes ➢ Ill-adaptation of educational systems to local learning needs
B. *Cultural Factors* ➢ Parents' low level of education ➢ 'Western' education perceived as incompatible with traditional/ cultural beliefs and practices ➢ Sceptical attitudes towards the benefits and outcomes from education	**D. *Factors Linked to the School*** ➢ Limited school/classroom space ➢ High school fees ➢ School curricula and school organization in conflict with traditional culture ➢ School calendar incompatible with farming cycle ➢ Lack of school canteens or school feeding facilities

Stimulating demand for Education must go along with concrete actions to satisfy the demand actions on the supply side. Here, we must abandon the politics of deceit with its hype on share numbers

and seriously address the political, institutional and school-related factors that ensure that children passing through the school goes together with the school passing through the children.

(iv) Invest in Education; Don't Simply Spend

One striking aspect of the politics of deceit with specific reference to Education is the hype on the huge chunk of national budgets devoted to the sector. The deceit is often acerbated in donor-generated literature on Education that often claims that the bulk of education budget goes to teachers' salaries.

Those who wear the shoe and who know where it pinches, are however aware that what is budgeted does not often represent what is eventually released. To such persons, the budgetary gymnastics illustrated in figure 11.5 below is very familiar story.

In this very typical example, there is a fall of 30% between the funds budgeted and the funds released (assuming timely release) and a further 20% fall between what is released and what is eventually used for the purpose for which it is intended.

Fig. 11.5: Budgeting gymnastics: Sharp difference between approved, released and effectively used budgets.

The 2011 Presidential Task Team on Education makes the following interesting distinctions:

> The APPARENT BUDGET is that which is published and publicized, while the REAL BUDGET is that which is cash backed and effectively released for project/programme implementation. Recent experience points to a progressive lowering of the real budget, in relation to the apparent budget. What is released is such a mismatch with what is budgeted that implementation often becomes extremely difficult[2]

Another dimension of the budget gymnastics relates to the question: Where does the money go to? Table 11.4 presents an ample illustration of a most likely answer to the question.

In Situation A (representing current trends) 55% of the budget is spent on peripheral items, while there are zero allocations to teacher development and expenditure at the school level. To ensure that responding to demands for education entails channelling financial resources to items that do impact positively on quality (i.e., genuinely investing in education rather merely spending) a radical paradigm shift to the Situation B funding model would be necessary .

Table 11.4: Spending on Education versus Investing on Education

	BUDGET ITEM (%)	SITUATION A	SITUATION B
1.	Political appointees in the Ministry of Education	15	05
2.	Administrative and professional departments of the Ministry of Education	15	10
3.	Parastatals of the Ministry of Education	25	10
4.	Teachers' salaries	25	20
5.	Teacher development	0	10
6.	Teaching-learning materials	10	20
7.	Infrastructure	10	15
8.	School-level expenditure	0	10
	TOTAL	100	100

[2] NIGERIA: Federal Ministry of Education (2011): Report of the Presidential Task Team on Education, page 38.

(i) Governance as Values Promotion

The Presidential Task team on Education in Nigeria (already cited) goes into some detail on value crisis in society and the need to re-infuse values into Education in the following words:

> It is generally believed that there has been serious value crisis in Nigeria, due mainly to the clash of cultures borne out of contact with the outside world (a well-known mark of colonisation) and advances in communication, which has exposed Nigerians yet to a variety of popular sub-cultures from different parts of the world.
>
> Nigeria's oil wealth, the effects of the civil war of 1967-1970, the prolonged years of military rule, the generalisation of corrupt practices and other factors have also resulted in the emergence of negative values that tend to accord respect to what you are instead of who you are. The challenge for education and society therefore is to reverse the drift towards negative (unethical) values; to ensure a rapid return to positive (ethical) values – a return to that which society has always treasured and which education is expected to inculcate

Values CAUGHT and TAUGHT

Values can be both caught (imbibed through normal socialisation processes) and taught (acquired through systematic instruction in the course of formal education). For this reason, society has to collaborate with the school (and vice versa) in the inculcation of ethical values in and through Education.

> *Whatever the school promotes must be anchored on the ethical (positive/moral) values of Society – that which society considers of most worth. On the other hand, the efforts of the school in promoting ethical values must be matched and reinforced by ethical values and behaviours in the world outside the school.*

Curriculum content at different levels of education
Ethical values must be built into ALL phases of Education-right from the pre-school phase to beyond the tertiary level. At the earliest phases, they should be EMBEDED into the curriculum; in the intermediate phases, they should be INTEGRATED into existing curricula; at the higher levels, they can be transmitted as CODIFIED knowledge.[3]

Since Values are more CAUGTH than TAUGHT, the role of Society and out-of-school education is crucial. In this case, two main methods can be applied: the explicit-instructional and the implicit-behavioural. The first implies instructing the people on what to do while the second implies showing the people by example what they should do. While we have made some attempts on the explicit-instructional side, we seem to have neglected the implicit-behavioural side. The two sides would have to run along in a complementary manner for sustainable value re-orientation to take place.

This is where leadership by example, leadership that abhors negative values and upholds positive values by word and deed, becomes important.

(ii) Recognizing and Promoting Quality as the real thing in Education
We have earlier said that one striking index of the politics of deceit is the tendency to hype on sheer numbers as evidence of educational achievement by governments. Such numbers often fail to answer the question: what positive impact has the education provided had on the beneficiaries, on the education system and on Society at large, in what specific areas, and to what extent?'

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[3] NIGERIA: Federal Ministry of Education (2011): Report of the Presidential Task Team on Education (op. cit.), page 54.

Education is not provided until quality is assured, and quality is not assured until the system attains the level of *all our children (in fact all our People) learning*. Quality in Education aptly illustrates the saying 'what you sow is what you reap'. The education system therefore has to systematically build in mechanisms for sowing, nurturing and reaping quality, as illustrated in table 11.5 below.

Table 11.5: Sowing, Nurturing and Reaping Quality in Education

INPUTS (sowing)	PROCESSES (nurturing)	OUTCOMES (reaping)
• Politics • Policy • Management • Personnel • Curriculum • Physical Infrastructure • Psycho-social infrastructure • Teaching-Learning facilities • Financial Resources	• Institutional management • Teacher professional support processes • Learner psycho-social support processes • Teaching-learning processes	• Cognitive learning • Life-coping skills • Life-long learning skills • Enhanced potential for positive contribution to society • ULTIMATELY, a self-sustaining educational system and society

As the table shows, a large number of quality inputs (ranging from good politics to quality funding) would have to be fed into the education development process. These inputs would then need quality processing in the form of quality management at the institutional level, along with teacher professional support, learner psycho-social support and quality teaching-learning processes. Quality processing or nurturing of the inputs would most likely lead to the reaping of quality outcomes. Quality outcomes go beyond merely passing prescribed education. It encompasses both cognitive and non-cognitive positive behaviour change as well as life-coping skills and enhanced usefulness of education system and of individuals to the ultimate beneficiary of education---Society at large.

Our prevailing practice is to mistake examination success for educational success and also to expect to reap quality without

sowing and nurturing it. To make that Education really happens in our society, we would need to treat numbers as bare bones and ensure that we systematically ensure quality inputs to be systematically processed to yield quality outcomes that would add genuine blood and flesh to the bare bones.

(iii)   Educating for All Talents
Figure 11.6 below shows that, while there is a generic talent common to all human beings with normal mental states, there are other dominant talents in different groups of men and women. The point here is that Education, to be responsive to a variety of needs in the populace has to address a wide variety of talents.

Fig. 11.6: A variety of talents to be addressed by education.

These talents are manifested everywhere in Society, and as table 11.6 shows, everyone of these talents is of special importance to society and is of practical utility to nation building.

Table 11.6: Manifestations and Social Utility of the Various Talents

TALENT TYPE	BEHAVIOURAL MANIFESTATIONS	SOCIAL UTILITY
i. Conceptual/ Ideational	• Good at generating ideas. • Shines with abstract thinking. • Scientifically inclined.	• Human progress has been driven largely by ideas.
ii. Design/ Construction	• Skilled in turning abstract constructs to concrete technical and social tools. • Enjoy refining and remoulding.	• Inventions, designing and re-designing have always contributed to changing the world.
iii. Manipulative	• Delight in handling of tools and gadgets. • Adept in using the hands.	• Human hands have always helped in harnessing and transforming the works of nature.
iv. Expressive	• Skilled in verbal communication. • Known for persuasive skills. • Public relations expertise. • Outstanding linguistic facility.	• Language distinguishes human kind from all other animals. • Language is our tool for logical thinking, social communication and problem-solving.
v. Socio-centric	• Out-going/extroverted. • Crowd-loving/crowd-pulling. • Never acting alone.	• Man and women are social beings. • Team spirit the in-thing in today's world of work.
vi. Organizational	• Order-prone. • Always ensuring that things work according to plan/that things fit into a mould.	• Order is said to be the first law in heaven. • Management often makes the difference in human affairs.
vii. Contemplative	• Introverted and engaged in deep and critical thinking. • Able to influence by thinking out of the box.	• Out-of-the-box thinking is key to discoveries and inventions. • Creativity helps competitiveness in today's knowledge economy.
viii. Quantitative	• At home with figures, shapes and quantities. • Communicates readily in graphic terms.	• Quantitative reasoning illuminates analytical thought and aids analysis and problem-solving.
ix. Artistic	• Enhanced sensibility to creative endeavours in all forms.	• ART-in all its forms-enliven the soft (human) side of human beings. • ART-its enjoyment and appreciation-brings us closer to the beauty of nature.

Education for All implies that 'All' must benefit, and this should mean carrying all talents on board. The prevailing practice is to a restrictive curriculum that gives prominence to supposedly intellectual talents. What we have failed to recognise is that intellectual talents take a variety of forms, each of which deserves to be cultivated through Education. Our failure to recognize this fact is a major explanation for poor demand for formal education in some segments of society. This is particularly relevant to the 'boy drop-out syndrome' in some parts of Southern Nigeria. It is also relevant to the mass failure phenomenon in the overall examination-dominated education system.

On way of promoting inclusion by educating for all talents is to evolve education policies that lay emphasis on developing all possible varieties of talents through widening the scope of educational provisions. These would take such forms as:

(1) Due emphasis to non-academic activities in schools (drama, physical activities, creative arts, music, manipulative activities, etc.). These do not necessarily constitute subjects on the school time-table; they are more frequently used as strategies for teaching and learning.
(2) Provision of mechanisms for identifying the special talents of every learner.
(3) Provision of 'special teachers' whose task is to cater for the unique talents of every learner.
(4) Provision of out-of-class learning activities centered around clubs and societies, where children can exercise their various talents.
(5) Giving appropriate reinforcement to the exercise of special talents.
(6) Ensuring that every child engages in out -of-class learning activities, to ensure that no potential talent is denied opportunity for expression.
(7) Not encouraging early and narrow specialization in subject choice among students.

The out-of-school sub sector of Education should be a necessary complement here. Values re-orientation programmes that recognise 'non-academic' talents would be the starting point.

(iv) Investing in Educative Schools

The point was made at the beginning of this discussion that buildings alone do not constitute schools. A school comes into existence, and can be an agency of Education only when it comes along with the following five key sets of educative (quality enhancing) features.

(a) Physical/environmental features
- Physical space—attractive and inviting
- adequate space for in-class and out-of class learning activities
- Classrooms with adequate sitting and move around spaces
- Adequate lighting, ventilation and security of classrooms and other teaching-learning spaces
- Classrooms furniture that do not squeeze students

(b) Managerial/organizational features
- Participatory decision-making
- Teacher professional support
- Healthy school-community relationship
- Free information flow
- Team spirit prevailing
- Encouragement of creativity in teachers

(c) Teaching-learning facilities
- quantitatively adequate
- timely/current/up-to-date
- closely linked to curriculum
- instigate intellectual activity in learners and teachers

(d) Learner psycho-social support systems
- Gender responsive practices
- Special needs support services
- Advisory and guidance support services
- Special attention to student learning difficulties
- Practice of empathy (towards learners) by all teachers

(e) Pedagogical Features
- General and professional education of teachers
- Level of experience of teachers
- Level of teacher knowledge of curriculum
- Efforts at continuing professional development by teachers
- Level of creativity in teachers

Whenever these educative features are absent, or are of inappropriate quality and quantity, the school cannot promote education. That is why merely parading renovated (at impossibly high cost) school buildings – without adequate attention to their educative features – is simply a game of politics of deceit. The way forward therefore is to build these educative features into school buildings to ensure that schools became teaching-learning facilities that genuinely educate.

(v)   Investing in the Teacher
The teacher is the manager of learning and cannot be replaced by ICT and any form of gadget yet to be invented by human ingenuity. Investing in the teacher is simply crucial, for any investment in Education to yield the desired dividends. Such investment would need to focus on

- Addressing the issue of social recognition of teachers.
- Ensuring 21st century-compliant curricula for teacher education.
- Ensuring professional support for career-long development of serving teachers.
- Systematically involving teachers in education policy development.
- Ensuring competitive financial remuneration for the Teaching profession.

Addressing the Issue of Social Recognition of Teachers
We must begin by re-affirming that Teaching is a specialized profession and that as ILO and UNESCO stated forcefully way

back in 1966, Teachers should be treated as valued professionals[4]. Teaching must cease to be an all-comers job reserved for those who CANT. It has to be recognised and promoted as the domain of those who can, whoa able, and who are willing (see box one).

Box 1: Who Should Teach?

Selection into teacher education programmes, to ensure that the Nation begins to 'teach with teachers' ought to be based on

- those who CAN (i.e. are capable of responding to general and professional education).
- those who are ABLE (i.e. those who have the standard pre-requisite qualifications – not watered down minimum standards – for entry to tertiary institutions).
- those who are WILLING (i.e persons with aptitude and likeness for teaching). This would require screening processes that involve the admistration of pedagogic aptitude tests, the development of which is itself a major challenge for researchers in the field of teacher education.

Public perception of Teachers is aptly illustrated by a Nigerian scenario, here reproduced as box two. This poor public perception is a consequence of value rot in Society. It is also a result of decades of government progressive downgrading and de-professionalization of Teaching. It can be addressed in four main ways.

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[4] ILO/UNESCO Joint Declaration Concerning the Status of Teachers, 1966.

> *Box 2: Get Out of Teaching and Look for a Job*
>
> - *Suitor's family spokesman*: A-salama-leikun, my people. May I introduce my young man, Ahmadu Tijani. Stand and be seen, Tijani.
> - *Tijan*i (Standing): A-salama-leikun, my elders.
> - *Spokesman*: As you are well aware, we have come to ask for the hands of your daughter, Amina, in marriage.
> - *Amina's Father*: La-kuli-lai! Tijani has grown so big! Looks every inch like his grandfather. What does he do for a living?
> - *Tijani* (timidly) I teach at Government Secondary School, Azare.
> - *Amina's Father:* Huuum! Well, you are from a good family. I'll give you my daughter, but….LISTEN CAREFULLY
>   Promise me that you'll look for a job!

First, Teachers have to exude self-confidence everywhere they go, and should not be ashamed to be teachers. Second, national authorities would need to walk their talk by recognizing deserving teachers for national awards. Third, the National Teacher Education Policy (in the Nigerian case) has to be implemented to the letter. Fourth, the habit of all others first and teachers much later (as currently practised in labour-type negotiations with governments) must give way to the practice of equal attention and equal respect to all professional groups.

Ensuring 21st Century-compliant Curricula for Teacher Education
Knowledge rules the world and it is currently dictating every nation's competitive readiness for the Knowledge Economy. Teachers as knowledge managers will have to remain professionally competitive by possessing Knowledge in all its contemporary ramifications. For this to happen, we must move from the narrow confines of 'subject and method' to a more comprehensive curriculum model that endows the teacher with a 21st century skills package, as illustrated below (see figure 11.7).

The six areas of the skills package require the following of today's teacher:

(1) The education foundation skill of 'learning how to learn'.
(2) A broad general knowledge as foundation on which more specialized learning should be built.
(3) Specific area knowledge, predicated on sound broad based knowledge.
(4) Specialized discipline knowledge, where appropriate.
(5) Knowledge of education and pedagogy principles.
(6) The ability to apply education/pedagogy principles in creative teaching.

Fig. 11.7: 21st Century skills package for teacher education.

Lifelong learning skills are paramount, as they provide the skills for the teacher's continuous development. A broad general knowledge would be needed to ensure versatility and flexibility (including openness to new ideas) in the teacher. Broadfield area knowledge would form the bedrock for more specialisd area study,

to ensure the development of system thinking in the future teacher. Mastery of educational principles and their applications would be predicated on a solid base of lifelong learning skills and would form an integral element of broad-based, general knowledge.

Ensuring Professional Support for Career-long Development of Serving Teachers

Professional support implies a systematic mentoring of practising teachers to identify their professional development needs and responding to them. The response will include a variety of re-skilling and re-tooling activities that should go on a continuous basis, to ensure that teachers are supported and encouraged to pursue career-long learning. Ideally, teacher professional support schemes should have two inter-related dimensions, as follows:

- Career-long: Opportunities to acquire new knowledge, skills and techniques needed for quality on the job performance at every step on the career ladder (e.g. developments in pedagogy, new educational ideas, government policies on education, developments in educational management, evolving curriculum issues, etc.).
- Career-wide: Broadening horizon to keep abreast with global development in issues concerning human develop-ment (e.g. climate change, gender-in-development, HIV/AIDS, etc.); new techniques for acquiring knowledge and assessing information (e.g. ICT).

Table 11.7 below is a framework for teacher professional support that has been built into the implementation guidelines for Nigeria's National Teacher Education Policy and which has been publicised in a recent UNESCO publication on Teachers.[5]

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[5] Obanya, PAI. 2011. Bringing Back the Teacher to the African School, UNESCO/IICBA.

Table 11.7: For each Level of Teacher, a Different Emphasis in Focus of Career-long Education

Career Level	Professional Improvement	Academic Improvement	General Education	Management Related Skills
Interns	⬭	⬭ (large)	⬭	
New Entrants	⬭ (large)		⬭	
Mid-Career Teachers	⬭	⬭	⬭	
Top Career Teachers	⬭	⬭	⬭	⬭
Teachers in Supervisory/ Management Positions		⬭ ⬭		⬭ (large)

The important point about the above framework is that all practising teachers would be continuously learning. The learning will include professional, academic and general education. Most importantly top-career teachers will be exposed to management skills development. The ultimate goal of this is knowledgeable, self-confident and respectable professional teachers – the most valuable input into quality education.

Involving Teachers in Educational Policy Development
We would re-emphasize the points already made earlier in the discussion. First, there must be the participation of teachers in all phases of policy development. They should not be brought in only for sensitization after a policy must have been concocted by non-teachers. Second, practising teachers (who know where the education shoe pinches) would occupy front seats in the education policy development process.

These steps would be recognition of Teachers as the real education sector professionals. They would also likely enhance teacher self-confidence and recognition by wider society.

Competitive Working and Living Conditions for the Teacher
The competitive work culture of today's knowledge economy requires that remunerations for various groups of contributors be competitively priced. For today's teacher, who has to manage knowledge (the raw material for today's economy), a competitive initial and continuing education should be the norm. This should also go along with competitive remunerations, meaning a scale of monetary and in-kind comparability with all other professions. This would be one sure way of attracting knowledge leaders into Teaching and more importantly keeping them permanently devoted to Teaching.

This has been a long time battle that must now be settled once and for all. Government and other employers of teachers just have to stick to mutually-negotiated salaries, incentives and other work-facilitating conditions for teachers. We should also put an end to the attitude of others first, teacher whenever we want to. Perpetuating the current practice of pushing the Teacher to the social backwaters will simply perpetuate a situation in which the progress of education is stunted because the nation is teaching without teacher.

Investing in Sustainable Human Development in all its Ramifications
What the introductory part of this discussion tried to prove is that deteriorations in the human condition are the surest breeding ground for Insecurity. Education is being suggested as an antidote to Insecurity, as Education is concerned with nurturing human potentials for continuous regeneration of Society, thereby contributing to ameliorating the human condition and enhancing Security.

Sustainable Human Development is concerned with the profoundly human (as opposed to the strictly technical/financial) dimensions of human achievement. The annual ranking of countries on HDI (Human Development Index) by UNDP is now part of development literature and a whistle blowing instrument to national authorities.

One way in which sustainable human development has been drummed into world development agenda has been through the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted by the United

Nations in the year 2000. Its progress within UN Member States has been systematically monitored and as its d-date (2015) approaches, serious thought is being given internationally to a post-2015 world. The MDGs are:

(1)   To halve the proportion of people living on less than $1 a day.
(2)   To halve the proportion of people suffering from hunger.
(3)   To halve the proportion of people without access to safe water.
(4)   To enrol all children in primary school, and achieve universal completion of primary schooling.
(5)   To empower women and eliminate gender disparities in primary schooling.
(6)   To reduce maternal mortality by three-quarters.
(7)   To reduce under-five mortality rate by two-thirds.
(8)   To halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS.
(9)   To provide access for all who want reproductive health services.
(10) To implement national strategies for sustainable development to reverse the loss of environmental resources.

Fig. 11.8: Estimated contribution of education to the MDGs.

It so happens that developments in every other sector do impact positively on Education, while Education is the very foundation for the development of every other sector. That in fact explains why Education should be the very priority of priorities in all societal development endeavours. That is also why we have come to the conclusion that ALL MDGs ARE EDUCATION SECTOR MDGS. We have in the course of our work in several countries attempt to compute the contribution of Education to all other MDGs and have arrived at the situation summarized in figure 11.8.

A vigorous pursuit of the MDGs is therefore a contribution to promoting Education in the comprehensive sense expatiated upon early in this discussion. Above everything else, promoting sustainable human development in all its ramifications is a direct attack on threats to deterioration of the human condition, and therefore a means of enhancing national security.

Conclusions
Security depends on political, social, economic and technical fundamentals in Society being what they should be – maintaining a state of responsiveness to the human condition. Disruptions in any of the fundamentals progressively develop bubbles that can always burst to create unbearable conditions for human life, threats in various forms to individual and collective life- a state of Insecurity.

Insecurity can be nipped in the bud if the enabling conditions are created for the promotion of sustainable development, as embodied in the Millennium Development Goals. Education, seen it the holistic sense described in this discussion, emphasizing the ten-point strategy on which we have already elaborated upon, is an investment in sustainable human development, and in the final analysis an investment in national security. Any continued neglect of, or inattention to the real issues in Education would amount to sowing the seeds for the eventual bursting of the political, economic, social and technical bubbles that trigger off Insecurity. For this reason, let every nation invest in Education for Society to be for ever secure.

Finally, to paraphrase UNESCO (1948) 'since the seeds of insecurity are sown in the minds of Men, it is in the minds of Men (and Women) that the foundation for Security should be built'. Education addresses the minds of Men. Therefore, let every nation of the world genuinely promote Education, the surest way to invest in national Security.

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UNESCO. 1948. The Charter talks of 'building peace in the minds on men' but today's slogan of the Organization has adopted the more gender-friendly formulation of *Building Peace in the minds of Men and Women*

12

The Imperative of Up-Grading National Laws, Investigative and Law Enforcement Processes to Combat Contemporary Spiritual Threats to Human and National Security

Osisioma B.C. Nwolise

Introduction

The most outstanding obligation of any government worth defending anywhere in the world, is security. The other important obligation of welfare of the people comes secondary because the nation and citizens must survive before any thoughts, plans, policies, programmes, and actions about welfare. As this author has noted elsewhere, "the security of a person, identity group, nation or the world is not only a sacred and strategic value, it is the utmost value" (Nwolise, as cited in Albert 2009: 257). This is so because as Zabadi (2001: 1) rightly observed: "Unless one can be assured of his physical security or safety, everything else will be meaningless".

It is in the same vein that Adam Smith (in Whynes 1979: 1) the legendary father of Economics insisted in the 18th century, that the provision of security from the tax payers' money is "the first duty of the sovereign". Section 14(2b) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria brings the idea home where it provided that "the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government".

Just as Ujomu (2003: 242) informs us that security is not only about survival, but that "there is also the focus on the attainment of peace and progress of individuals, groups and the society", the late sage, Chief Obafemi Awolowo (1967) long recognized the fact that the security and welfare of the people do not begin and end with the physical realm. They are also spiritual and a leader should pursue not only physical but also spiritual well-being of the people. In his words:

> The aim of a leader should be the welfare of the people whom he leads. I have used 'welfare' to denote physical, mental, and spiritual well-being of the people.

All over the world, governments pursue the security of the people and the state through mainly the making of relevant laws, establishment of (defence and) security agencies to enforce laws, investigate crimes and prosecute offenders in combating crime, and the protection of lives, rights and properties of citizens. In these processes, they combat the various threats to human and national security. These threats are not only physical, they are also spiritual. But the main threats that are well known to government and the people are the physical threats to human and national security such as:

(i) ***Natural disasters:*** Flood, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tornadoes, hurricanes, gas emissions from lakes and wells, thunder strikes, tsunamis, ship wrecks etc.

(ii) ***Violent conflicts:*** World wars, international wars, civil wars, terrorism, communal conflicts, chieftaincy riots, ethnic conflicts, religious conflicts, insurgencies, etc.

(iii) ***Man-made disasters:*** fire, planecrashes, train crashes, road accidents, etc.

(iv) ***Violent crimes:*** armed robbery, kidnapping, cross-border crimes, etc.

Unfortunately today, there is a great problem – the government is not focusing attention on the spiritual threats to human and national security. Yet, these spiritual threats are becoming not only very serious on a daily basis, they are also multiplying in number. A few practical experiences of the people will suffice here.

(i) On September 26, 2016, the Police at Abeokuta, Ogun State, on a tip-off stormed a shrine inside a dense bush in Okuku village where kidnapped people were hypnotised, raped, dispossessed of their belongings and

butchered for rituals. The Police found assorted charms, fake United States dollars, and fake Nigerian naira currencies at the shrine also (Monitored on NTA, Sept 27, 2016).

(ii)   In the Central Region of Ghana, in 2012, a 60-year old woman delivered a giant rat at the Twelve Apostles Church. She had planned to transfer the rat into her sister's womb (through embracing her) because she (sister) insulted her during a quarrel. Jerry Arthur, a Municipal Assembly man told Adom Television in Ghana that the community was protecting the rat "for fear that if they killed it, the 60-year old suspected witch would die" (*Daily Trust* 2012: 41).

(iii)   In Zambia, Burundi, Tanzania and some other East African nations, albinos have become endangered species because their body parts are used for rituals, goodluck charms, etc. In Nigeria, it is people with hunchback that are at risk. The Tanzania Albino Society raised alarm in 2008 that 35 albinos were murdered for limbs, hair, and organs used by native doctors to made potions. Body parts of an albino sold for $1000. It is ground into powder for making amulets performing different spiritual roles (*The Economist* 2009; Maduagwu 2010: 25).

(iv)   In December 2013, five men in an Akwa Ibom community confessed to being wizards, and that they had killed many people in their community. Due to the confession, six other men and women billed for death by January 2014 became free (*Saturday Sun* 2014: 12).

(v)   In Mozambique, in 1989, a man named Vasco Frashisco was killed by one Abel to enhance financial returns from his grinding mill. The secret leaked when spiritual investigations were carried over the mysterious death of fifteen People in Abel's family (Endtime No. 3, undated).

(vi)   In 2012, 150 gold miners died in a village in Ghana along River Pra. Out of these, only 17 bodies were recovered and buried. The angry ghosts of the rest 133 dead miners harassed and sacked the villagers shouting "We are cold" (Africa Investigates 2012). The villagers relocated out of the village for safety.

(vii)   In Liberia, hundreds of people have been killed by greedy and desperate politicians who use human organs, bodies, parts, or whole human beings for election-enhancing rituals. President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf issued several warnings against the practice known as "gboyo" (see Maduagwu 2010). Earlier Presidents had approved the execution of politicians found guilty of "gboyo".

(viii) To many people, the ceaseless travails of the Jews of Israel have their roots to the curse they placed on themselves during the trial of Jesus Christ. Pilate had washed his hands saying: "I have no part in the death of this innocent man, it concerns you only. And the whole people answered, His blood be upon us, and upon our children." With this, Pilate set Barnabas free, scourged Jesus and handed him over to them to crucify (Mathew 27: 24-26).

(ix)   The sudden death of a successful construction company driver called Konany Abel of Tarly village in Cameroon in 1996 was traced to witchcraft by three different delegations. Strategic Spiritual Intelligence revealed the names of the 10 culprits led by a man called Baka. The 10 men were banished from the village (Albert 2005).

(x)   One Mrs. Grace Okoh, 43 years of age, had her pregnancy tied for 6 years before the child was born. Right from the beginning of the pregnancy in 2001, she was having nightmares seeing a particular woman with blood stains in her mouth always appearing in her

dream telling her "You will not give birth to this child" (The Westerner 2007: 28).

(xi)   In August 2016, one Lawrence Okoh was lured from Port Harcourt to Warri by a business associate, and killed for rituals (*Sunday Tribune* 2016: 6). His body parts were cut away especially his vital organs.

(xii)   Over the Ondo State Governorship election of November 2016, the Secretariat of the All Progressives' Party (APC) was sealed off with juju which was placed in front of the locked gate. Nobody could enter the Secretariat, including the Police personnel. Spiritualists had to be called in to ward-off the evil spirits before the gate was opened (*Nigerian Tribune* 2016: 1).

(xiii)   On August 24, 2016, the Kwara State Police Command arrested and paraded two persons in Ilorin hawking human heads. The Commissioner of Police, Mr. Olusola Amore told newsmen that the men had taken the human heads to an Alhaji to buy, but he refused and raised the alarm. They had killed the deceased and dumped their headless bodies in the bush (*Nigerian Tribune* 2016: 35).

(xiv)   On September 6, 2016, the Police arrested a herbalist (Tunde Banjo) and a Muslim cleric (Nurudeen Adeniyi) who allegedly murdered a 16 year old girl (Olayinka) at Ijebu-Igbo in Ogun State, and severed her breasts for rituals. Two fresh human hearts were also recovered from them. The girl's body was dumped in Ogbere River (*New Telegraph* 2016: 9).

The objective of this discourse is to examine contemporary increasing spiritual threats to human and national security in Nigeria, and interrogate the imperative and strategies of up-grading national laws, as well as investigative and enforcement processes to enhance human and national security.

The rationale for thinking aloud on this topic at this point of Nigeria's history is not far-fetched. First, the national laws, investigative and enforcement processes of a nation are supposed to grow with the crimes and criminal tendencies of the nation in order to ensure the rule of law, enhance human and national security, and to ensure that the citizens continue to live in civilized environment, in peace, comfort and safely. In contemporary Nigeria, there are colonial laws even in the pursuit of criminal prosecution that need to be upgraded. For example, in Nigeria, there is punishment against the rape we all know which is about raw physical sexual pleasure of a depraved man. But there is no law, and punishment against ritual rape. Also, the investigative process and capacity of the Police have not been up-graded to meet the new type of rape which is for rejuvenating the expiring life of an old man, or for money rituals.

Also, kidnapping began in the Niger Delta region as a way of calling the attention of the Federal government and the world to the lack of development, and related injustices being suffered by the people of the region. From this political motive, the kidnapping moved to the South East for commercial (money making) purposes. As this pecuniary purpose spread to other parts of Nigeria, the ritual dimension emerged. People are now kidnapped for human parts used in money rituals, and electoral gladiation (power and influence). People are also kidnapped to oil the organ transplant industry of Europe, for meat ball factories or prostitution.

Again, we all know of the usual Yahoo processes that involve 419 and advance fee fraud. But a new spiritual dimension has come in now known as Yahoo-plus. This involves the use of hypnotism (juju) to effect command and control of victims at the other end of the internet who are defrauded or controlled spiritually to a place and killed.

These new spiritual dimensions of old physical crimes require new legislations for punishment, and new investigative techniques. For example in the case of ritual rape, the old practice is to arrest the man, charge him to court for enjoying a woman's body without her consent. He may be sentenced where found guilty to some

years of imprisonment. This is justice for the victim even where no compensation or restitution has been made. It is a different thing in ritual rape. If the man is merely sent to prison, the girl may die while the man in prison. Then the man completes his prison terms, and comes out to enjoy his blood money. Therefore new investigative technique by the Police and new punishment by the courts are needed to ensure justice for the victim and her family.

Second, the Nigerian state is not even recognising and reacting to existing spiritual threats to human and national security unlike countries like Tanzania, and Liberia. In Tanzania for example, where, as stated earlier albinos are murdered for rituals, the government nominates an albino to represent the endangered group (albinos) in the country's parliament. Also, there is death penalty for whoever kills an albino, and native doctors are screened, registered, licenced, and re-orientated against such evil acts. Offending members are tried, convicted and hanged by the state.

Third, today, spiritual attacks are used to eliminate security forces, and the Nigerian state has no answer for this newly emerging trend. An example will suffice here. In May 2013, over 70 Nigerian security personnel from the Nigeria Police Force and Department of State Security died at Alakyo, Nassarawa State during their mission to arrest the Chief priest of the Ombatse deity, Baba AlaAgu. Up till now (2016), nobody has told the nation what killed the 70 security personnel. The Federal Government that they served never did any inquiries into their death and no explanation was given. The Chief Priest of the deity when asked on African Independent Television (AIT) what happened to the 70 personnel said he thinks it is spirit that killed them and burnt their vehicles. There was no physical attack.

Fourth, many of the accidents that occur on the highways of the nation are not ordinary-they are spiritually caused by witches and wizards that are hungry to drink blood, or by angry roving or static spirits, especially spirits of citizens who died in accidents. There was a case in which an insider of the dark world explained how they cause accidents on Highways (*Sunday Sun* 2007). But the scientifically minded have no time for such things which they

regard as superstition. Yet hundreds of people die daily in accidents on our highways, some in mysterious circumstances.

Fifth there is need to raise awareness about the increasing intrusion of spiritual threats to human and national security to stimulate necessary individual and collective responses.

Sixth, as noted elsewhere by this author, the nation today is confronted by new crimes with Spiritual roots. These include: Ritual rape, Ritual murder, Hypnotism (which occurs in one-chance buses in Lagos, and in Micra taxis in Ibadan), Oath-based kidnapping, Oath-based forced marriages, spell-based sexual assaults, Yahoo-plus activities and cyber-crimes, controlled prostitution based on death oath or death spell, cult related murders, spiritually induced crimes and actions (Nwolise 2016: 4; 2015: 2) etc. The government and its security agents have to stand-up to these new crimes with spiritual roots in other to discharge government's security obligations to the citizens. Denying their existence or pretending that these do not occur is great disservice to the Nigerian nation and humanity. Science or no Science, there is a body of overwhelming evidence of their occurrence.

Seventh, people should stop shying away from issues concerning spiritual threats to human and national security and mobilize to confront them squarely to save lives and protect human rights: As this author has asserted elsewhere:

> There is so much havoc going on in the spiritual realm of human and national security today that there is every urgent need for governmental and societal attention to be focused on that realm to save lives, protect human rights, and national values and to enhance human and national security. There is nothing happening in the physical world today that is not happening in the spiritual world – rape, bombing, robbery, kidnapping, hostage taking, food poisoning, ambushing, imprisonment, murder, torture, conspiracy, politics, accidents, maiming, and others (Nwolise 2012: 6).

Eighth, marriages are crashing daily due to one form of spiritual crime or the other. These crashing marriages spill children of broken homes into the streets to worsen the insecurity in the nation. These children easily become recruited into the fold of cultists, armed robbers, kidnappers, terrorists, and insurgents. For example, the 16 year old marriage between Funmilayo Adedeji and Emma Adedeji was dissolved in September 2016 on ground of spiritual insecurity. The wife (Funmilayo) accused the husband of using their son for money rituals, hence the man started showing signs of affluence when their son was born – a 12 year old boy cannot walk, talk (*Saturday Tribune* 2016: 17).

Ninth, criminals and violent persons of various forms today acquire and apply spiritual powers, much of them diabolical, in contemporary society and these endanger human and national security. For example, the story recently hit the headlines of Nigerian newspapers of one Agwaza in Benue State, who was acclaimed to have magical powers of appearing and disappearing, and of being impenetrable by bullets, matches, arrows, etc. These powers were said to have been bequeathed to him by his father who was known by the locals as a very powerful native doctor before he died. He has been hired by several groups for gun fights in Cameroon (seven times), and Niger Republic (eleven times). His supernatural powers stem from a shrine situated on top of a rock at the fringes of his village (Gbise). These supernatural powers have made it impossible for him to be arrested and reigned in by security agents, including the military, which has raided his village, and "reduced all his property including the clinic and school built, for the community to rubbles (*Sunday Sun* 2016: 6). His shrine and father's house were also destroyed by the military "in an attack described by locals as vicious" (*Sunday Sun* 2016: 7). These attacks came after a period of love lust between him and the Benue State government which had earlier granted him amnesty over alleged crimes of armed robbery, kidnapping, murder and rustling of 3000 cattle. The bubble burst because it was suspected that Agwaza was involved in the murder of the Security aide of the present Governor of Benue State. Writing about Agwaza, a newspaper correspondent noted:

> He reigned for about a decade in Benue and its neighbouring states as the most dreaded king of the underworld with a spirit image in the mould of the legendary Robin Hood. Within this period, he held the state and its environs by the jugular in his macabre display of professional dexterity, allegedly robbing, maiming and spilling blood alongside members of his gang with glee (*Sunday Sun* 2016: 6).

The point being raised here is that Agwaza was able to do all these due to the possession of spiritual (Supernatural) powers that are deployed destructively rather than positively to threaten human and national security. His violent activities in Niger, Cameroon etc impacted on Nigeria's national image negatively apart from the killings and other cross-border illegalities and criminalities. Before the case of Agwaza came up, Abia State and its environs had suffered seriously from the violent and criminal activities of Obioma Nwankwo (a.k.a Osisikankwu), who also acquired and applied supernatural powers. He boasted of his invincibility as he and his gang terrorized people, robbing, raping and kidnapping. Forgetting that he was a mere mortal, he boasted that no man born of woman could kill him. It took a fierce military operation to bring his reign of terror to an end; and because of the high level of his atrocities, his corpse was paraded round Umuahia, and even to the Governor's office to assure the Governor and people that he was really dead (*Saturday Sun* 2016: 12).

On June 19, 2016, the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps discovered in Dikwa LGA, the spiritual book named *Guduma* used by the *Boko Haram* as "a powerful charm" deployed in the North East terror war. Part of its function is "to indoctrinate followers into submission to the dictates of leader of the sect" (Muhammadu 2017: 10). No doubt the evil book is instrument of hypnotism and spiritual warfare and could be used against national troops in various ways.

Tenth, the courts need to wake up and get ready to take on spiritual crimes. With increasing socio-economic hardship in the land, there is bound to be more spiritual threats to human and national security. The courts are to suggest new laws and

investigative processes that will enable them try spiritual crimes. Ritual murder is far more a crime than ordinary murder cases the society and courts are used to. Ritual murder involves often the decapitation of the victim's body severing the head and vital organs and throwing the carcass into river or bush without a befitting burial. The result is that the ghost or spirit of the victim becomes a restive and roaming agent of destruction in search of justice in the society. In August 2016, one Mr. Lawrence Okoh was lured from Port Harcourt to Warri by a business associate who killed him and removed some body parts for rituals (*Sunday Tribune* 2016: 6). Again, in September 2016, ritualists and traffickers abducted 45 children in Delta and Anambra States. Irate youths destroyed the shops of the leader of the ritualists known as Madam Cash in Asaba (*New Telegraph* 2016: 1). Thus, the punishment for ritual murder must be more severe than that for ordinary murder by an angry or aggrieved person. In the same vein, ritual rape is far more than ordinary rape by a depraved man in search of raw sexual pleasure. Ritual rape will lead to the eventual death of the female victim after a long tortuous period of suffering. Some ritual rapes involve caging the spirit of the dead female to be "vomiting" money for the rapist. Again, the society therefore requires new laws to punish ritual rapists. Also, the investigating law enforcement officers require new knowledge, training, skills, and new techniques to find out when a rape is ritualistic.

Eleventh, the Police need to rise to the challenge of spiritual crimes, and upgrade their investigative capacities, competencies, and skills. The Police personnel need to be educated and retrained as they require new knowledge and new skills to handle spiritual cases. For example, in 2013, five men in Akwa Ibom State mentioned earlier confessed being wizards. The youths took them to a Police station, but the Police told them that they (Police) do not want to be involved in spiritual matters (*Saturday Sun* 2014: 12). This marks the act of cowardice, incompetencies, ignorance and derelection of duty on the part of the Police. In a situation where the lives of over five citizens were on the line, it was inhuman, unprofessional, and unpatriotic for the Police to

have developed lilly-liver and abandoned their core duty of protecting the lives and property of Nigerians. But the Police can be forgiven here, as the state has not trained them to handle spiritual matters!

Twelveth, cult wars are decimating Nigerians and destroying properties all over the country. Several universities and secondary schools are facing the menace of cult groups, today which are based on spiritualism. Several states of the federation today experience mini-wars between and among cult groups, during which innocent citizens are killed and properties worth millions of naira destroyed especially in Anambra, Imo, Lagos, Rivers, and Bayelsa States. For example, the Lagos State Police Command on August 24 2016, paraded a 29 year old self-confessed leader of a cult group, Mr. Ibrahim Balogun (a.k.a. Small Jpron) who allegedly killed five persons, during cult-wars. He had in January 2016 set a house ablase in Bariga, Lagos, in which a 65 year old woman was burnt alive to death. Small Jpron had joined the *Eiye* confraternity in 2009 to revenge against the *Aye* cult group that murdered his friend, Sunday Folorunsho (a.k.a Small Biscuits). The Lagos State Commissioner of Police, Mr. Fatai Owoseni said that Small Jpron had been declared wanted by the Police for multiple murder cases (*The Punch* 2016: 4). In June 2017, a deadly cult group called Badoo hit the air waves in Lagos. It was specialised in wiping out families, smashing their victim's heads with heavy stones, and wiping their blood with white handkerchief sold at ₦500,000 each. In July 2017, another cult group hit the air waves in the north by the name "Sarasuka."

Thirteenth, people are manipulated spiritually to commit crimes and do evil things they would not have done. For example, the wife of a man in the University of Ibadan was sent by her husband with his ATM Card to go to his bank and withdraw ₦20,000 for family needs. As the wife entered a Micra taxi, a co-passenger touched her body with a white handkerchief, and she lost her senses. She was spiritually controlled to a bank at Yemetu instead of her husband's bank at Agbowo near the University. At the Yemetu bank, she withdrew over ₦100,000 which she handed

over to the criminals. It took 72 hours of spiritual cleansing to get her back to normal on her return home. Again, the *Nigerian Tribune* reported the case of a Police man who was detailed to protect a female Local Government Chairperson. One day, as the boss came out of a thanksgiving church service and entered her car, the Police man meant to protect her turned his gun and fired several bullets into the woman he was supposed to protect. On questioning, he said he did not know the spirit that overwhelmed him telling him "shoot her, shoot her" (*Nigerian Tribune* 2016).

There was also the case of a 22 year old Tanko Abdullateef, a security guard, who killed his female boss MS Mabel Okafor that employed him to protect her and her house in Lagos. When arrested in his village in Taraba State where he ran to after the murder and asked what offence her boss committed against him, he told the Police that she did nothing wrong. He felt a spiritual influence on him that moved him to commit the murder. In his words:

> Wallahi, my boss didn't offend me; it was the devil that pushed me into such action. At the time she called me, I had a knife in my hand to cut onions and pepper to prepare my dinner, and as she opened her door and gave the instruction (to trim flower branches), I just felt a spirit pass through my body. The next was that I stabbed her and I found her on the floor… I can say that as this (killing) happened, it was the devil that got into me, because I never believed that I could kill a human being (*Saturday Tribune* 2016: 8).

There was the case in Lagos several years ago, of a woman who spent eight years seeking the fruit of the womb. She eventually had a baby boy. When the boy was two years old, she placed him and three other children of her neighbours into a drum in the compound, poured fuel on them, and set them ablase. They all burnt to death. By the time she regained self-consciousness, she fainted screaming, and asking how she could have killed a child

she spent 8 years seeking! People need to be aware that these things happen, and get prepared. This is the essence of, or rationale for this modest piece.

Conceptual Discourse

Four concepts germane to this chapter's discourse are worth defining, to ensure a common understanding of the words and better appreciation of the contents of this chapter. These are: National Security, Human Security, Spiritual Security, and Spiritual Threat. The four concepts are defined one after the other in that order.

National Security

Security is commonly understood in terms of safety – especially physical safety. In the literature of Strategic Studies, security is often used interchangeably with national security. Throughout the cold war era, (1945-1989), national security was perceived and practised in terms of state security achieved through militarism- that is, safety of the state based on the establishment of massive military weapons and large size of military personnel. This perception propelled the production of all forms of missiles and nuclear warheads, as well as the US programmes on star wars. Some dictators even equated national security with regime security. Hence within that period, scholars like Lippman (cited in Imobighe 1998: 14) asserted, that national "security rises and falls with the ability of a nation to deter an attack or defeat it". Morgenthau (1960) also saw national security from the prism of maintaining or protecting the integrity of the national territory and its institutions, while Bellamy held that national security is "the relative freedom from war, coupled with a relative high expectation that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that should occur" (cited in Buzan 1991: 17). All these are conceptions of national security seen from the angle of militarism.

However, such conception ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union (a super power of the period) in 1991 without any war. The final "death" blow against the militaristic conception of

national security came with the humiliation of the United States (the second super power) on September 11, 2001, when a handful of angry and unarmed Arab boys hijacked a fully loaded civilian passenger planes inside the country, and used them as "missiles" to destroy the twin towers of the World Trade Centre, in New York, and part of the Pentagon in Washington DC.

These two events brought a rethinking in the world about the concept of national security. The view of McNamara (1968: 149) now had meaning to the effect that:

> Security is not military hardware, though it may include it; security is not a military force, though it may involve it; security is not traditional military activity, though it may encompass it. Security is development, and without development there can be no security.

McNamara went further to add that:

> Any society that seeks to achieve adequate military security against the background of acute food shortages, population explosion, low level of productivity and per capta in come, low technological development, inadequate and inefficient public utilities, and chronic problem of unemployment, has a false sense of security.

These and similar views generated transformations in ideas which expanded the conception of national security vertically to now accommodate individual, group, state, and international security. The conception also expanded horizontally to accommodate five new dimensions – Political, Military, Economic, Societal, and Environmental Security as reviewed by (Buzan). Nwolise (in Albert 2009) expanded the dimensions to fifteen, by adding ten (10) new dimensions to Buzan's five. These ten are: Physical, Psychological, Technological, Image, Territorial, Legal, Treasury, People's Power, Global, and Spiritual security. These fresh views

and similar views all over the world gave rise to the concept of Human security, which focuses security thinking on human beings instead of the state, (governments), or mere territory.

Human Security
The concept of human security emanated from the efforts of the United Nations which set out to refocus humanity's thoughts on security away from abstract state security to the security of the people or human beings within the state. Fired by works such as that of (Berneth) who asserted that security rests on the welfare of the people, the United Nations Commission on Human Security held in 2004 that human security seeks to "protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedom and human fulfillment" (UNCHS 2014). Thus Hubert defined human security as meaning:

> … safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats. It is a condition or state of being characterized by freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety or even their lives… It is an alternative way of seeing the world, taking people as its point of reference, rather than focusing exclusively on the security of territory or government (Hubert)

It is the view of this author (Nwolise) however that the focus of security thinking and practice on physical security alone does not give the total security architecture of any human being or nation. It does not enable the total understanding, study, prediction and control of the security of any human being or nation. A human being who cannot sleep at night due to harassment by witches/wizards or juju men cannot be said to be secure, especially where his blood is being drained by same forces. A woman who is carrying a pregnancy for 3 years instead of the normal 9 months as a result of witchcraft or juju manipulation cannot be said to be secure. Just as a human being can be cursed or spiritually programmed to behave abnormally, a nation can suffer the same

fate because the nation is made up by individuals, and also led or ruled by individuals.

Spiritual Threat
A threat can be regarded as any object, utterance, attitude, or action that endangers a person, group, state, or the world. Thus, a spiritual threat is any object, utterance, attitude, or action from the spiritual realm that endangers a person, group, state, the world or any associated property.

Spiritual Security
As this author has observed elsewhere:

> Spiritual security has to do with the safety, peace, development, welfare and happiness of the human spirit… Spiritual security concerns keeping the citizens close to God who is the Supreme Being and protector… The spiritual dimension directs the attitude moral values, and actions of people towards the generally accepted areas (Nwolise, as cited in Albert 2009).

When a person is spiritually vulnerable (unsafe) he or she can be manipulated by stronger, spiritual forces to do anything good or bad. He or she can even be killed through witchcraft or juju. His career can be terminated or stagnated. He or she can be hypnotised and kidnapped, robbed, or raped.

Spiritual Threats to Human and National Security
The following are spiritual threats or sources of spiritual threats to human and national security:

- (i)   Wrath of God.
- (ii)   Wrath of local deities, especially man-made ones.
- (iii)   Aggressive juju (charms).
- (iv)   Aggressive witchcraft.
- (v)   Curses.
- (vi)   Spells.

(vii)   Oath-taking or oath-breaking.

(viii) Merchantile native doctors, especially the greedy ones who misuse their spiritual powers and empower other people to do same.

(ix)   Possessed plants, animals, clinics, eateries, and blood test laboratories.

(x)   Aggressive ghosts and ancestral spirits.

(xi)   Bewitched or charmed objects such as chairs, vehicles, needles etc.

(xii)   Spiritual covenants.

(xiii) Desperate and greedy wealth or political power seekers, as well as husband/wife snatchers.

(xiv)   Secret societies and cult groups.

(xv)   Familiar spirits – "Ogbanje" ("abiku"), spirit husband, spirit wife.

(xvi)   Static or roving spirits.

(xvii) Hypnotism.

(xviii) Sexual indiscipline – leading to guming of man and woman committing adultery, or death of man (in Yorubaland one who climbs a married woman laced with "magun" ("magun" means "don't climb").

(xix)   Blood transfusion involving the blood of a person that has made incisions that keep some spirits dwelling in his/her blood.

(xx)   Ritual rape.

(xxi)   Ritual murder.

(xxii) Spiritual poisons especially those delivered through dreams (Nwolise).

I have been asked severally whether a nation can be spiritually threatened or spiritually insecure; and my answer has always been a loud Yes! How is this possible" This can be in four main ways:

(a)   With contemporary conception of national security to incorporate human security or the security of citizens, when a citizen is threatened or killed, the nation becomes

insecure. Thus, when a citizen is spiritually threatened or killed, the nation is spiritually insecure because as noted earlier, a nation is paramountly made up of human beings. Territory, government and sovereignty which are the elements of the state will be useless without the human beings.

(b)   When government personnel are spiritually threatened or attacked, or initiated into secret cults or shrines of local deities, the nation becomes spiritually insecure. The political leaders of many countries belong to secret societies. Samuel Doe of Liberia and his Ministers for example were initiated into the cult of the *Nya-gbe-a-weh* deity whose shrine was located at the Gede Mountains of Liberia. Doe himself was a member of the free Mason. This meant in a way that the citizens and Liberian state were subjected to dictates of the shrine.

(c)   A nation can be spiritually captured, cursed or punished. Sodom and Gomorrah got into too much atrocities and attracted the wrath of God. It is believed by many today that the endless travails of the state of Israel as mentioned earlier is the product of the curse brought upon the nation by the forefathers who had insisted that Pilate condemn Jesus Christ, and that the blood of Jesus should be on their heads and heads of their children. In the case of Liberia mentioned above, apart from the initiation of President Doe into the cult of the *Nya-gbe-a-weh* deity of the Krahn ethnic group, as the 7th Priest, the critical national symbols of Liberia (National Flag, Constitution, and Coat of Arms, etc.), were buried in the shrine. This implies that Liberia was run as dictated from the shrine. The Chief Priest of the deity, Blahyi, known as General Butt-naked during the Liberian Civil War had seven supernatural powers including the power to appear and disappear, to bear the magical cutlass of war, and to be impenetrable against bullets. In the bid to reinforce these powers, he killed several people especially children

during the war, for which he had to apologise profusely to the Liberian people and seek their forgiveness at the end of the war.

(d) Corruption and blood spilling reduce a nation's spiritual standing. Each innocent person killed in any nation by defence and security personnel, criminals, avoidable socio-economic hardship (especially hunger and avoidable road accidents disease) curses the nation and fights the society in his own way. Thus, when politicians and public officers steal public money meant for roads, hospitals, agriculture, pension, salaries, gratuities, job creation, etc, they bring curses upon themselves, their children and children's children, and the nation!

The Imperative and Strategies to Up-Grade National Laws, and Investigative Processes

Even though we have enumerated several sources of spiritual threats to human and national security in this discourse, our main concern is the spiritual threats coming from citizens, and how these can be appropriately prevented, investigated, and punished. It is not only imperative but also very urgent that the national laws, investigative processes and punishment for spiritual crimes be upgraded now. The reasons are not far-fetched:

(i) To ensure that investigation processes of law enforcement agencies are at par or ahead of spiritual crimes and crime syndicates such as the Yahoo-plus boys using juju, or hypnotism to effect command and control of their victims.
(ii) For justice to be surely and adequately done to victims of spiritual aggression and their families.
(iii) To maximize the spiritual and physical security of citizens.
(iv) To ensure that national laws are adjusted to be in tune with newly emerging spiritual crimes such as ritual rape, ritual murder, Yahoo-plus, etc.

(v)   To ensure that the judges have modern laws to punish spiritual crimes.

The Strategies for the upgrading include:

(a)   Massive public education, enlightenment and mobilization about newly-emerging spiritual threats, crimes, and crime syndicates:

(b)   The making of new laws incorporating new severe punishments for these new spiritual crimes: This will arm court judges with appropriate punishments for each of the new spiritual threats. For example, whereas ordinary rape attracted few years' prison terms, ritual rape should attract life imprisonment or capital punishment. Also whereas ordinary 419 (Yahoo) attracted refund of money and or some years jail term, ritualized yahoo (Yahoo plus) should carry life imprisonment.

(c)   The Police needs retraining to build their investigative capacities and competencies. Because of the emergence of ritual rape for example, the motive for every rape now must be established. This is because merely sentencing a ritual rapist to jail does not give justice to the victim and her family. In fact, the girl or woman will die while the rapist is in jail, but he will come out at the end of his prison term to enjoy his blood money. But if the Police is able to establish the motive of the rape as ritual (for money), the rapist will be forced to reverse certain ritual processes to save or free the victim before his trial and imprisonment. Where no other investigative process yields the desired result, the Police has to apply Strategic Spiritual Intelligence (SSI) which I have discussed severally elsewhere (Nwolise 2009, 2012, 2015, 2016).

The motive of every kidnapping must also be quickly established these days, as one kidnapping can be for any if these motives: pecuniary ransom, ritual murder, human organs harvest for the organs transplant industry of Europe, controlled prostitution abroad, slave labour, etc. SSI is also relevant here.

(d)   The courts have to enforce the new laws made to combat spiritual threats and spiritual crimes.

(e)   The members of the Civil Defence need to now comb all bushes and forests in Nigeria for shrines and factories where innocent people are kept, butchered for human spare parts or rituals, and or prepared into meat balls sold to unsuspecting people to eat. This requires providing them with helicopters for surveillance or their working with the Nigeria Air Force, and Nigeria Police for aerial surveillance. Any building located in a suspicious bush or forest area must be searched. There have been revelations by people who were kidnapped or abducted through micra taxis in Ibadan or one-chance buses in Lagos of how they found themselves in tick forests and either escaped or were released because their "heads" were too strong or not feasible for the operations of their abductors. In these forests are factories in which human flesh are grinded to make meat balls. Human body parts are also sold there.

Conclusion

Whoever continues to deny the existence of spiritual threats, crimes or criminal syndicates simply because Science in its dogmatism cannot prove these things is doing serious harm to citizens and society. Even though such people and groups are entitled to their opinions and right to free speech, they, themselves constitute security risks to people and the nation, as they scream superstition, while hundreds of human beings die daily all over the world as a result of spiritual aggression.

During my Inaugural lecture at the University of Ibadan in 2014, I suggested the establishment of a Department of Spiritual Studies, as a nucleus for a future Faculty of Spiritual Sciences. Some people laughed it off. They thought how can Science study spiritual things? This can be done if only Science can humble itself, and reduce its pompous posturing as regards what it can't see, touch, smell or measure. Today, a South African University is recruiting witches and wizards from all over the world for the take-off of a Department for the study of Witchcraft in 2018. They hope that with serious research on witchcraft, they can reduce traffic

jam, as well as drastically cut-down fuel importation, as people can fly in the air to work, market, and for long distance travels. Some European nations' companies are now researching on motor-bags (travelling bags that can run on motor ways). Thus, in the next few years, a person who wants to travel a short distance will no longer use his car or go to Motor Park to board a vehicle. All he or she will do is to sit on his bag, turn a switch, and the bag carries him or her on the tarred road to his destination. Thus, South Africa is preparing to research on travelling by air not in airplanes but on mat, broom, or even car without fuel. These are nations that have respect for knowledge and research, unlike in Nigeria. It is a pity. Until our political leaders begin to value knowledge and research, and have respect for and use educated people, this country can't see any meaningful progress. No nation develops with governance based on sentiments, emotions, and common sense, instead of on knowledge, research, skills and expertize.

I strongly believe that spiritual crimes and aggression will continue to increase as long as they have commenced. It behoves on the state to prepare its law enforcement agents and its laws to be ahead of the spiritual criminals and aggressions in order to be on top of the situation, in pursuit of its primary obligation of meeting the security and welfare of the people. In this direction, I also strongly believe that just as intelligence is the heart of security, Strategic Spiritual Intelligence is the intelligence strategy for combating spiritual insecurity and maximization of human and national security in this 21st century and beyond.

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